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ARISTOTLE'S FEELING FOR DEVELOPMENT IN PHILOSOPHY

JOSEPH T. CLARK, S.J.

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NOTES AND DISCUSSION

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JOSEPH T. CLARK, S.J.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In his monumental and interesting and provocative volume, in which he attempts by an analysis of world civilizations to diagnose, like some cosmic physician of cultures, the fatal ills of the Western world, Oswald Spengler says:

> In the world-consciousness of the Hellenes all experience, not merely the personal but the common past, was immediately transmuted into a timeless, immobile, mythically-fashioned background for the particular momentary present . . . the Classical culture possessed no memory.[1]

This statement, however, does not refer to the absence in Greek thought

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[1] *The Decline of the West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 8. Permission to quote from this book has kindly been granted by the publisher.

of what moderns have come to call "the historical sense."[2] For Spengler thus amplifies his previous remarks:

> The memory of the Classical man—so to call it, though it is somewhat arbitrary to apply to alien souls a notion derived from our own—is something different, since past and future, as arraying perspectives in the working consciousness, are absent and the "pure Present", which so often roused Goethe's admiration in every product of the classical life and in sculpture particularly, fills that life with an intensity that to us is perfectly unknown.[3]

Without attempting to controvert the value of this insight in the field of aesthetic appreciation of Greek plastic art or dramatic form, may one not question the validity of its general application to all manifestations of Greek life and thought? Is the lack of a feeling for continuity in the development of thought and cultural tradition in general as universal among the Hellenes as Spengler claims? One instantly recalls, for example, some such passage as the following:

> We must not disregard the question whether we should hold that there is one substance of this kind or more than one, and if more than one, how many; we must review [μεμνῆσθαι] the pronouncements of other thinkers and show that with regard to the number of substances they have stated nothing that can be clearly formulated.[4]

Is not this to possess a conscious memory of the past and to have a very clear recollection of its content as a *tradition* on some particular topic of philosophic interest? Perhaps Spengler intends to exclude the particular genius of Aristotle from his otherwise universal summary. Such an explicit omission would at least evade the problem that arises in this instance. Yet Spengler appears to have Aristotle also in mind. For he proceeds to say within the same context, "The one and only evolution-idea that is timeless, ahistoric, is Aristotle's entelechy."[5] Is not this to credit Aristotle on the one hand with a recognition of individual organic development through successive

---

[2]That is indeed truly absent in the ancient historians and freely admitted by classical scholars. See, for example, Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1939) I, 13: ". . . the classical period when the historical sense was not yet developed . . ."

[3]*Op. cit.*, p. 9.

[4]Aristotle *Metaphysics* Λ 1073a14-16. For convenience here and throughout my article I am quoting from the Loeb edition of Aristotle, making an occasional minor change in the translation (Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, with an English trans. by Hugh Tredennick [2 vols., "Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1936]). Permission to quote from this work has kindly been granted by the publisher.

[5]*Op. cit.*, p. 15.

stages of growth in time and yet to empty that concept of all historical character?

But is this true? Did not Aristotle expressly realize that there was a philosophical tradition and that he was himself a part of it? Did he not appreciate the fact that specific problems had a history and that they appeared before the mind bathed in the lights and the shadows of the past? It is at least the mature interpretation of one classicist that

> Aristotle was the first scholar to set up along with his philosophy a conception of his own position in history . . . He was the inventor of the notion of intellectual development in time, and regards even his own achievement as the result of an evolution dependent solely on its own law. Everywhere in his exposition he makes his own ideas appear as the direct consequences of his criticism of his predecessors.[6]

These contradictory judgments of Spengler and Jaeger constitute a problem in the accurate appreciation of Aristotle's thought and in the general interpretation of the Greek spirit. Since the point is of particular importance in the history of philosophy and Aristotelian scholarship, it may not be without value to examine what evidence there may be in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to establish whether or not he possessed a feeling for development in philosophic thought.

THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

It would of course be a mistake to expect a completely finished and formal statement on this question in the *Metaphysics*. For although in these pages one may uncover evidence for a definitive reply, one cannot say that Aristotle anticipated this inquiry to the letter and gave it an explicit and final answer. Nor would it, on the contrary, be accurate to conclude that because the assertions relevant to this topic in the *Metaphysics* are only random and fragmentary, Aristotle did *not* possess this feeling for development. For it is impossible to regard the present *Metaphysics* as a single and continuous work, com-

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[6]Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), p. 3. Compare also the remarks of Robert Adamson (*The Development of Greek Philosophy* [London: Blackwood & Sons, 1908], p. 1): "Greek Philosophy forms a continuous development. The Aristotelian system is based on and complementary to the Platonic both in its general character and in its treatment of special problems. The Platonic system, in its turn, can be understood only as carrying out tendencies which had found expression in earlier thought. The interest of these earlier thinkers is not merely historical. *They exhibit philosophy in the making*" (italics mine).

pleted in strict accordance with a carefully predesigned plan. The various books of the *Metaphysics,* although amalgamated under one broad perspective, are more like heterogeneous and relatively independent monographs, later strung together without too close attention to time of composition or continuity of theme.

Everywhere the reader experiences Aristotle's own realization of the tentative and exploratory character of his researches. He says, for example, "We have stated the nature of *the science which we are seeking* [τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης] and what is the object which *our search* [τὴν ζήτησιν] *and our whole investigation* [τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον] must attain" (A 983a23-24). For his philosophy is a relentless and progressive search for the truth and an adventure of a persistent mind in quest of reality. Aristotle is always conscious of a trial of effort in the attempted solution of a problem. "We are *trying* [πειρώμεθα] to determine the nature of sensible substance" (Z 1037a14). Many of his conclusions furthermore are not proposed as definitive solutions beyond all further possibilities of revision. "With regard, then, to definitions by division, let this suffice as *a preliminary statement* [τὴν πρώτην] of their nature" (Z 1038a35). And even when he appears to have discovered the answer, he is not satisfied with its formulation and therefore resumes the investigation afresh in order to state it "more clearly [σαφέστερον]" (Z 1035b4).[7] Such, then, is the unfinished and tentative character of the evidence in the *Metaphysics.* But is it not more valuable in a study of this kind precisely because of its fluid, progressive character, disclosing the traces of long periods of development in Aristotle's thought? Excerpts from the *Metaphysics* will not reveal a static cross section of Aristotle's mind. Such passages will rather afford the larger perspectives through time, provided by a horizontal cut. Whatever the random evidence of the *Metaphysics* consistently displays may, I submit, safely be regarded as constant and typical of the various phases of Aristotle's thought.

THE FACT OF TRADITION

It would appear that Aristotle recognized in general terms an absolute and first origin of philosophy and a process of gradual development through small successive stages. For he says:

[7]On the whole question of the time and order of composition of the different parts of the *Metaphysics* see Jaeger, *op. cit.,* pp. 167-227, and W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), I, xiii-xxxiii.

> It is through wonder that men begin now and *originally began* [τὸ πρῶτον ἔρξαντο] to philosophize; wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then *by gradual progression* [κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προιόντες] raising questions about the greater matters too (A 982b12-15).

This development, moreover, seems to be a process of increasing clarification by which the real outlines of the problem come into proper focus and thus accelerate the advance toward a final solution. For in the perspectives afforded him by his subsequent position in time, Aristotle can see clearly that it was after the now familiar set of causes that the first philosophers were "groping uncertainly [ἀμυδρῶς . . . θιγγανόντες]" (A 988a24). In the beginning of interpretative thought, conceptions are hazy, and even the most careful expressions reflect this lack of precision. The causes, for example, were

> only vaguely [ἀμυδρῶς] conceived; and although in one sense they have all been stated before, in another they have not been stated at all. For the earliest philosophy [ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία] speaks falteringly [ψελλιζομένη] as it were, on all subjects: being new [νέα] and in its infancy [κατ' ἀρχάς] (A 993a11-15).

But it must not be supposed that these initial efforts are altogether without permanent results. For each new stage in the development is not a completely fresh start. Every growing generation of thinkers carries on its shoulders the contributions of its predecessors and transports them into the future. For the discovery of wisdom is not to be considered the prerogative of any one individual. Truth is a common objective and its acquisition is a social achievement.

> The study of truth is in one sense difficult, in another easy. This is shown by the fact that whereas no one person can obtain an adequate grasp of it, we cannot all[8] fail in the attempt; each thinker makes some statement about the natural world, and as an individual [καθ' ἕνα] contributes little or nothing [μηθὲν ἢ μικρόν] to the inquiry; but a combine of all conjectures [ἐκ πάντων] results in something considerable [τι μέγεθος] (a 993a31-993b4).

Nor is it correct to exclude as worthless and irrelevant the opinions of those philosophers whose sincere but unsuccessful inquiries merely scratched the surface of the profound problems revealed by experience. They, too, have helped to erect the edifice of tradition and to sharpen the wits of its heirs.

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[8] I follow Bekker here. Hermann Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphysica* (Bonnae: Ad. Marcus, 1848), reads πάντως.

> It is only fair [δίκαιον] to be grateful not only to those whose views we can share but also to those who have expressed rather superficial opinions [τοῖς ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφηναμένοις].[9] They too have contributed something; by their preliminary work they have formed our mental experience. If there had been no Timotheus, we should not possess much of our music; and if there had been no Phrynis, there would have been no Timotheus. It is just the same in the case of those who have theorized about reality; we have derived certain views from some of them, and they in turn were indebted to others (a 993b12-19).[10]

This progressive development, furthermore, coextensive with the generations of men, appears somehow to be almost an automatic process whereby those later in time are also *eo ipso* the wiser in knowledge. It is as if time itself were the teacher of the ages. For Aristotle refers to the earlier thinkers as οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ πρότερον (B 1002a9) and to their successors as οἱ δ' ὕστερον καὶ σοφώτεροι τούτων (B 1002a11), almost as if they were σοφώτεροι because οἱ ὕστερον.

This progress furthermore appears to have no ultimate term at present discernible in the vision of man. At least this series of more and more perfect approximations seems to be true of man's persistent and perpetual quest for the answers to some of the more perplexing problems. Aristotle does recognize clearly at least one question "which was raised long ago, is still, and always will be, and which always baffles us [καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον]—'What is Being?' " (Z 1028b2).[11] Have we not here the picture of a stream of historical thought, arising at some point in the dim and distant past, flowing without interruption down the winding

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[9]I prefer here the translation of Hermann Bonitz (*Aristoteles Metaphysik* [Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1890], p. 31): ". . . deren Lehren sich mehr *auf der Oberfläche* gehalten haben" (italics mine).

[10]St. Thomas comments on this passage thus: "Ostendit quomodo se homines ad invicem adiuvant ad considerandum veritatem. Adiuvatur enim unus ab altero ad considerationem veritatis dupliciter. Uno modo directe. Alio modo indirecte. Directe quidem iuvatur ab his qui veritatem invenerunt; quia, sicut dictum est, dum unusquisque praecedentium aliquid de veritate invenit, simul in unum collectum, posteriores introducit ad magnam veritatis cognitionem. Indirecte vero, inquantum priores errantes circa veritatem exercitii occasionem dederunt, ut diligenti discussione habita, veritas limpidius appareret" (*In II Metaphys.*, lect. 1 [ed. M. R. Cathala, O. P. (Turin: Marietti, 1950) no. 287]).

[11]It seems to me that Alexander's paraphrase misses this important projection into the future. He reduces Aristotle's remarks merely to a generalized comment on the past. See Michael Hayduck (ed.), *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1891), p. 461: ". . . τὸ πάλαι μὲν καὶ ἀεὶ ὑπὸ τε τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ζητούμενον καὶ ἀπορούμενον."

course of the ages, gathering volume and force and form at every turn of time, and leading on always more closely to the ocean shores of truth, without, however, the certain promise of altogether mingling with its clear blue waters within the vision of contemporary man? And is not this to have an alert and conscious memory of the past? Is not this to sense beneath the individual idiosyncrasies of philosophers and their thoughts a larger human wisdom that pulses and grows?

There is, however, appended to this general view of Aristotle an incidental and hypothetical detail which it is difficult to interpret in its own context and more difficult still to harmonize smoothly and satisfactorily with what Aristotle says elsewhere in clear terms.

> A tradition has been handed down by the ancient thinkers of very early times and bequeathed to posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the Divine pervades the whole of nature. The rest of their tradition has been added later in a mythological form to influence the vulgar and as a constitutional and utilitarian expedient; they say that these gods are human in shape or are like certain other animals, and make other statements consequent upon and similar to those which we have mentioned. Now if we separate these statements and accept only the first, that they supposed the primary substances to be gods, we must regard it as an inspired saying; and reflect that *whereas every art and every philosophy has probably been repeatedly developed to the utmost and has perished again* [κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἑκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων] these beliefs of theirs have been preserved as a relic of former knowledge. To this extent only, then, are the views of our forefathers and of the earliest thinkers [τῶν πρώτων] intelligible to us (Λ 1074b1-15).[12]

It is obvious, however, that Aristotle regards this theory of cyclic recurrence merely as a probable [κατὰ τὸ εἰκός] explanation of an anthropological problem, the exact nature of which is not, I submit, too definitely described in the context.[13]

Is this cycle eternal in duration or is it a periodic fluctuation between fixed limits? Did it in fact have an *initial* origin? Bonitz seems to incline to the latter view:

> It is not to be wondered at that Aristotle takes no account of the mythological wrappings which covered the popular worship of the gods . . . yet he is of the opinion that in the most

[12]This same theory of cycles reappears in *De Caelo* i. 270b19, *De Meteorologia* i. 339b27, and in the *Politeia* vii. 1329b25. But no other details are introduced that might light up obscurities in this passage.

[13]The crux of the matter is, I think, the correct meaning of πολλάκις.

> ancient traditions he has discovered the *first vestiges of the truth* which both in these matters and in others has *frequently* been discovered by men and in turn lost.[14]

Does not this imply that if one were to retrace the sine curve of thought's history through all its maximum and minimum points, one would ultimately arrive at what Bonitz terms the "prima vestigia veritatis"? This interpretation, if true, would lead us to revise our previous conclusions about Aristotle's sense of the development of philosophy in such a way as to consider such growth not as a single, rectilinear process, coextensive with the irreversible forward thrust of time, but as a recurrent pattern that reappears and reproduces itself in the many constructive periods of history.

St. Thomas, however, whose disagreement with Aristotle on the problem of the eternal existence of the world may have made him peculiarly sensitive on the point, here understands Aristotle to mean consistently with that position an *eternal* cycle of growth and decay in the body of human knowledge. He judges that Aristotle was led to espouse this cyclic theory in order to avoid conflict with his companion thesis.

> . . . and it was necessary for Aristotle to hold this that the eternity of the world might be maintained. For it was evident that at a certain definite time men began to philosophize and to discover the arts. But *it does not seem reasonable that for an infinite period of time* the human race was without them. *And so he says* that philosophy and the other arts were *often* discovered and lost, and that the opinions of those ancient writers were preserved up to now, like relics.[15]

And it is, I think, correct to say that whenever in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle considers the growth of philosophy *as known to history*, either in written records or oral tradition, he speaks as though there were

---

[14]"Nihil mirum quod Ar[istoteles] fabularum involucra, quibus obtectus est vulgaris deorum cultus, nihil curat . . . atque idem tamen in antiquissimis opinionibus *prima* sibi videtur invenisse *vestigia veritatis*, quae et his et aliis in rebus *saepius* apud homines inventa sit ac vicissim interierit" (*Aristotelis Metaphysica*, II, 514 [italics mine]).

[15]". . . et hoc necessarium fuit ponere Aristoteli ut possit salvari aeternitatem mundi. Manifestum enim erat quod a quodam certo tempore inceperant homines philosophari et artes invenire. *Inconveniens autem videbatur quod infinito tempore* fuisset absque his humanum genus. *Et ideo dicit* quod philosophiae et aliae artes fuerunt *multoties* inventae et corruptae et quod opiniones illorum antiquorum quasi reliquiae salvantur usque nunc" (*In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 10, Cath. 2598 [italics mine]). Cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 130: ". . . not merely once or twice, but *indefinitely often*" (italics mine).

an *absolute* origin of philosophic thought.[16] This conclusion is reenforced by an analysis of what one might call Aristotle's underlying conception of the "psychological development" of the common problems and their gradual clarification. Contemporary philosophy, he suggests, could be traced in a logical way step by step back through preceding ideas which recede, like the series of integers, to an initial *first* unit. It may therefore be true that Aristotle adopted a cyclic theory for some such extrinsic reasons as St. Thomas suggests. But in either case Aristotle's feeling for development in the history of thought is clear. At the moment it is irrelevant whether or not, and for what reasons, that development must be considered as not rectilinear but cyclic. As far as the evidence from the *Metaphysics* is concerned, Aristotle is at least acutely conscious of development in his own recorded time.

THE MOLDERS OF TRADITION

It would, however, be a mistake so to regard the progress of development as to exclude from the tradition those thinkers who were not successful in their attempted solution of problems. It is true that progress is an advance toward truth. But the men who have aided that advance are not only those whose names are forever associated with the discovery of some fragment of truth, but also those whose reflections—inadequate or not—directed them in their successful quest. So Aristotle determines to "consider at length what contributions valuable or otherwise [καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς],[17] they make to the inquiry which is now before us" (A 989b28-29). In fact, one may recognize as a source of the dynamic energy that sustains the perpetual movement of traditional thought even the restless dissatisfaction that accompanies frequent and certain decisions of practical experience, which are, however, devoid of all conscious realization of the why and the wherefore. For

> as it seems, all men form unqualified judgments, if not about all things, at least about what is better or worse. And if they do this by guesswork and without knowledge [μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντες], they should be all the more eager for truth; just as a sick man should be more eager for health than a healthy man; for indeed the man who guesses, as contrasted with him who knows, is not in a healthy relation to the truth (Γ 1008b25-30).

[16] See the passages quoted in this study: A982b12-15, A988a24, A993a11-15.

[17] I much prefer the translation of Bonitz, *Aristoteles Metaphysik*, p. 22: ". . . was sie denn *richtiges und was unrichtiges* für unsere gegenwärtige Untersuchung bringen" (italics mine).

It is apparent, then, how wide the scope of tradition is and how many the minds whose inquiries make and mold it.

But not every self-appointed philosopher really philosophizes. Not every author of a world theory is automatically qualified for admission as a member of the confraternity of thinkers who advance the march of human thought. There are some who, despite all pretensions and claims, do not belong to authentic historical tradition. And these are they who ignore or transcend the limits of reason and seek theories and formulae for understanding the universe elsewhere. These are they who cloud the issues by introducing hypotheses that depend for their validity on some gnostic legend or mystic experience impervious to rational analysis. By deserting reason for some blind emotional guide, they have forfeited their right even to respectful consideration.

> It is not worthwhile to consider seriously the subtleties of mythologists [τῶν μυθικῶς σοφιζομένων]; we must rather ascertain by cross-examining those who offer demonstration of their statements [τῶν δι' ἀποδείξεως λεγόντων] why exactly things which are derived from the same principles are some of an eternal nature and some perishable. . . . (B 1000a19-21).

For the tradition by which thought develops is unequivocally a *rational* tradition. This may not be to deny all value to whatever noble moral impulses may be derived from mystic experience and legendary creeds; but it is to reaffirm with vigor that the authentic growth of philosophy is the product of rational, logical thinking. This tradition is a monument to mind.

So true is this that one must also refuse to consider seriously those who, although pretending to consecrate all their energies to a rational solution of problems, nevertheless decline to control their researches and check their conclusions by the correct rules of logic. If it is a mistake to abandon reason and embrace mysticism in the quest of truth, it is no less an error to attempt to use reason and at the same time abuse it by failure to conform to its intrinsic laws of correct procedure. Despite his deep respect, therefore, for other minds, Aristotle does not delay to assert,

> As for the attempts of some of those who discuss how the truth should be received, they are due to lack of training in logic [δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν]; for they should understand these things before they approach their task, and not investigate while they are still learning [μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν] . . . (Γ 1005b3-4).

There is, in short, a certain minimum of technical competence required before one can expect to have his ideas regarded with respect and influence in professional circles. And those who thus presume to

have discovered the replies to world questions before they have been trained to realize what logical form and structure the true answer must possess really deserve the brief mention tradition gives to their declarations. For the mind cannot hope to progress by being untrue to itself. This procedure really impedes advance. For it sidetracks discussion into deceptive detours that always come abruptly to a dead end. Such, for example, assume absolutely nothing and obstinately require that every statement should be strictly demonstrated. This is because they lack training in logic, "for it shows lack of education not to know of what we should require proof, and of what we should not" (Γ 1006a6-7). It is obvious that discussion under these conditions "is pointless [περὶ οὐθενός]" (Γ 1008a30); there is "no arguing [οὐκ ἔστι λόγος] with people of this kind" (K 1063b13).

Although a certain minimum, therefore, of logical competence is necessary before one may be accepted as a genuine contributor to philosophic tradition, an excess of glib facility in this craft can quickly degenerate into sheer verbalism and engender sophistical displays that disgrace and dissipate the native energies of intelligence. One must therefore distinguish clearly two classes of participants in the historical discussions of philosophy: *the sincere* [οἱ ταῦτα πεπεισμένοι] who are interiorly convinced of the opinions which they propose or of the difficulties which they raise, and *the contentious* [οἱ τοὺς λόγους μόνον λέγοντες] who mouth words which really do not reflect their true mind on the matter (Γ 1011a4, 5). Such persons engage in controversy "not from a sense of difficulty [μὴ δι' ἀπορίαν] but for argument's sake [λόγου χάριν]" (Γ 1011b1). It is from them that one may expect devious demonstrations that are "fictitious [πλασματῶδες]" (M 1082b3). And Aristotle adds, in order to avoid all ambiguity, "by fictitious I mean 'dragged in to support a hypothesis' [τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν βεβιασμένον]" (M 1082b4). And this counterfeit interest disposes them also to "swallow down [ἀποτρώγουσιν]" (B 1001a2), as if they were as trifling as their own syllogisms, real and solid objections against an unacceptable position. In fact, although logic is necessary to clarify and recognize truth, too much of it in the mouths of dilettantes can fog the atmosphere and conceal where the solution to a problem really lies. Tradition honors sincere logical thinkers and repudiates alike the premature pronouncements of the uneducated as well as the vain quibbles of the frivolous dialectician. For the quest of truth is a serious business.

THE STATUS OF TRADITION

It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that when the field has been cleared of legend, nonsense, and irresponsible quibbles, there remains in solitary splendor only an untarnished monolith of truth. Not at all. At any stage in the process, true tradition on any single point is liable to be regretfully incomplete. For there may be a genuine difficulty "as serious as any, which has been left out of account both by present thinkers and by their predecessors" (B 1000a5-6). Circumstances change, and the experiences of a later generation of philosophers may disclose problems and difficulties which their predecessors could not or did not discern in the context of their own times. But even when the real and relevant issues of the question have long since been recognized and discussed, one is very apt to discover that the total results of tradition are confused and inconclusive. In each case one "must consider, then, with regard to these matters, which of the views is right and which wrong [καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς]" (Z 1028b27). For the heirs may be able to detect flaws and structural defects in the arguments or entire systems of interpretation which time bequeaths.

But it is most important to remember that real gems of truth may be hidden in the depths and the debris of partial error. And it is part of authentic tradition to separate carefully these fragments of truth from their context of mistakes. Tradition is thus very tolerant and very generous because it is anxious not to abandon whatever parcels of truth have been discovered either in content or in philosophic method. One must therefore recognize that "the exponents of the Forms are partly right in their account when they make the Forms separate; that is, if the Forms are substances, but they are also partly wrong, since by Form they mean the 'one-over-many'" (Z 1040b25-30).[18] Definite progress has been made when it is clearly established just where the difficulty lies. To ferret out and apprehend error is the first step in the process of expelling it. This conciliatory spirit requires, of course, an intelligent and understanding sympathy with all the sincere elements in the mixed heritage of truth and error. One must, for example, be able to recognize how it happened that "he who first assumed that there are Ideas, and that the Ideas are numbers, and that the objects of mathematics exist, *naturally* separated

[18]Cf. *Metaphysics* M 1086a12-15. Note too the significant comment of Werner Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 12: "[Aristotle] never for a moment imagined that in describing the logical and ontological difficulties of Plato's theory he had disposed either of its historical significance or of the absolute value of its contents."

them [εὐλόγως]" (M 1086a11-12). Even when the portion of truth, enveloped within deep layers of serious error, is pitiably small and only analogical at that, it is truth; and it is a part of tradition to recognize and accept it as it is. Thus one must be broad enough to see that

> there is a sense, however, in which these thinkers make it clear that goodness is predicable of numbers, and that the odd, the straight, the equal-by-equal, and the powers of certain numbers, belong to the series of the beautiful. For the seasons are connected with a certain kind of number; and the other examples which they adduce from mathematical theorems all have the same force. Hence they would seem to be mere coincidences, for they are all accidental; but all the examples are appropriate to each other, and they are one by analogy . . . (N 1093b11-19).

Only by such unfeigned sympathy can the smallest strands of truth be preserved and woven in their proper place and relative importance into the seamless fabric of philosophic thought.

Still, even when tradition is free from all obvious error and is clear on a point, it may be inconclusive. The truth toward which the past progressed may now be in sight, but the decisive arguments for its acceptance may still be missing or poorly fashioned. In such cases the ascendant opinion certainly recommends itself to the inquiring mind. But tradition hands it on punctuated—not with a period, but with a suspended question mark. The true philosopher accepts it as it is; and if, despite his own efforts, he fails to improve the situation by deciding the issue, he transmits the remaining problem in the same tentative expression. He should recognize that the truth of the matter is gradually coming into certain focus and not hesitate to say, when doubt still remains, "What is the formal cause? The essence. What is the final cause? The end. But perhaps [ἴσως] both of these are the same" (H 1044b1). And even in attempting to discern the all-important reasons why certain philosophers expressed this or that theory, one may discover that tradition can only suggest several motives but does not decide the problem. In one instance, for example, "it seems probable that it arose in some cases from the doctrine of the natural philosophers, and in others from the fact that everyone does not form the same opinion about the same things" (K 1062b22-24).

When, moreover, one is conscious of the development of ideas and aware of his own part in the process, one will not be impatient to attain to a quick certitude prematurely but will remain content to make the most of what tradition provides and what the present can contribute toward a final solution of the question. The true method of advancement, therefore, is by sympathetic and painstaking comparison

of alternative opinions and the application of what one might call "the principle of least complications." For "we must not fail to observe how many impossibilities and absurdities are involved by other theories, and what views the more enlightened thinkers hold, and what views entail the fewest difficulties [ἐλάχισται ἀπορίαι]" (Λ 1075a26). Nor is it consistent with tradition to allow the moral value or the systematic importance of any tenet to be substituted as evidence for its truth. Even when, at some stage in the historical process of clarification, great strides forward are made and the obscurities of centuries are suddenly dissipated by a flash of genius, conservative respect for tradition advises cautious conclusions strictly proportional to the evidence on hand. Hence, authentic philosophy, conscious of growth, may impartially conclude a very creditable presentation of its position with the modest remark that "it is probably true [εὔλογον ἀληθές] to say that the first principle is of this nature" (N 1091b20).

It must not be supposed, however, that tradition is nothing but a random texture of vague and inconclusive hypotheses that are neither true nor demonstrably false, but whose real identity is unknown. For truth is clearly attainable with conclusive evidence worthy of full and firm assent. For it is impossible that philosophy should forever remain suspended between two inaccessible poles. One must agree that on some points there is confident assurance.

> There is a principle in existing things about which we cannot make a mistake; of which, on the contrary, we must always realize the truth—viz., that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, nor admit of any other similar pair of opposites (K 1061b34-1062a1).[19]

But one may object with some specious show of force that this routine observation is common to all sane minds and of only trivial importance in comparison with the real unsolved problems of philosophy. It does at least indicate, though, that it *is* possible to achieve certain truth. And this is reason enough to continue the search.

It sometimes happens that tradition can only affirm without doubt that a particular theory is wrong; as, for example, to say "that all things are substances is wrong [ψεῦδος]" (K 1060b5). But in such cases it is really unorganized certitudes about aspects of the truth which finally convince the mind of the error in the opposite opinion. Thus, "it has been clearly demonstrated [δέδεικται δὲ καὶ δεδήλωται] that no one generates or creates the Form" (H 1043b15). Tradition may also be able to distinguish in matters of very involved logical

[19]Cf. *Metaphysics* Γ 1005b24.

complexity that when the mind "combines the predicates in one way, it is right [ἀληθεύει], when in the other, it is wrong [ψεύδεται]" (Γ 1012a4). Even when truth and error differ from each other only by a hair's breadth, thought may be keen enough to discern clearly the small but important difference. At all events, when truth is discovered, full and clear, the discoverer is bound by the canons of intellectual conscience to recognize and accept it as such. He should not therefore fear to close his exposition of it with the courageous comment that "we have now stated the truth [τὸ ἀληθές]" (Z 1035b4).

THE FUNCTION OF TRADITION

But even when it is granted that truth may be attained by the human intellect and certainly acknowledged as such, surely it is obvious that at any stage in the developmental process the percentage of such ascertained certitudes is in inverse ratio to the amount of unsettled problems. And it may honestly be asked how such a tradition, long since molded in great part by men who failed to find the truth and retaining still in large segments their ambiguous and inconclusive hypotheses, can really be of service to a perplexed posterity. It can first of all be a very valuable point of departure. For each new mind in every generation can resume the uncompleted search, fortified and encouraged and enlightened by the rich experience of the past. We

> must avail ourselves of the evidence of those who before us have approached the investigation of reality and philosophized about Truth. For clearly they too recognized certain principles and causes, and so it will be of some assistance to our inquiry at present if we study their teaching; because we shall either discover some other kind of cause, or have more confidence in those we have just described (A 983b1-7).

But in order to employ to the most profitable advantage the results of tradition, one must feel obliged in conscience to ascertain as accurately as possible the faithful echo of its genuine views. It is not enough to be satisfied with any mere verbal clichés lifted out of their original context and bandied about as a true summary of ideas. For words and formulae can change their significance with the lapse of time and the vicissitudes of use. We must inquire both "what it is that they [the thinkers] hold and in what sense they hold it [τί λέγουσι καὶ πῶς λέγουσιν]" (M 1086a29). It is not, however, always necessary, in order to achieve this accurate understanding, to review every letter of every syllable in every record of philosophical tradition. No matter how ideally desirable that perfection of knowl-

edge may be, it is surely impracticable and unnecessary. For even when we have given

> only a concise and summary account [συντόμως . . . καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς] of those thinkers who have expressed views about the causes and reality, and of their doctrines; nevertheless we have learned thus much: that not one of those who discuss principle or cause has mentioned any other type than those which we have distinguished in the *Physics* (A 988a18-23).

When, moreover, an opinion is clearly in the wrong, it may be so for a large number of convincing reasons. In such instances there is need only of establishing that for one or other or some few of these reasons the opinion in question is untenable. "It would take too long to consider in detail all the impossible consequences of this theory, but it will be sufficient to observe the following . . ." (B 998a9-10). Such a process of pragmatic selection distinguishes historic philosophy from the history of philosophy. For the philosopher is eager to con the past only insofar as it will empower him to organize the present and thus construct in advance the outlines of the future. When, therefore, tradition is not clear on points of doctrine and when the language in which it is transmitted admits of ambiguous interpretations, one must do his best to reconstruct the true significance of the passages in question and venture to decide what his predecessors really intended to say. "Even if their exponents do not articulate their theory properly, still this is what they are trying to express" (B 1002b28-29).[20]

When, however, the philosopher who is conscious of his debt to the past and his obligations to the future has summarized the discussions of tradition—even if only in condensed and perhaps uncertain form—he is "one who has heard all the conflicting theories [and] like one who has heard both sides in a lawsuit, is necessarily more competent to

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[20]One must report in this connection the view of Harold Cherniss (*Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935], p. x): ". . . it can be shown that Aristotle was so consumed with the ideology of Platonism and the new concepts he had himself discovered or developed that it was impossible for him to imagine a time when thinking men did not see the problems of philosophy in the same terms as he." While I recognize many merits in this book, particularly the genuine value of its methodology of contextual study and interpretation, is it not true that Cherniss here somewhat overstates the case beyond the limits of his evidence? In these pages one misses, I think, an effort to exhibit that warm sympathy of understanding which Aristotle would highly recommend and the absence of which he would deeply deplore.

judge'' (B 995b2-4).[21] How much this procedure helps to focus the mind on the real locus of the problem and thus discover in the very bosom of the controversy the heart of its solution is shown by the observation that

> all thinkers maintain that all things come from contraries. But they are wrong both in saying ''all things'' and in saying that they come from contraries . . . For us, however, this problem is satisfactorily solved by the fact that there is a third factor (Λ 1075a27-31).

When, however, this respectful attention to tradition does not provide a sure insight into the final solution of the problem, it can at least prevent a fatuous repetition of the mistakes of the past. For the *obligation* of each generation is a negative precept not to distort or destroy the human heritage of truth already attained. Posterity, however, has only an *opportunity* and a *standing challenge* to advance and increase that store of wisdom. Therefore

> we must first examine the statements of other thinkers, so that if they have been mistaken in any respect, we may not be liable to the same mistakes; and if there is any view which is common to them and to us, we may not feel any private self-irritation on this score. For we must be content [ἀγαπητόν] if we state some points better than they have done, and others no worse (M 1076a10-16).[22]

This surely is to fulfill perfectly one's *obligation* to transmit the wisdom of the past undamaged into the expectant hands of posterity and at the same time to make the most of one's *opportunity* to benefit the future by improving wherever possible its quality of content and its richness of expression.

One may furthermore employ the established results of tradition

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[21]Cf. St. Thomas, *In III Metaphys.*, lect. 1, Cath. 343: "Est autem attendendum quod propter has rationes consuetudo Aristotelis fuit fere in omnibus libris suis, ut inquisitioni veritatis vel determinationi praemitteret dubitationes emergentes."

[22]The text seems certain but interpretation is difficult. See W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924) II, 408. Alexander is of no help here. The best translation I know is by Bonitz (*Aristoteles Metaphysik*, p. 269): ". . . wenn wir eine Ansicht mit ihnen gemeinsam haben, wir *nicht* darüber mit uns allein *unzufrieden sind*; denn man muss *zufrieden sein*, wenn man einiges besser, anderes doch wenigstens nicht schlechter erklärt" (italics mine). Note that Aristotle is *conscious in purpose* of what scholars *recognize in effect*. So Clodius Piat, *Aristote* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1903), p. 93: ". . . c' est d' après le principe de continuité que se développe la philosophie grecque. Les révolutions lui sont étrangères; il ne s' y fait que des réformes où l' on va précisant de plus en plus la meme idée."

[τὸ εἰωθός] as a constant check on individual inquiry in order to maintain equilibrium and insure constant progress (M 1077a15-16). It is a matter of real importance and not merely of idle antiquarian interest to recognize that one can quote in support the consistent testimony of the ancients (Λ 1069a25).

> In giving a hearing not merely to his own reason, but also to what has historically been believed, to the collective experience of men or to the ideas of famous persons, Aristotle is not so much lazily relying upon the general opinion as displaying insight into the limitations of every merely intellectual argument about such matters.[23]

This attitude of course presupposes a species of humility; or is this enviable spirit of personal modesty merely the reflection in the intellectual sphere of a preciously rare *humanitas*?

Under no circumstances, however, is the mute and glorious past to be construed out of excessive reverence as some sort of infallible and dogmatic authority, a final arbiter in all disputes from which there is no appeal. No ipse dixit has more logical value than the evidence which is adduced in its support. This fawning attitude would be really so to exalt tradition as to alter its true genius and personality; this would be to stunt growth by idealizing it. Together with the deepest respect for its own past and an almost religious reverence for the yet unborn truths that are carried within it, true philosophic tradition depends for its continuous development upon the fresh energies of independent research and the fine freedoms of mature and well-informed preferences. Refer to, indeed, and regard with respect the heritage of philosophy; but

> for the rest we must partly investigate for ourselves [τὰ μὲν ζητοῦντας αὐτοῦς δεῖ] and partly learn from other investigators [τὰ δὲ πυνθανομένους παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων] and if those who apply themselves to these matters come to some conclusion which clashes with what we have just stated, we must appreciate both views [φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους], but follow the more accurate [πείθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις] (Λ 1073b10-16).

It is not the function of true tradition to stifle independence of inquiry or independence of judgment even when it protects both against error and inadvertence by recommending recollection of the past and attentive collaboration with contemporary co-workers. Thought is a social process embedded in the context of space and time, and truth a

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[23] Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

co-operative achievement that crowns the efforts as it fulfills the hopes of the historic generations of man.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite the limited range and the heterogeneous character of the evidence, one may, I submit, rightly conclude that the *Metaphysics* does testify to Aristotle's consciousness of a philosophic tradition that develops by gradual stages through successive clarifications toward definite solutions and is molded by the consciously co-operative enterprise of men whose reliance on reason is confident and sure, who are sincere in purpose and equipped with enough logical competence for the task. This tradition, furthermore, although eager for truth, controls its hunger with patience and rests intelligently content with the *best* that can be attained at the moment, because the moment is really of small matter in the long process of mind through history at a pace that may be slow but is sure, more sure perhaps because it is slow, but slow certainly in order to be sure. I therefore suspect that Aristotle *redivivus* would be more inclined to agree—not with Spengler's estimate of the Hellenes—but with something along the lines of Erdmann's comment on man:

> . . . the results of one age and one philosophy afford the material and the starting point for their successors. Hence the distinctness and the conflict of philosophic systems is no disproof of the assertion that all systems of philosophy are only the development of a single philosophy, but rather speaks in favour of this same assertion.[24]

[24]Johann Eduard Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1890) I, 2-3. Thus much for the *Metaphysics*. It should however prove of further interest and value to correlate these conclusions with a parallel study of the other portions of the Aristotelian *corpus*—especially, perhaps, with the *De Anima* and the *Ethica Nicomachea*.

ULRICH OF STRASBOURG: HIS DOCTRINE OF THE DIVINE IDEAS

LEVIAN THOMAS, F.S.C.

A philosophy teacher once remarked during an extracurricular discussion that, like it or not, Platonism is and has been the triumphant philosophy. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that Plato has made his influence sharply felt in every century and in almost every country where philosophy flourishes. To that influence even the thirteenth century, the age of Aristotle, was no stranger, and we need look no farther than the doctrine of the Forms or Ideas to confirm that fact. To be sure, before the Platonic Ideas could be acceptable in a Christian scheme of things, they had to undergo a profound modification, a "baptism" if you will; but that modification Augustine had already provided in the forty-sixth of his *De Diversis Quaestionibus* LXXXIII. That doctrine is too well known to bear repetition here; but it is legitimate to speculate that if Augustine had not formulated it some other Christian thinker would have. For, as Gilson says, not only are all medieval thinkers one with Augustine in affirming the existence of Ideas, but they all agreed in putting this doctrine at the very heart of philosophy.[1] This was so for at least two reasons: first, because the Augustinian-Platonic doctrine of the Forms succeeded in giving to creatures their ultimate ontological foundation, in virtue of which they possess their own natures; secondly, because it was intimately bound up with the theology of the Word, in whom all the possible participations of God eternally subsist. So true is this second point that St. Albert the Great does not hesitate to say flatly

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[1] *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 157.

that he who denies the existence of the divine Ideas denies the existence of the Son of God.[2]

But of all the expositions of this doctrine undertaken in the thirteenth century one of the most clearly and completely stated is that of an almost unknown contemporary of St. Thomas Aquinas, one Ulrich of Strasbourg. Of his life we know little, save that he is said to have followed Albert's lectures at Cologne between the years 1248 and 1254; since the same is said of St. Thomas, it is likely that Ulrich was born sometime during the first quarter of the thirteenth century. Between 1272 and 1277 Ulrich was provincial prefect of the German province of the Dominican order, after which he was released from his duties as superior and sent to Paris to read the *Sentences.* He died there—suddenly, one might gather—during the same year and before he had attained the magistracy.[3] His chief work is the *De Summo Bono,* a kind of philosophical-theological *summa* on problems current in his time. The fifth tractate of the second book of this work contains an explicit and carefully detailed statement on Ulrich's views on the problem of the divine Ideas.[4]

It is worthy of note that Ulrich's presentation is found in a tractate which itself is a kind of a commentary on the divine Names. Like all Christian thinkers, Ulrich has no hesitancy in predicating intellectual acts of a creative and provident God. For, granting the fact of creation, God must know what He produces; otherwise He would act irrationally and the world itself would then cease to be intelligible. Granted providence, there must be an ordering to an end, an ordering which is impossible without the presence of an intellect. It is necessary, therefore, to consider first what it means to posit intellectual operations in God, since this is the essential background to a proper understanding of the doctrine of the Forms. If anything is common to this teaching in the thirteenth century, it is precisely this, that the Idea consists not simply in God's knowledge of things, but in the knowledge of His essence as it is imitable by the creature.

Intellect and substance are identified in God; and whether God knows Himself or others, this knowledge proceeds by way of His essence. This Ulrich understands, and hence he immediately makes it clear that when God understands things other than Himself, He

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[2]St. Albert, *In I Sententiarum Librum,* d. 35, E, art. 7, obj. 4 (ed. August Borgnet [Paris, Vives], XXVI, 90).

[3]Cf. Quetif-Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* (Paris, 1729), p. 356.

[4]The matter for this article is taken from chapters 1 and 8-11 of *De Summo Bono,* II, 5. The Paris manuscript BN 15900 has served as text. References to this manuscript will be by folio and column.

understands them insofar as He knows Himself to be their cause, according to His own manner of causing. It is the last phrase which is the important one; the divine knowledge embraces all things, actual and possible. The divine causality actually extends only to those things which God will create according to His own manner of causing. Thus Ulrich immediately separates himself from any Neoplatonic notion of a necessary emanationism as the explanation of creatures. Though God creates by knowing and though He knows all He creates, He does not create all that He knows. Ulrich outlines his position by distinguishing between what he calls the practical intellect and the speculative intellect in God, both identified *secundum rem,* but differing *secundum rationem.* God's knowledge embraces all the possibles which have not been produced and which will not be produced, but which nonetheless could be produced. Properly speaking, the speculative intellect causes nothing. Hence, as soon as we add the note of God's understanding Himself as a cause according to His own manner of causing, then that knowledge belongs to the practical order. Because God knows Himself as an efficient cause He knows the effect with a practical knowledge. We note here a doctrine which will appear full-blown in Ulrich's teachings on the practicality of the divine Ideas. For if they are practical, as we shall see they are, then the Ideas are oriented to action and will bear particularly on the individual whom God has decided to create.

So carefully does Ulrich base the foundation of the creaturely essence on the divine that he next proceeds to analyze the problem from a different point of view—namely, the consideration of the truth of the divine nature as the explanation of the truth of things. The emphasis has now shifted from the divine essence conceived as causal to the same essence conceived as regulative. We are on the familiar ground of Augustinian-Anselmian rectitude. God's knowledge of Himself as cause is the true knowledge of the perfect artist; the truth of creatures will be regulated according as they faithfully represent the divine exemplar in themselves. The truth of the divine intellect is causal; what it causes is the truth of the created being, which is therefore an exemplate of the divine art. The permanent and immutable basis of the truth and stability of things is the same as the basis for the being of things—the intellect of the First Cause. This is the ultimate basis for truth which Anselm had in mind when he defined truth as the "oughtness" of existing and acting as had been fixed beforehand in the divine art.[5]

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[5]St. Anselm, *De Veritate,* XIII (*PL,* CLVIII, 486).

But if the truth of things is the truth of an exemplate, things themselves are still true and real. Ulrich has no wish to fall into the Platonic error that would endow material things with only the pseudo-reality that belongs to the imitation of the real. The presence of a quiddity and a form, according to him, guarantees the individual truth of the individual being, for it is always the individual which is the real terminus of the creative activity of God. The truth of creatures is a derived truth, since truth can be predicated essentially only of God. But though truth is present to the creature by way of exemplary and efficient causality, the point is that it is present. Truth is one from the side of the regulating divine rectitude; but it is diverse insofar as things diversely imitate this first simple art. The diversity of truth is based on the different measure of proportion of each being to the being of the First Truth. The division, in other words, is that of an analogue, analogically one in all its subjects.

It may be noted in passing that neither Ulrich's emphasis on the divine essence as causal nor his emphasis on the same as exemplary is intended to explain the origin of multitude from unity. Rather, he is attempting to explain the being and the truth of an already posited multitude whose source is a simply unity. Ulrich is little concerned, at least here, with the origin of multitude, for he clearly holds that multiplicity begins when an omnipotent God creates *ex nihilo*. It begins, that is, with an act which is voluntary because it springs from a free decision, but which is likewise intellectual since the act whereby God creates arises from a knowledge of His essence. The being, the truth, the perfections of creatures mirror and are founded upon the truth of the divine nature; and hence the creature is said to participate in and imitate the being of the First Cause. It is safe to say that Ulrich's primary interest in the doctrine of Ideas is in the essential foundation which it gives to creatures.

The men of the Middle Ages never wandered very far from Augustine in their definition of the divine Ideas, and a particular point upon which they insist is that these originating forms are found, not outside of, but within, God. Faithful to this tradition, Ulrich begins an explicit presentation of his position by stating that all things are eternally in God under the aspect of knowledge. "By reason of science, all things are said to have been eternally in God."[6] Ulrich's immediate problem is then to show what is the proper significance of the statement that all things are eternally *in* God. The very formula

[6]"Ratione scientiae, omnia dicuntur ab aeterno in Deo fuisse" (*De Summo Bono*, II, 5 [60va]).

of the problem is significant. He does not ask how, or in what manner, the knowledge of things exists in God; he has already distinguished between the knowledge of God which embraces all possible effects and the knowledge of His actual effects. What he wants to discover now is the meaning of the expression that the creature is in God.

First of all, says Ulrich, the existence of a thing only in the divine knowledge is not the existence proper to a created nature. Hence when he says of things that they exist eternally in God, he means that the Form or the Idea of the things are eternally in the divine mind. But there is a sense in which the creature itself may be said to be in God. We say that a thing exists in its efficient cause, and doubtless that expression is significant as denoting existence in the active power of the cause. Such existence is, however, at best only potential, and as potential it is imperfect. A more perfect type of existence is that of a thing cognized in a knowing intellect, for there a thing exists not merely potentially, but formally; that is, its form actually exists, albeit intentionally. The direction of Ulrich's thought is clear. When he says that a creature exists in God he does not mean only in the will and omnipotence of God, considered as an active power. Such existence is a potential one, an existence that can logically be ascribed to all the possibles. But in the divine intellect the very form of the creature is to be found, the principle whereby the creature possesses its specific nature. That form is not the actual nature of the individual existent, but is an actual form in accord with which the creature is made. Hence when the proper distinctions have been made, Ulrich has no hesitancy in affirming that the creature is indeed in the Creator, though, as he himself says, the construction is not appositive; there is no identification, that is, between the divine essence and the proper nature of the creature.

It is not out of place here to re-emphasize a point made above. Ulrich is not concerned with the general question of things existing in the active power, or in the general knowledge, of God. To say that the creature is in God is to say that his Idea exists in the divine mind as a practical form. The purely possibles are not creatures, for they have not been and will not be created. To predicate existence of Ideas in God is to predicate them determinatively. "The creature in the creator . . . is said by way of determination, drawing that which has been determined outside its form, as when it is said that a man has been pictured."[7] The parallel is clear and the example

[7]"Creatura in creatore . . . dicitur per determinationem, trahens determinatum, extra suam rationem, sicut . . . homo pictus" (*ibid.*, 60ra).

is a happy one. A man may be said to have been pictured when the artistic exemplar in the mind of the artist has been embodied in the picture. As realized, the picture is the fulfillment and the determination of the form which the picture has, as it were, drawn out. The doctrine of the practicality of the Ideas is plainly indicated.

The Ideas therefore are to furnish the ontological foundation of a creatable nature. But Ulrich is still wary of any Platonism that would deprive these natures of their own proper reality. Thus he is aware of Augustine's and Anselm's views that a thing may be said to be more truly in God than it may be said to be in itself.[8] This Ulrich accepts only cautiously. If, he says, we compare the being of a creature in its proper nature to the being which it possesses in God on the basis of that which is analogically common to the being of a creature, then certainly Augustine and Anselm are right. Manifestly things are more truly where they can be identified with the life and light of God than they are in themselves, where they exist in a mutable and creaturely manner. But let us change the basis of comparison. Suppose the same nature is compared to itself according to a different manner of existing. Now it is clear that the creature does not exist in God with the perfection of its own nature or essence, for actual being is "truer" than potential or intentional being. Hence on this basis the dictum of St. Augustine and St. Anselm cannot be accepted. "A thing more truly has the being of its proper nature where it is actually and simply and essentially, as it is in its own nature, than where it is only in the potency of its cause and secondarily and indistinctly, as it is in God".[9]

The use of the expression "in God"—*in Deo*—is not fortuitous. Ulrich makes it abundantly clear that he regards this phrase as exactly meeting his needs. Only the subsistence of the divine nature may be said to be *in essentia Dei;* all things actual and possible are comprehended *in scientia Dei;* but only the Ideas may be said to be *in Deo.*[10] What precisely, therefore, is it which constitutes the Idea as something in God distinct from a simple act of the divine science? It is exactly this, that the Idea is essentially practical, bearing on that which is to

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[8]Cf. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram,* V, 25, 35 (*PL,* XXXIV, 332); St. Anselm, *Monologion,* XXXIV (*Pl,* CLVIII, 189).

[9]"Res esse suae propriae naturae verius habet ubi est actu et simpliciter et essentialiter et secundum distinctionem suae proprietatis, sicut est in sua natura, quam ubi est tantum in potentia suae causae et secundum quid et indistincte, sicut est in Deo" (Ulrich, *op. cit.* [60vb]).

[10]*Ibid.*

be produced. The Idea, we have seen, depends on the divine science; and this science, considered only in itself, does not express any relation to a creature. God's knowledge of things, that is, considered in itself, remains the same whether there is a creation or not. But the Idea, Ulrich insists, is signified as ordered to creation and thus it connotes an effect to be realized. It is a practical form, posited in the divine intellect by that eternal act whereby that intellect knows that it will be diversely imitated by creatures.

It is precisely this insistence—a repeated insistence—on the practicality of the Idea that serves to set Ulrich off from contemporaneous presentations of the same doctrine. True, Ulrich has not given a precise definition of what he means by "practical knowledge," but his whole context makes it clear that he has in mind Aristotle's definition of the practical intellect as that which is ordered to the end of operation.[11] Therefore, of things which God can make but does not, He has not a practical knowledge. Hence Ulrich warns us to beware of the errors of those who say that with respect to the meaning of the name the idea is related equally to both the speculative and practical knowledge of God;[12] he calls the Ideas "practical forms according to which the divine intellect has produced and does produce creatures";[13] and he states flatly that what God can, but does not make and will not make, has no Idea in God, because the Idea is a practical form which expresses a relation to an effect.[14]

True, Ulrich does allow for various synonymous names with respect to the Idea. Thus he says that the Idea is an exemplar insofar as all things imitate it and a species insofar as it is the medium whereby God knows all things.[15] This may seem to allow for a speculative function of the Idea since God, as Ulrich himself insists, knows more than He produces. Yet the clear and unambiguous insistence on the practicality of the Ideas would force us, it seems, to limit the Idea as a cognoscitive medium to that means whereby God knows what He makes. God knows all things actual and possible; He has Ideas only of that which actually will be made. All else is known by the *scientia simplicis notitiae;* and the Idea, therefore, is not a medium of knowledge within the speculative order. Hence in this doctrine the Idea does have its source within the depths of the divine essence; but it does not bear on this essence only as it is capable of being participated

[11] *De Anima* iii. 10.
[12] *Op. cit.*, chap. 10 (65rb).
[13] *Ibid.*, chap. 11 (65va).
[14] *Ibid.* (66rb).
[15] *Ibid.*, chap. 10 (64rb).

—it points directly to eventual participation. To repeat, God knows what He produces, but He does not produce all that He knows—He produces only that of which He has an Idea. The divine Idea is a creative principle, not simply a cognoscitive one.

In none of Ulrich's great contemporaries is there this same insistence on the Idea as practical, though in most aspects of his doctrine Ulrich is in essential agreement with them. Moreover, it may be said that in extending the Idea to the merely possibles his contemporaries were faithful to the tradition of St. Augustine, who said, "According to these [Ideas] anything which is able to begin to be or cease to be, and everything which does begin to be or cease to be, is said to be formed."[16] St. Augustine clearly meant the Ideas to include all the possibles, and to this interpretation Alexander of Hales, St. Albert, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure were true. Thus Alexander says that the exemplary cause is related to all that can be produced, even though it never actually is.[17] St. Albert, at least in his *Summa,* says explicitly that the Ideas relate to all possibles, even though these never come about.[18] The position of St. Thomas is more complicated; though the Angelic Doctor asserts that the ordering of the divine Ideas is to the practical,[19] he does say that the Idea as a cognoscitive principle may be called a *ratio* and is thus related speculatively to things.[20] St. Bonaventure simply says that the Idea expresses the immensity of the divine truth in expressing and knowing everything which is possible to God.[21]

The reasons for Ulrich's peculiar emphasis will be discussed at the end of this article. But as clearly as a man can state his position, Ulrich is maintaining in the face of his contemporaries that the Idea arises only when God knows that His essence will be participated, not when He knows Himself as only capable of being participated. Dionysius has said that the "acts of the divine will are the determining and effective models of things."[22] Ulrich, it is clear, regards the practical knowledge of God as the act of His divine will.

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[16]"Secundum eas formari dicitur quidquid oriri vel interiri potest, et omne quod oritur vel interit" (*De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII,* q. 46 [*PL,* XL, 30]).

[17]*Summa Theologica,* Pars II, q. 3, m. 2, c. 3 (ed. Quarrachi, II, 20).

[18]St. Albert, *In I Partem Summae Theologicae,* tract. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 3 (ed. August Borgnet [Paris, Vives], XXXI, 565).

[19]*De Veritate,* q. III, a. 6.

[20]*Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 15, a. 3.

[21]"Idea dicit immensitatem divinae veritatis in exprimendo et cognoscendo omne quod est Deo possibile" (*In I Sententiarum Librum,* d. 35, art. unicus, q. 5, ad 2 [ed. Quarrachi, I, 612]).

[22]*De Divinis Nominibus,* V, 8 (*PG,* III, 845).

The notion of the practicality of the Ideas is borne out in other ways. Thus it is the diversity of real relations to the one divine essence that serves to explain the multiplication of Ideas. It is even more proper, says Ulrich, to speak of the Idea of many things rather than many Ideas, since the plurality is one of relation and not of fact. But even though the divine essence is simple, it is the fact that it is capable of being really imitated by a multiplicity of creatures that explains why we may speak of the Idea in the plural. The emphasis on the actual unity of the divine idea and its relational multiplicity also serves to show how far removed from Plato's thought Ulrich may be considered to be. There is no indication in Plato of any identity of Ideas with a supremely simple God, whatever the notion of divinity in Plato may turn out to be. The archetypal world of the *Timaeus,* according to Aristotle, was peopled with a multitude of independent entities. It is this independent real multitude that Ulrich would remove. The Idea is really one because the essence of God is really one; a real plurality of Ideas is as repugnant to Ulrich as a real plurality of Gods would be. Only on one point will Ulrich agree with Plato, and that is on the notion that the divine mind operates through an immutable and perpetual exemplar and not by one fashioned and shaped. The form whereby the world was made is eternal and unchangeable, and if we understand the intelligible world of Plato as that eternal form there is no quarrel with him. Moreover, Ulrich's insistence on the practicality of the Ideas serves to mark him off from the Platonic thesis. The archetypes of the *Timaeus* do bear a relation to things produced. But the Platonic Forms, subsisting independently of the Demiurge, would remain exactly the same, whether there was a world of creatures below or not, since the Ideas are sufficient to themselves. Not so with Ulrich. In his thought, that which has relation to nothing other than itself is the divine essence, and while the divine Idea is that essence, the Idea, qua Idea, appears only with the notion of a real creation. In short, it is evidently Ulrich's thesis that had God chosen never to create, the Idea would not have appeared in the divine intellect. This does not mean that God is mutable, for it is eternally true that God has willed to create and that is why the Idea is among the names predicated eternally, not temporally, of God.

The emphasis on the practicality of the forms and the proper nature of each creature in itself leads us first of all to state that individuals have Ideas in God in such a way that in God the form or idea of John differs from that of Aegidius. This is to be expected, since the Idea is an operative form, and operation is concerned with, and terminates

in, the individual. But the problem is complicated by the fact that Ulrich also posits an Idea of species in God. Perhaps he is merely again setting himself off from the Platonic thesis that individuals have no other idea than that of the species.[23] But unfortunately he gives no definition of what he understands by species, at least in this section of his *Summa*. We might fairly ask, If the Ideas are practical forms in accord with which things are produced or will be produced, why an idea of species? Is the species a produced reality? At least, we might ask for an explanation of what meaning is to be attached to species here; unfortunately none is given. Ulrich does say that there is a more perfect distinction of species in God than there is of individuals, since species differ formally and individuals differ only materially.[24] Hence it is at least probable that the Idea of species is posited insofar as this species is a formal likeness of the numerically distinct, whatever the principle of individuation may be. This formal likeness then is realizable only in individuals who possess the common likeness of an essential nature. It would be then the divine Idea which establishes and grounds the formal differences of these natures.

Clearly there are Ideas of accidents since they are effects of a cause and since whatever perfection exists in a creature must exist *exemplariter* in the Creator. Moreover an accident is a reality with a special mode of being. Who would maintain, that is, that the essence of whiteness is the same as the essence of the thing that is white?

Like St. Thomas, Ulrich holds that, properly speaking, prime matter has its Idea in the composite, since prime matter exists as part of the essential composition of the thing. But to this line of reasoning, Ulrich adds another cause for positing an idea of prime matter. Though prime matter is understood as without act and without form, it is distinct from first form; since it has its own being, albeit a potential being, in some manner it must imitate the first act, even though it does so imperfectly. Ulrich may be inclining to the view of St. Augustine that matter was first created in a state of informity;[25] since it was created there must needs be an Idea of it. Nor can it be argued that its very imperfection prevents the existence of an Idea for it; for, says Ulrich, the imperfection is in the exemplate, not in the exemplar.

The same type of reasoning is applied to the existence of material privation. Material privation is regarded as the essence of a form deprived of actual being in matter; as such, it appears as a potency

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[23]Cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* i. 9.
[24]*Op. cit.*, chap. 11 (66rb).
[25]See *De Genesi ad Litteram*, I, 3, 8; I, 4, 9 (*PL*, XXXIV, 349).

and is equated with one of the principles whereby matter is moved to actual being. It is therefore the essence of a form in matter according to potential being. Since it is a potentiality, it is a reality and therefore in need of an Idea. As an inchoative form it cannot be of itself, since nothing can ever cause itself; nor can it come from matter, since the form must exist prior to matter—not temporally, evidently, but with a priority of nature. Hence it must be caused by God. Whatever God causes, He causes through an Idea. Therefore an Idea even for material privation. If there is one fundamental notion in this section of the *De Summo Bono,* certainly it is this, that the divine Ideas are causal mediums of divine action.

We are now in a position to synthesize a descriptive definition of what Ulrich means by the divine Idea. The Idea is nothing other than the divine essence, known as imitable by the creature; it is the likeness of the exemplate, existing outside of things in the first operating cause—that is, in God. There it exists according to the aspect of the practical intellect which includes the will, one as the divine essence is one, multiple only as it signifies a diversity of essence and of relations. It is prior to all creatures, eternal as God is eternal, the singular, uniform, productive, and conserving cause of whatever reality God has produced or will produce.

The last point to be raised here is the attempt to explain the reasons which led Ulrich to differ so markedly from his contemporaries in refusing to posit in God an idea of the merely possible. Now it may be said that just as the expressionism of St. Bonaventure, for example, lays special emphasis on the part played by the Word, conceived as Expression and Truth, in the generation of Ideas,[26] so too Ulrich's doctrine merely lays special emphasis on the ontological foundation of creatures by reason of the originating Forms which are the Ideas. That may be true; it does not seem to tell the whole story, for the same foundation is present also in the doctrines of those who hold that the Idea belongs to the speculative order. Ulrich never explicitly states his reasons for his stand other than to insist repeatedly that the Ideas are ordered to effects. Hence it would appear legitimate to attempt some inferences of our own.

At least one definite result is achieved by a doctrine of the practicality of the Ideas; for whoever holds such a doctrine thereby separates himself from any Neoplatonic explanation of the origin of things. Ulrich was surely aware of this, for he censures those "vain philosophers" who substituted a necessary emanation for a

[26] *In I Sent.*, q. 2, ad 2 et 3 (ed. Quarrachi, I, 606-7).

Christian creation. Who these "vain philosophers" were is not indicated precisely, but there is little doubt that it is Avicenna who is meant. The Avicennian universe consists of a series of emanations, beginning with a First Principle and extending ultimately to the matter of the corporeal world. From this First Principle a series of Intelligences are generated necessarily, from the first down to the tenth and last, the Agent Intellect, which by its act of thinking produces human souls and the four elements of the finite world.[27]

The generation of the ten intelligences not only introduces necessity into the First Principle, but it means that the production of things is not a true creation. Now what Ulrich, like all Christian thinkers, wants is precisely a production that is a creation. Avicenna's First Principle, by the mere fact of knowing himself, gives rise to a series of Intelligences, each independent of the being of the first. The creatures of this world appear only late in the emanation and owe their being to the First Principle only mediately if at all. But the Christian God, in knowing Himself, knows likewise all the possible participations of His essence. Through an act of the practical intellect, identified with the divine will, there is generated an Idea eternally identified with the divine essence. Because the Idea is practical it insures a creation; God is thus the immediate cause of creatures. It is reasonable to infer, then, that Ulrich's peculiar emphasis on the practicality of the Idea represents a determined effort to separate himself from any Arabian or Greek Neoplatonism. One of the signs of that separation is a God who creates through an Idea that is His essence, and not through an intelligence inferior to, and yet independent of, Him.

Finally, it may be that Ulrich thinks he has discovered an intelligible necessity for such a doctrine. He insists time and time again that God knows all things and that He knows them through His own essence. But would not God's knowledge of things remain exactly what it is if there never had been a creation? Granted a creation—and a creation that proceeds by way of a causal science—the knowledge of His essence as actually participated or to be participated must differ in some way from His knowledge of that same essence merely as capable of being participated. The difference is not a real one, to be sure, since all are agreed in denying any real distinction between the divine causality and the divine science; but it is a difference. The only necessity that Ulrich can find for an Idea is if there be a creature who imitates it. That is his reason for the practicality of the Ideas; by this he sets himself apart from other exponents of this doctrine.

[27]Avicenna, *Metaphysica*, IX, 4.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE *PRIMA VIA*

JOSEPH OWENS, C.Ss.R.

I

THE PROBLEM OF THE *PRIMA VIA*

Of the five "ways" to prove that God exists, the one which proceeds from the movement of sensible things is called by St. Thomas Aquinas the "first and more manifest."[1] This way is described by him as having an efficacy that is irresistible.[2] It is the only way that is used in the direct treatment of the question in his last résumé of his own theological doctrine.[3]

The argument from motion, however, has had a long and varied history. In the light of that history, it would seem at first glance to be anything but an easy and manifest proof that God, as He is understood by a Christian, exists.

The external structure of the *prima via* is obviously taken by St. Thomas from Aristotle. Looked at in this light, the argument has its sources in the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*.[4] Yet in the *Physics* the proof from motion seems to reach nothing further than a celestial

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[1] *ST*, I, q. 2, a. 3. The reason for the designation "first and more manifest" is sought in the contemporary philosophical situation by A. Boehm: "Nous pensons que c'est le fait que, dans la pensée contemporaine, il était accepté sans difficulté par les philosophes des diverses écoles, qui s'inspiraient, d'une façon ou d'une autre, du néoplatonisme . . ." ("Autour du Mystère des 'Quinque Viae' de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des Sciences Religieuses*, XXIV [1950], 229).

[2] "Haec enim via probandi primum principium esse, est efficacissima, cui resisti non potest" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 3 [Leonine no. 6]).

[3] *Compend. Theol.*, cap. 3.

[4] Cf. *CG*, I, cap. 13. These are the only sources acknowledged by St. Thomas. For further possible sources, see the Index in R. Arnou's *De Quinque Viis Sancti Thomae* (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1932), p. 103.

soul.[5] In the *Metaphysics,* the demonstration arrives at a plurality of separate substances, each of which, although act without any admixture of potency, is nevertheless a finite entity.[6] In neither case does the result of the proof at all resemble the Christian God. Yet the immobile movent reached by the Aristotelian process is said by St. Thomas, without comment or elucidation, to be the God of whom he is treating as a Christian theologian.[7] How can this be? Certainly something that may be a celestial soul or a plurality of finite separate entities is hardly what Christians see at once to be the God of scriptural revelation, the God who had declared Himself to Moses in the words of Exodus, "I am who am."[8]

In such a background, then, need one be surprised to see that the conclusion of the *prima via* has been found unsatisfactory by many later writers? Leading Scholastic thinkers after the time of St. Thomas have minimized or sought to supplement or have even rejected the argument from motion. Duns Scotus considered it to be a less perfect manner of reaching God, attaining Him in a more *per accidens* way than do the other proofs.[9] Cajetan looks upon the argument as

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[5]Cf. J. Paulus, "La Théorie du Premier Moteur chez Aristote," *Revue de Philosophie,* XXXIII (1933), 259-94 and 394-424; A. Nolte, *Het Godsbegrip bij Aristoteles* (Nijmegen-Utrecht: Dekker & van de Vegt, 1940), pp. 126-33 and 172-75.

[6]Cf. J. Owens, "The Reality of the Aristotelian Separate Movers," *Review of Metaphysics,* III (1950), 319-37; *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian* Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951), pp. 279 ff.

[7]*ST,* I, q. 2, a. 3. Cf.: "Primo autem ponemus rationes quibus Aristoteles procedit ad probandum Deum esse. . . . Sed quia Deus non est pars alicuius moventis seipsum, ulterius Aristoteles, in sua *Metaphysica,* investigat ex hoc motore qui est pars moventis seipsum, alium motorem separatum omnino, qui est Deus" (*CG,* I, cap. 13).

[8]"Sed contra est quod dicitur *Exod.* III, ex persona Dei: *Ego sum qui sum*" (*ST,* I, q. 2, a. 3).

[9]". . . igitur Metaphysica et naturalis scientia sunt de eodem per accidens; sed de Deo est naturalis magis per accidens, quia summa descriptio, ad quam pervenit de ipso, quasi remotior est a quidditate Dei, quam summa Metaphysici" (*Metaph.,* I, 49; in *Opera Omnia,* ed. Vives [Paris, 1891-95] VII, 37a).

". . . sed tam proprietas considerata in scientia naturali quam in ista de effectu, non potest sibi inesse, nisi primum movens sit et nisi primum ens sit; ergo utraque scientia potest probare ipsum esse. Tamen ista immediatius . . ." (*ibid.,* no. 35, p. 28b).

"Multo etiam perfectius ostenditur primam causam esse ex passionibus causatorum consideratis in Metaphysica quam ex passionibus naturalibus ubi ostenditur primum movens esse. Perfectior enim cognitio et immediatior

concluding just to a first immobile movent in general, without caring for the moment whether or not that movent be merely a celestial soul; later the predicate "immobile movent" is shown to be in truth proper to God, and so the conclusion is drawn directly, but *quasi per accidens*, that God exists.[10] Suarez rejects the argument entirely, maintaining that it cannot conclude even to an immaterial prime movent, let alone an uncreated one.[11] Other outstanding Scholastics may be listed as having stated that the *prima via* does not immediately and explicitly prove that God exists.[12] A recent writer, finally, insists even more strongly than Cajetan that the demonstration must be "prolonged" in order to attain its desired result.[13]

In view of this rather discouraging history, one may well ask how St. Thomas is justified in stating so abruptly of the immobile movent

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est de Primo Ente cognoscere ipsum ut *primum ens*, vel ut *necesse esse*, quam cognoscere ipsum ut *primum movens*" (*Opus Oxon.*, Prologus, III, 7, 21; ed. M. F. Garcia [Quaracchi, 1912-14], I, 66 [no. 80c]).

As these statements of Duns Scotus are made in the background of the Arabian controversy regarding the subject of metaphysics, the argument from motion is looked upon as a purely physical argument, pertaining solely to natural philosophy. Cf. Part Two of this article, note 115.

[10]"Et ut melius intelligatur quod dicimus, singillatim explanando dicitur, quod primae viae, ex parte motus, sat est quod inferatur, ergo datur primum movens immobile, non curando utrum illud sit anima caeli aut mundi: hoc enim quaeretur in sequenti quaestione. . . . Omnia enim haec praedicata, scilicet movens immobile . . . sunt secundum veritatem propria Deo: et ideo, concludendo haec inveniri in rerum natura, concluditur directe, quasi per accidens, quod Deus est, idest, *Deus, non ut Deus, sed ut habens talem conditionem, est;* et consequenter ipsum substratum, scilicet Deus ut Deus, est" (*In ST*, I, q. 2, a. 3, comm. III; ed. Leonine [Rome, 1888], IV, 32b).

[11]"Primum medium sumitur ex motu coeli, quo usus est Aristotel., 8 Physic., et illud etiam adhibuit 12 Metaph., text. 26, ubi ex motu coeli aeterno pervenit ad demonstrandum primum motorem immobilem. Hoc autem medium per se ac praecise sumptum multis modis invenitur inefficax ad demonstrandum esse in rerum natura aliquam substantiam immaterialem, nedum ad demonstrandum primam et increatam substantiam . . ." (*Disputationes Metaphysicae*, XXIX, 1, 7; in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Vives [Paris, 1856-77], XXVI, 23a).

[12]Cf. L. D. Urbano, "La prueba del movimiento y la existencia de Dios," *Ciencia Tomista*, XV (1917), 81; P. Descoqs, *Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932-35), I, 293-94; A. Brémond, *Le Dilemme Aristotélicien* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1933), pp. 149 ff.; M. J. Adler, "The Demonstration of God's Existence," *Thomist*, V (1943), 189-91. On the history of this question, cf. M. Chossat, "Dieu (Son Existence)," *Dict. de Théol. Cath.* (Paris, 1911), IV, 931-34.

[13]"La *prima via* appelle donc un prolongement indispensable pour mener jusqu'à Dieu . . . Bref, la *prima via* est plutôt un acheminement vers la preuve authentique, qui commence là où la *prima via* finit" (F. van Steenberghen, "Le problème philosophique de l'existence de Dieu," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, XLV [1947], 164; cf. *ibid.*, 152, 168).

reached by the *prima via,* "And this all understand to be God."[14] May one still view the procedure from sensible motion as the "first and most manifest way" of showing that God exists? Can it even be considered to reach the Christian God at all satisfactorily? If so, how is it the most obvious and most evidently cogent of all the five ways?

In attempting to answer these questions, the first step, naturally, will have to be a brief glance at the *prima via,* and then a comparison with its Aristotelian sources from both structural and doctrinal viewpoints.

II

THE STRUCTURE OF THE *PRIMA VIA*

The structure of the *prima via* in the *Summa Theologiae* is remarkably clear. Its starting point is located in things of the sensible world, things which are evidently perceived through sensation to be in movement. The examples given are of fire heating wood and the hand moving the stick which pushes something else. From an analysis of this movement of sensible things two propositions successively emerge. The first is that whatever is being moved is being moved by another; the second, that an indefinite series of movents that are being moved cannot account for this motion. The conclusion from the analysis of the movement seen in sensible things is therefore that there is a first movent which is not being moved by anything, and this all understand to be God.

The argument, accordingly, is constructed as follows:

1. Starting point: Some things in the sensible world are being moved.
2. Propositions: (*a*) Whatever is being moved is being moved by something else; (*b*) An indefinite series of moved movents cannot account for motion.
3. Conclusion: There is a first movent which is not being moved by anything at all, and this all understand to be God.[15]

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[14]*ST*, I, q. 2, a. 3. Similarly, "Et hoc dicimus Deum" (*CG*, I, cap. 13 [Leonine p. 30, ll. 15-16]). Also, ". . . et hoc est Deus" (*In I Sent.*, d. 3, divisio primae partis—the texts will be found in Part Two of this article, notes 83-84). ". . . et hoc dicimus Deum" (*Compend. Theol.*, cap. 3). F. van Steenberghen comments: "C'est tout, et quand saint Thomas ajoute aussitôt: '*et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum,*' il sait fort bien que cette affirmation est très elliptique et qu'elle demande quelques explications" (*op. cit.*, p. 310).

[15]"Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur. . . . Hic autem non est procedere in

The starting point—namely, that things in the sensible world are in movement—is looked upon as evident through sensation and as needing no further elucidation. That a first movent which is not being moved by anything is the Christian God does not seem to be conceived as open to challenge. Only the two propositions are considered as needing proof. These are demonstrated through an analysis of the sensible movement in terms of act and potency.

The first of the two propositions emerges from a metaphysical examination of the movement seen in sensible things. It is not accepted in any a priori way, either analytic or synthetic, but is reached frankly as a *conclusion* from what is seen happening in the sensible world. St. Thomas reasons with an evident example before his mind. A piece of wood which is cold is being heated by a fire. The movement in this case is alteration, change in quality. Insofar as the wood is being moved from cold to heat, it is in potency to being hot. This is at once seen to be the necessary condition for being moved. The thing that is being moved has to be in potency to that towards which it is being moved. That which is imparting the motion, on the other hand, has to be actual in this respect. To be in potency involves lacking the act, and nothing can lack the act and have it at the same time. Nothing therefore can be simultaneously in act and potency in the same respect. So nothing can move itself. If it is being moved, it is being moved by something else.[16]

The basis of this argument is that the act is something over and above the potency, something more than the potency, and so has to come from something which already has or is that act.

The second proposition follows from a continuation of this study of sensible movement in terms of act and potency. If that which is

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infinitum: quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur: et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum" (*ST.*, I, q. 2, a. 3).

[16]"Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur: movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum: de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu: sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa: quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri; et illud ab alio" (*ibid*).

imparting the motion is thereby being moved itself, it also is necessarily being moved by another. If this third is also a movent that is being moved, it likewise is being moved by still another. But one cannot proceed in this way indefinitely, for there would be no first movent, and so nothing else would be imparting motion; for the others are movents only through being moved by the first movent. Therefore there must be a first movent which is not being moved by anything; and this all understand to be God.[17]

This reasoning quite evidently derives its force from the doctrine of act and potency explained in the proof of the first proposition. Anything that is being moved does not have of itself the act towards which it is being moved. So in an indefinite series of moved movents, none would have the act of itself. Accordingly, such a series would never be able to account for the motion. Since there is sensible motion, then there must be something which of itself is act, in the sense that it is in no way being actualized by anything else. "To impart motion," the proof has stated, "is nothing else than to educe something from potency to act."[18] The first movent, accordingly, is not being moved by anything, in the sense that it is not being actuated by anything whatsoever in imparting the motion. Such a movent, St. Thomas declares without the least hesitation, is understood by all to be God.

In examining the historical genesis of this argument, then, one should carefully watch the starting point, the two propositions, and the conclusion. From such a study one may hope to find in exactly what respects the argument of St. Thomas resembles its sources in Aristotle and in exactly what respects it differs from those sources in order to arrive at such a radically different conclusion.

III

ARISTOTLE

Three presentations of the argument from motion are found in Aristotle. They are located, respectively, in the seventh book of the *Physics,* the eighth book of the *Physics,* and Book Lambda of the *Metaphysics.*

BOOK VII OF THE *PHYSICS*

The seventh book of the *Physics* is a treatise quite detached from the main groupings.[19] It establishes in its opening paragraph the

[17] *Ibid.* Text *supra,* n. 15.

[18] *Ibid.;* cf. *supra,* n. 16.

[19] It has two backward references to *Physics* v, but does not seem to be referred to by any other Aristotelian treatise. On its authenticity and

proposition that "everything that is being moved is necessarily being moved by something."[20] This "something" is understood as being in some way "other"[21] than the thing which is being moved, even though it may not be outside[22] that thing. The proposition itself is demonstrated by a proof based upon the divisibility of every mobile thing. A mobile thing has parts. If one of the parts were not in motion the whole as such, primarily and per se, would have to be at rest.[23] The mobile thing, accordingly, cannot be being moved primarily and per se; so it must be being moved by something, in the sense of something which is in some way other than the thing itself considered primarily and per se.

This reasoning of the Stagirite has been found difficult or unacceptable by commentators throughout the ages.[24] It is regarded by

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chronology, and the double version of its first three chapters, cf. W. D. Ross's *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 11-19. The argument demonstrating the primary movent is substantially the same in each of the two versions.

[20]*Physics* vii. 1. 241b24.

[21]Cf. alternate text, *ibid.*, 242a3; 13.

[22]*Ibid.*, 241b40-41 (Ross lineation).

[23]*Ibid.*, 241b35-242a49.

[24]Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Posteriores Commentaria* (ed. H. Diels [Berlin: Reimer, 1895]), pp. 1039.13-1040.16, finds this argument and previous Greek treatments of it unsatisfactory. He himself suggests that the basis of the reasoning is that an extended thing as a whole cannot be present to itself as a whole, since it is spread out in parts and so cannot coincide with itself as movent and thing moved (*ibid.*, pp. 1040.30-1041.3). He does not seem any too convinced of his own interpretation, however, and says (*ibid.*, p. 1042.7-9) that a more exact and clearer proof is to follow in Book VIII; cf. pp. 1036.8-1037.10.

St. Thomas (*In VII Phys.*, lect. 1 [Leonine nos. 4-6]) is aware of the Greek and Arabian objections against this proof, but he defends its *propter quid* character against Averroes, who (*In VII Phys.*, 2 [Venice, 1562, fol. 307v2 L]) had classed it as a *quia* argument ("de genere signorum certorum"). The objection that Averroes is answering—namely, that the basic presupposition of the Aristotelian proof does not apply universally since in heavenly bodies or in the Platonic self-moving soul a part could not be imagined to be at rest—is quite legitimately universalized by St. Thomas instead of being restricted to those particular instances.

W. D. Ross, in *Aristotle's Physics* (p. 669), states that the argument is not valid in regard to the dependence of motion on a part of the thing that is being moved. "But Aristotle makes the mistake of supposing that this implies the causal dependence of the movement of AB on the movement of a part of itself Γ B. That this is false is shown by the fact that it is equally true that if AΓ were at rest AB could not be in motion, so that AB's motion, if it were causally dependent on that of Γ B, would be equally dependent on that of AΓ." But that is exactly the force of the argument. The dependence of motion on its parts applies equally to all its parts. It is dependence by way of material causality, as Ferrariensis noted in regard to the interpretation of St. Thomas: "Sunt tamen causa totius in genere

St. Thomas, however, as a *propter quid* demonstration, based on the "primary and per se" character that is denied to anything mobile, as such. The argument concerns any mobile thing which has in itself the principle of its motion. If such a thing were imparting motion to itself without being moved by another, it would be being moved primarily and per se; just as if something were hot without having that heat from something else, it would have to be the primary and per se instance of heat. But the argument of the Stagirite has shown that no mobile thing can be being moved primarily and per se.[25]

This reasoning, St. Thomas argues, seems to be a *propter quid* demonstration, for it contains the cause why it is impossible for any mobile thing to be moving itself. That a thing is moving itself means nothing else than that the thing is the cause of its own motion. Now to be cause to oneself of any characteristic means to possess that characteristic *primarily*; for what is primary in any genus is the cause of what is subsequent, as fire, which is the cause of heat to itself and to others, is the primary instance of what is hot. But motion depends upon the parts of the mobile thing. So there cannot be any primary instance in motion. There cannot be any such thing as a *primary* mobile whose motion would be independent of its parts, any more than a divisible thing could be the primary being; for as divisible it would depend upon its parts.[26]

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causae materialis, et motus partium sunt materia motus totius" (*In Contra Gentiles*, I, 13, comm. IV). Ferrariensis had phrased in the following words what is substantially the same objection: "Quia aliquis posset dicere quod est vera de quiescente ad quietem alterius moventis, non autem de quiescente ad quietem partis. Pars enim est materia totius, non autem quod movet totum" (*ibid.*, comm. III). Cf. also A. Brémond, *Le Dilemme Aristotélicien*, p. 143, n. 1, for a similar objection.

[25]St. Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Phys.*, lect. 1 (Leonine nos. 2-3).

[26]". . . sed videtur dicendum quod non sit demonstratio *quia*, sed *propter quid;* continent enim causam quare impossibile est aliquod mobile movere seipsum. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est, quod aliquid movere seipsum nihil aliud est, quam esse sibi causa motus. Quod autem est sibi causa alicuius, oportet quod *primo* ei conveniat; quia quod est primum in quolibet genere, est causa eorum quae sunt post. Unde ignis, qui sibi et aliis est causa caloris, est primum calidum. Ostendit autem Aristoteles in sexto, quod in motu non invenitur primum, neque ex parte temporis, neque ex parte magnitudinis, neque etiam ex parte mobilis, propter horum divisibilitatem. Non ergo potest inveniri primum, cuius motus non dependeat ab aliquo priori: motus enim totius dependet a motibus partium, et dividitur in eos, ut in sexto probatum est. Sic ergo ostendit Aristoteles causam quare nullum mobile movet seipsum; quia non potest esse primum mobile, cuius motus non dependeat a partibus: sicut si ostenderem quod nullum divisibile potest esse primum ens, quia esse cuiuslibet divisibilis dependet a partibus" (*ibid.* [Leonine no. 6]).

Cf. "Quia vis rationis in hoc consistit, quod, si aliquid seipsum moveat primo et per se, non ratione partium, oportet quod suum moveri non de-

This explanation of St. Thomas's is in its nature highly metaphysical. Though without explicit reference here, it is evidently, from both doctrine and example, based upon a principle taken from a document which Greek tradition has rightly placed among the metaphysical treatises of Aristotle. The highest instance of any characteristic is the one which is cause of that characteristic to the other things which are designated by the same name.[27] But mobile things are essentially imperfect; they cannot have a "highest"—that is, a perfect and primary instance in their own genus. Therefore no mobile thing can be the cause of its own motion primarily and per se.

Such an interpretation is in principle entirely Aristotelian. It makes the argument of the Stagirite convincing and satisfying. Yet it is not used in the text of the *Physics*. The Stagirite himself does not invoke the principle that is found in the *Metaphysics*. Rather, he leaves the argument on the physical plane, the plane of natural philosophy.[28] He is apparently content to have shown that "being moved" cannot pertain primarily and per se to any mobile thing. Having excluded the one alternative by this negative conclusion, he accepts the other alternative without further investigation. He continues on the same physical plane to prove his second proposition—namely, that a series of mobile things, each of which is being moved locally by another, cannot go on to infinity; there has to be a first

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pendeat ab aliquo; moveri autem ipsius divisibilis, sicut et ejus esse, dependet a partibus; et sic non potest seipsum movere primo et per se" (*CG*, I, cap. 13 [Leonine p. 31a, ll. 20-26]).

There has been a long neo-Scholastic controversy commencing in 1888 with A. de Margerie and still continuing (e.g., A. Pechhacker, "Zur Begründung des Kausal prinzips," *Scholastik*, XXV [1950], 518-34) as to whether the "principle of causality" is analytic or synthetic or even (F. Sawicki) a postulate. This controversy has neither an Aristotelian nor a Thomistic background. The causal proposition "Whatever is being moved is being moved by something else," as a universal and necessary truth, is for Aristotle and expressly for St. Thomas, not a "principle" in the modern epistemological sense, but the *conclusion* of a *propter quid* demonstration. The notions of act and potency and participation are the prior conceptions used in proving it.

[27]Aristotle *Metaphysics* α. 1. 993b24-26.

[28]The relation of the particular sciences—including natural philosophy—to the primary philosophy is sketched by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* E. 1. 1025b4-18. The particular sciences take a certain type of being and deal with it, accepting *what* it *is* either as evident or on hypothesis. They do not attempt to assess it in terms of being. The problem of whether or not motion is something essentially imperfect, accordingly, should lie outside the realm of the natural philosopher's inquiry, just as the consideration of contrariety or perfection (*Metaphysics* Γ. 2. 1005a10-13) lies outside the scope of the geometer. The "first" which is denied by Aristotle to motion in *Physics* vi. 5, is, of course, the "first" in a continuum.

movent.[29] In the interpretation given by St. Thomas, the way to prove the second proposition would lie wide open. Since mobile things cannot have a primary and perfect instance in their own genus, they must ultimately have that motion from something which is not mobile. But the Stagirite does not proceed in this way. Instead, he enters upon a laborious argument from purely physical considerations of time and motion.

In a word, Aristotle's treatment in the seventh book of the *Physics* remains within the limits of natural philosophy. The basic argument is made clearer and more convincing by St. Thomas, but only by being raised to the metaphysical level. What was kept strictly on the physical plane for the Stagirite is treated metaphysically by St. Thomas.

The nature of the primary movent reached by the Aristotelian reasoning is not determined. It is left vaguely as the "first movent." Even the obvious conclusion that it has to be immobile is not made explicit. Whatever is being moved is being moved by something, and a series of movents that are being moved cannot extend to infinity. The only conclusion drawn by the Stagirite from these two propositions is that there must be a first movent, not as final cause, but as that from which the beginning of motion proceeds.[30] St. Thomas, entirely in accord with his interpretation of the basic argument, expressly concludes to the immobility of the first movent as its proper characteristic.[31]

This argument is not used in the *prima via* of the *Summa Theologiae*. It shows, however, that St. Thomas approaches the question from the viewpoint of the essential imperfection of motion. Such an approach, based on the relation of the imperfect to the perfect, is on the metaphysical level. Because motion is essentially imperfect, it requires something outside the order of mobile things—understood as divisible or extended things—to account for it. But St. Thomas does not say that the immobile movent attained solely by the reasoning on this basis is God. Quite obviously, any immaterial movent would satisfy the requirement of the argument as it stands. Apparently all that Aristotle intended it to show is that any series of local movements has to have as its first movent a soul, either celestial or terrestrial. Based

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[29] *Physics* vii. 1. 242a49-243a2.

[30] *Ibid.*, 2. 243a3-4.

[31] "Si non movetur, habetur propositum, scilicet quod aliquid sit movens immobile; quod est proprietas primi moventis. . . . Erit ergo aliquid primum movens, quod erit prima causa motus: ita scilicet quod ipsum non movetur, sed movet alia" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1 [Leonine no. 1]).

as it is upon the extended and divisible nature of the mobile things, it can lead, even as it is here interpreted by St. Thomas, only to an unextended and indivisible nature. Proceeding from this basis alone, it does not necessarily involve God as He is understood in the Christian sense.

BOOK VIII OF THE *PHYSICS*

The eighth book of the *Physics* bases its procedure on the *eternity* of motion. It describes motion under the simile of a sort of life to physical things.[32] It envisions a treatment which will be of interest not only to natural philosophy, but also to the science which treats of the first principle;[33] namely, the primary philosophy.

Motion, the Stagirite argues, is eternal because every motion presupposes a subject which has to be generated or at least changed by a preceding motion. So every motion by its very nature presupposes a prior motion.[34] The same holds proportionally for every corruption, which by its nature similarly requires a further corruption.[35] The nature of time supports this argument. The divisible time can neither be nor be known without the indivisible "now," the medium which has to have time both before and after it. Time, therefore, has to be eternal. Accordingly, motion, of which time is but an affection, must likewise be eternal.[36]

St. Thomas accepts the validity of the Aristotelian argument that motion which has to arise through the process of nature (that is, through motion) must be eternal. This, however, leads for him to the conclusion that the original production of things was not a motion or change, but a sort of "emanation" which required no subject.[37]

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[32] *Physics* viii. 1. 250b14-15.

[33] *Ibid.*, 251a5-8. For some chronological indications, cf. G. Verbeke, "La Structure logique de la preuve du Premier Moteur chez Aristote," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, XLVI (1948), 160.

[34] *Physics* viii. 1. 251a8-b10.

[35] *Ibid.*, 251b28-252a5.

[36] *Ibid.*, 251b10-28.

[37] "Et quia omnis motus indiget subjecto, ut hic Aristoteles probat et rei veritas habet, sequitur quod productio universalis entis a Deo non sit motus nec mutatio, sed sit quaedam simplex emanatio. Et sic *fieri* et *facere* aequivoce dicuntur in hac universali rerum productione, et in aliis productionibus. Sicut ergo si intelligamus rerum productionem esse a Deo ab aeterno, sicut Aristoteles posuit, et plures Platonicorum, non est necessarium, immo impossibile, quod huic productioni universali aliquod subjectum non productum praeintelligatur; ita etiam, si ponamus secundum nostrae fidei sententiam, quod non ab aeterno produxerit res, sed produxerit eas postquam non fuerant, non est necessarium quod ponantur aliquod subjectum huic universali productioni. Patet ergo quod hoc quod Aristoteles hic probat, quod omnis motus

Contrary to Aristotle, therefore, St. Thomas can allow a first indivisible in motion, before which there was no motion, and a first indivisible in time, before which there was no time.[38]

The ability to see motion originating in an indivisible indicates quite evidently an entirely different approach to the problem. In fact, what primarily seems to interest St. Thomas in this argument is how the mobile things originally acquired their *esse,* their "to be," from the principle of all *esse.* This production of the totality of *esse,* whether it is from eternity or not, cannot be by way of motion.[39] Motion, in a word, even though it is eternal, cannot ultimately be produced through motion. The essentially imperfect nature of motion seems here, as in the commentary on Book VII, brought to the fore. Motion requires something more than motion to explain its presence.

Moreover, the eternity of motion, which is the basis laid by the Stagirite for his demonstration, is regarded by St. Thomas as irrelevant to the proof. Whether motion is eternal or not, its *esse* has to be accounted for by a sort of emanation from the cause of all *esse.*

Clearly, St. Thomas has shifted the starting point of the demonstra-

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indiget subjecto mobili, non est contra sententiam nostrae fidei: quia jam dictum est quod universalis rerum productio, sive ponatur ab aeterno, sive non ab aeterno, non est motus nec mutatio" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1 [Leonine no. 4]).

"Sunt enim huiusmodi rationes efficaces ad probandum quod motus non inceperit per viam naturae, sicut ab aliquibus ponebatur: . . . inceperunt esse a causa universali totius esse. Ostensum est autem supra, quod productio totius esse a causa prima essendi non est motus, sive ponatur quod haec rerum emanatio sit ab aeterno, sive non. Sic ergo non sequitur quod ante primam mutationem sit aliqua mutatio" (*ibid.* [Leonine no. 18]).

[38]"Si ergo ponimus motum non semper fuisse sed est accipere aliquod primum indivisibile in motu, ante quod nihil fuit motus; erit etiam accipere aliquod nunc in tempore, ante quod non fuit aliquod tempus" (*ibid.* [Leonine no. 20]).

[39]". . . quia antiqui naturales non potuerunt pervenire ad causam primam totius esse, sed considerabant causas particularium mutationum. Quorum primi consideraverunt causas solarum mutationum accidentalium, ponentes omne fieri esse alterari: sequentes vero pervenerunt ad cognitionem mutationum substantialium: postremi vero, ut Plato et Aristoteles, pervenerunt ad cognoscendum principium totius esse.

"Sic igitur patet quod non movemur ad ponendum aliquod fieri ex nihilo, quia reputemus ea esse solum entia quae sunt visibilia: sed magis e contrario, quia non consideramus solas productiones particulares a causis particularibus, sed productionem universalem totius esse a primo essendi principio" (*ibid.*, [Leonine no. 5]).

"Sed sicut dictum est, ipsum esse non acquisiverunt per mutationem vel motum, sed per emanationem a primo rerum principio: et sic non sequitur quod ante primam mutationem sit aliqua mutatio" (*ibid.* [Leonine no. 18]). Cf. *De Substantiis Separatis,* cap. 7; *Opuscula,* ed. Perrier (Paris: Lethielleux, 1949), I, 152-58.

tion from the Aristotelian *eternity* of motion to the *esse* of motion.[40] The culmination of the proof, accordingly, will have to be in the cause which ultimately produces motion from the viewpoint of the *esse* of that motion. What exactly is signified by *esse* in this context is for the moment not made clear.[41] But enough is evident to show that St. Thomas is proceeding from a starting point radically different from that of the Stagirite, and that his approach to the proof from motion is here, as in Book VII, highly metaphysical.

After establishing on the basis of sense evidence[42] that there are things which are sometimes being moved and sometimes at rest, the Stagirite proceeds to prove that whatever is being moved is being moved by something.[43]

The first proof is an induction of all the different types of movement. Things that are moving and being moved per accidens, are moved by belonging to, or being parts of, something else that is in move-

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[40]St. Thomas is fully aware that Aristotle bases his proof on the *eternity* of motion: ". . . quia hic in octavo et in *Metaphys.*, ad probandum primum principium, utitur aeternitate motus" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1 [Leonine no. 6]). Cf. "Ex hoc igitur processu manifestum est quod Aristoteles hic firmiter opinatus est et credidit necessarium fore, quod motus sit sempiternus et similiter tempus. Aliter enim non fundasset super hoc intentionem suam de inquisitione substantiarum immaterialium" (*In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 5 [Cathala no. 2496]). St. Thomas maintains, however, that the demonstration is clearer if it can dispense with the eternity of motion: "Si enim mundo et motu existente sempiterno, necesse est ponere unum primum principium; multo magis sempiternitate eorum sublata; quia manifestum est quod omne novum indiget aliquo principio innovante" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1 [Leonine no. 6]). Cf. "Quia si non fuerit mundus aeternus, necesse est quod fuerit productus in esse ab aliquo praeexistente" (*In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 5 [Cathala no. 2499]). Cf. also *CG*, I, lect. 13 (Leonine p. 33b, ll. 10-19).

[41]The infinitive *esse* may signify for St. Thomas the essence or quiddity or nature of a thing, or the act of existing, or the truth denoted by the copula. "Sciendum est quod esse dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur esse ipsa quidditas vel natura rei, sicut dicitur quod definitio est oratio significans quid est esse; definitio enim quidditatem rei significat. Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus. Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod 'est' dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae" (*In I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1). For Boethius, who is responsible for fixing so much of the Scholastic terminology to technical meanings, *esse* had meant the definition (*In Isagogen Porphyrii*, IV, 14 [*CSEL*, 2d ed., XLVIII, 273, 1. 13]) or the form (*Quomodo Substantiae* . . . [*PL*, LXIV, 1311]) of the thing. This was entirely in accord with the Aristotelian usage of the Greek infinitive of the verb "to be" to signify form.

[42]*Physics* viii. 3. 254a35-b4.

[43]*Ibid.*, 256a2-3.

ment.[44] Things being moved by violence and against their nature are clearly being moved by something else.[45] In things which by nature move themselves, as animals, there is one part which moves, distinguished from what is being moved.[46] Finally, inanimate things which are naturally in motion are moved per se by what generates their nature, per accidens by what removed the impediment.[47] In treating this last type Aristotle insists that every nature or habit will always be in action if the proper conditions are present and nothing is hindering. If a man has knowledge he will be thinking, unless something hinders him; otherwise he would be ignorant. Fire burns, if nothing is preventing it; light and heavy bodies exercise their respective activities straightway, if nothing hinders. Quantity similarly expands at once, if nothing prevents it.[48]

All that Aristotle requires is the form or nature in the agent and the presence of the *passum;* and then, if nothing hinders, the activity and motion straightway take place. The only per se cause required is that which generated the form in the matter. The thing by its very nature "energizes"[49] according to that form, without the need of any further per se cause. The only other factor ever required is a per accidens cause to remove any impediment that may be present. This is the same notion of efficient causality that is found in the *Metaphysics.*[50] Natural things always "energize," and all that is required to explain efficiency is the presence in the agent of a form that is the same as, or equipollent to, the form produced in the *passum.* No awareness of any existential problem in efficiency can be perceived in the text of the Stagirite.

St. Thomas reports this doctrine of the Stagirite faithfully and without comment.[51] For the moment, he remains strictly within the limits of the Aristotelian conception of efficiency.

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[44] *Ibid.*, 254b7-10.
[45] *Ibid.*, 254b24-27; 255b32-33.
[46] *Ibid.*, 254b27-33.
[47] *Ibid.*, 254b33-255b29.
[48] *Ibid.*, 255b1-24.
[49] *Ibid.*, 255a34-b5.
[50] *Metaphysics*, Z 7-8. 1032a12-1034a5; 8. 1050b28-30.
[51] "Ergo de prima potentia reducitur in actum cui coniungitur secunda potentia, per aliquod agens, scilicet per docentem. Sed quando sic se habet quod habet habitum scientiae, non oportet quod reducatur in secundum actum per aliquod agens, sed statim per seipsum operatur considerando, nisi sit aliquod prohibens, puta occupatio vel infirmitas aut voluntas" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 4 [Leonine no. 3]).

"Haec ergo, scilicet aqua, primo est in potentia levis, et postmodum fit levis in actu; et tunc statim habet operationem suam, nisi aliquod prohibeat" (*ibid.* [Leonine no. 5]).

Having established this first proposition on the basis of induction, Aristotle immediately goes on to show that one cannot proceed indefinitely in a series of moved movents. Since all things that are being moved are being moved by something, the first in a series of movents is in a greater sense the movent than the others. The others depend on the first in imparting motion, but not the first on the others. The movement of all the others, accordingly, depends on the first. There must therefore be a first movent which is not being moved by another. An indefinite series of moved movents would have no *first* movent and so could not account for motion. In a series of moved movents, then, the first movent is necessarily being moved not by another but by itself. The principal example given to illustrate this doctrine is the stick moving the stone and being moved by the hand, the hand being in its turn moved by the man, and the man finally being moved by nothing other than himself.[52] The self-movent, accordingly, is located in animate beings.

The doctrine is further explained by showing that if everything which is being moved is being moved by a *moved* movent, this requirement (that every movent is being moved in imparting its motion) will be either per accidens or per se. If the requirement is only per accidens, motion need not be eternal.[53] If on the other hand every movent is being moved not per accidens but necessarily, then a particular movent would be giving itself, either immediately or mediately, the same type of act to which it is being moved. This would mean that one who is teaching is thereby learning what he is teaching and so would necessarily both have and not have the knowledge in question. So the first thing that is in motion in a series either will be moved by something that is at rest or else will be moving itself.[54]

". . . sicut etiam dictum est in qualitate, quod quando est quale in actu, statim tendit in suam actionem; sicut ille qui est sciens, statim considerat, nisi aliquid prohibeat. Et similiter in motu quantitatis; quia ex quo facta est additio quanti ad quantum, statim sequitur extensio in corpore augmentabili, nisi aliquid prohibeat" (*ibid.* [Leonine no. 7]).

[52] *Physics* viii. 5. 256a2-b3.

[53] *Ibid.*, 256b3-27. W. D. Ross (*Aristotle's Physics*, p. 669) takes the immobile movent at 256b24 as referring to God. But comparison with 257b26-258b4 shows that Aristotle is thinking of the immobile movent as part of the self-movent; that is, as a soul. The Stagirite notes that Anaxagoras therefore correctly said that the Mind must be impassible and unmixed, since Anaxagoras makes the Mind the source of motion; that is, efficient cause. But Aristotle does not say that his own immobile movent here is unmixed or separate from the animated body.

[54] *Ibid.*, 256b27-257a27. That something which is "at rest" (*eremoun*) could cause motion is not taken into consideration by Aristotle. "At rest" means the privation of motion in something mobile. It does not refer to im-

The cause and first principle of motion, moreover, should be that which moves itself rather than that which is being moved by another, since that which is per se a cause is always prior as such to that which is cause only in virtue of being dependent on something else. Accordingly, a new approach to the question from the viewpoint of *how* a thing moves itself should bring out this same doctrine. For motion is a process towards act; it is an imperfect act. The mobile thing is in potency to act; it lacks the act towards which it is tending. The movent, however, already has that act, as, for instance, what is hot imparts heat and what has the form generates. If a thing as a whole could heat itself, it would be at the same time both hot and not hot in the same respect. Therefore, when a thing moves itself, one part of it is the movent and another part is being moved. The self-movent, further, cannot be conceived as having parts which reciprocally move each other. In this case there would likewise be no *first* movent, and so the arguments just considered would apply equally in this case. Nor is the primary self-movent being moved by a self-moving part, for in this case that part would be the primary self-movent.[55]

The result of this reasoning, then, is that in all instances that which primarily imparts motion is immobile.[56] This immobile movent has been located as a part of the self-movent, quite clearly in the sense of a soul. Again, in all the foregoing explanation of the reduction of potency to act, the only requirements are that the movent already have the form that is being imparted and that it be in contact with the *passum*. No existential problem seems to arise.

St. Thomas in his commentary has no disagreement with this Aristotelian reasoning[57] and is careful to point out that, although for motion in general the Stagirite had rejected any primary instance, he can nevertheless admit a primary self-movent in particular.[58]

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mobile being. *Eremia* is found only in mobile things. Cf. *Physics* iii. 2. 202a4-5; iv. 12. 221b9-14; v. 2. 226b15-16 and 6. 229b24-26; vi 3. 234a31-34 and 8. 239a12-14. St. Thomas is well aware of this distinction (cf. *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 3 [Leonine no. 2]); nevertheless in the present text (*ibid.*, lect. 5, 9 [Leonine no. 13]) he takes this argument as concluding in its first member to something "immobile." He likewise gives this same interpretation at *CG*, I cap. 13 (Leonine p. 32b, ll. 19-24).

[55] *Physics* viii. 5. 257a27-b32.

[56] *Ibid.* 258b4-9.

[57] *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 5 (Leonine nos. 9-11).

[58] "Ubi considerandum est quod Aristoteles prius in sexto probavit quod in motu non est aliquid primum, . . . quia tunc loquebatur de motu in communi, et de mobili secundum quod est quoddam continuum, nondum applicando ad determinatas naturas. Et secundum hoc sequeretur quod non esset aliquid primo motum, et per consequens nec aliquid primo movens, si movens sit continuum: et ita etiam non esset aliquid primo movens seipsum. Sed nunc

The final step in the Aristotelian argument is to show that among such immobile movents at least one must be eternal.

In some self-movents—namely, plants and animals—the immobile movents sometimes are and sometimes are not, without any process of generation and corruption.[59] But the eternity of motion does not permit that all unmoved movents should be so. There has to be some *eternal* immobile movent to cause the *eternally continuous* motion.[60] Moreover, if the continuity of the eternal motion is to be accounted for, this eternal movent cannot be mobile even per accidens, as, for instance, are the souls of terrestrial things which move from place to place with their bodies, or those heavenly bodies which have several motions.[61] It will impart continuous motion; but the movent that it is moving mediately can impart contrary motion and so cause some things to be sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest.[62] Finally, the primary movent has no magnitude and is located at the circumference of the universe where the motion is quickest.[63]

This reasoning, evidently, leads to nothing more than the soul of the outermost heaven. Starting from the eternity of motion, it has shown by induction that whatever is being moved is being moved by something. But in a series of things that are being moved, there must be a first movent in virtue of which the others impart motion. This first movent is not being moved by anything other than itself and so has to be a self-movent; and in a self-movent the motion is caused by a part that is immobile, as in animate things.[64] The eternal continuity of motion, however, can be explained only by a celestial soul which is immobile both per se and per accidens; and the sole reason why the primary movent must be immobile both per se and per accidens is this eternal continuity of motion. Since efficient causality is explained ultimately by form as act, it requires nothing further in this order of cause. Every Aristotelian form "energizes" of its own nature, when nothing hinders. The soul of the first heaven in this way fully suffices to explain the primary movement of the heavens as efficient cause. In the line of efficient causality the argument is closed. It leaves no way open to argue to any further *efficient* cause of motion.

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iam Aristoteles loquitur de motu, applicando ad determinatas naturas: et ideo ponit aliquid esse primo movens seipsum" (*ibid.*, [Leonine no. 6]).

[59] *Physics* viii. 6. 258b16-24; 259b1-20.

[60] *Ibid.*, 258b26-259a20.

[61] *Ibid.*, 259a20-b31.

[62] *Ibid.*, 260a1-19.

[63] *Ibid.*, 10. 266a10-267b26.

[64] Cf. summary of the reasoning *ibid.*, 6. 259a29-b1.

St. Thomas, however, cannot admit a primary movent which *necessarily* causes eternal movement.[65] But otherwise he remains quite close to the text in his commentary on this final part of the demonstration. He speaks cautiously in regard to the sphere movents, in such a way as not to commit himself to any animation of the heavens.[66] Having rejected the eternity of motion as a fact, he is not in a position to press home the force of the Stagirite's argument. At one point he interprets the text as excluding a certain possible proof for the eternity of the primary movent. The primary movent is immobile. Therefore it cannot be generated or corrupted; it cannot at one time be and at another time not be; and so it must be perpetual. But he notes that Aristotle does not bother about this reason. The capacity to acquire or lose *esse* does not prevent a thing from being immobile according to the Stagirite's doctrine of being. But the fact that some souls come to be and perish is mentioned by Aristotle merely to show that the totality of such souls cannot account for the eternal continuity of motion. The same fact is interpreted by St. Thomas as indicating a direct argument for the eternity of the primary movent, an argument, however, in which the Stagirite is not interested.[67] On the basis of *esse* as an act which is acquired or lost in generation and corruption, this argument would be conclusive; and *esse* had as a matter of fact been substituted for the eternity of motion by St.

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[65]"Est autem sciendum quod hae rationes, quibus Aristoteles probare nititur primum motum esse perpetuum, non ex necessitate concludunt: potest enim contingere absque omni mutatione primi motoris, quod non semper moveat, sicut supra ostensum est in principio huius octavi" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 6 [Leonine no. 8]).

[66]For example: "Et huius diversitatis ratio est, quia motores superiorum orbium non constituuntur in suo esse ex sua unione ad corpora, et eorum connexio est invariabilis; et ideo quamvis corpora orbium moveantur, ipsi non moventur per accidens" (*ibid.* [Leonine no. 6]). The plurality of such immobile movents as established by the Aristotelian argument is not questioned: "Est etiam attendendum quod, quia nullum movens motum potest causare motum continuum sempiternum, ideo in XI *Metaph.* probare intendit multitudinem motorum immobilium secundum multitudinem caelestium motuum, quasi illa consideratio sequatur ad istum" (*ibid.*, lect. 10 [Leonine no. 8]).

[67]Cf. Aristotle *Physics* viii. 6. 258b16-259a8. St. Thomas: "Potest autem aliquis sic procedere. Omne quod non potest quandoque esse et quandoque non esse, est perpetuum: sed primum movens, cum sit immobile, ut ostensum est, non potest quandoque esse et quandoque non esse; quia quod quandoque est et quandoque non est, generatur et corrumpitur; quod autem generatur et corrumpitur, movetur: ergo primum movens est perpetuum. Aristoteles autem de hac ratione non curat: quia potest aliquis dicere si vult, quod in quibusdam contingit quod quandoque sint et quandoque non sint, absque hoc quod generentur et corrumpantur per se loquendo, et per consequens absque hoc quod per se moveantur" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 6 [Leonine no. 5]).

Thomas as the starting point of the demonstration at the beginning of his commentary.[68] But St. Thomas, remaining with the text, does not press his own viewpoint further. Nor does he anywhere in this part of the commentary proper expressly identify the Aristotelian prime movent with God.[69] Only in the solemn invocation at the conclusion of the treatise does he mention that the Philosopher ends the study in the principle of all nature, which is the God of Christian worship.[70]

BOOK LAMBDA OF THE *METAPHYSICS*

Book Lambda of the *Metaphysics* contains a further development of the proof from motion. This book, like the seventh book of the *Physics,* is a comparatively detached treatise. It has no certain references either to or from any of the other metaphysical writings. It shows some dependence on Book Nu, however, and refers back explicitly to the physical treatises.[71] It presupposes especially the doctrine of eternal motion and time, as established in the eighth book of the *Physics.* It presents itself as a treatment of entity (*ousia*).

The starting point of the demonstration is once more the eternity of motion. Motion and time are eternal, and being accidents they presuppose substance (*ousia*). There must, then, be an eternal immobile substance. This substance has not only to be in act, but its very entity (*ousia*) must be act, if it is to be the principle of eternal motion; if its nature were potency, it would be possible for it not to be, and so motion need not be eternal. This substance, accordingly, will be

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[68]Cf. *supra,* nn. 39-40. St. Thomas himself looks upon everything, except the subsistent act of *esse,* as being in potency to *esse.* Speaking independently of Aristotle, he says: "Substantia autem simplex quae est ipsum esse subsistens, non potest esse nisi una, sicut nec albedo, si esset subsistens, posset esse nisi una. Omnis ergo substantia quae est post primam substantiam simplicem, participat esse. Omne autem participans componitur ex participante et participato, et participans est in potentia ad participatum. In omni ergo substantia quantumcumque simplici, post primam substantiam simplicem, est potentia essendi" (*In VIII Phys.,* lect. 10 [Leonine no. 13]). "Omne enim quod non est suum esse, participat esse a causa prima, quae est suum esse. . . . Unde sicut motus perpetuus demonstrat infinitam virtutem motoris, non autem ipsius mobilis; ita et perpetua eius duratio demonstrat infinitam virtutem causae a qua habet esse" (*ibid.* [Leonine no. 14]). On the two senses of *generatio* and *corruptio,* cf. *De Veritate,* V, a. 2 ad 6.

[69]In this part of the commentary, God is mentioned explicitly only when St. Thomas is treating the comments of Alexander and Averroes (*In VIII Phys.,* lect. 10 [Leonine no. 14]).

[70]"Et sic terminat Philosophus considerationem communem de rebus naturalibus in primo principio totius naturae, *qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Amen*" (*ibid.,* [Leonine no. 9]. Cf. Javellus, *In Metaph.* XII, 3 (Venice, 1568, fol. 322v2).

[71]Cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics,* I, xxvii-xxviii and II, 384.

without matter. As the object of knowledge and love, it will impart motion to the first heaven.[72] It knows itself and nothing else.[73] To account for the other original movements in the heavens, a plurality of such separate substances is required.[74]

In this reasoning Aristotle considers the first heaven as being moved, through *final* causality, by a separate entity which is entirely without matter. Since a number of other eternal movements are observable in the heavens, these likewise require corresponding separate movents. The argument of the *Metaphysics,* accordingly, leads to a plurality of eternal, separate movents, which are final causes only and not efficient causes. As act is equated with form and finitude in the primary philosophy, each of these pure acts, including the first, has to be finite.

The treatment from the viewpoint of *ousia,* therefore, adds nothing further in the line of efficient causality to the immobile movents of the *Physics.* It shows that the movent must have an eternally unchanging object of desire, which has to be pure act. This object of desire is not required to explain efficiently any passage of the sphere soul from potency to act, but only to account for the eternally unchanging character of the motion which it causes. The further treatment in the *Metaphysics,* accordingly, adds nothing to the Aristotelian requirements for the functioning of a cause from the viewpoint of efficiency. Like the procedure in the eighth book of the *Physics,* this proof rests on the eternity of cosmic motion.

St. Thomas realizes full well that the Aristotelian argument is based on the eternity of the world.[75] Yet without the least hesitation he changes this basis to the production of *esse,* and on that new foundation he builds up the demonstration in such a way as to arrive at substance without potency. If the world is not eternal, it has to be produced in *esse* by something which pre-exists. This likewise, if it is not eternal, would have to be produced by something; and since one cannot proceed indefinitely, one must reach an eternal substance in which there is no potency.[76] The act in question, accordingly, seems

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[72]*Metaphysics* Λ. 6-7. 1071b3-1072b14. St. Thomas notes: ". . . necesse est enim, si primum movens movet sicut primum intellectum et desideratum, quod primum mobile desideret et intelligat ipsum. Et hoc quidem verum est secundum opinionem Aristotelis, inquantum caelum ponitur animatum anima intelligente et desiderante" (*In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 8 [Cathala no. 2536]).

[73]*Metaphysics* Λ. 9. 1074b15-35.

[74]*Ibid.* 8. 1073a14-1074a17.

[75]*In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 5 (Cathala no. 2496). Text *supra,* n. 40.

[76]"Sed quamvis rationes probantes sempiternitatem motus et temporis non sint demonstrativae et ex necessitate concludentes, tamen ea quae hic

to be that of *esse,* produced in mobile things by something which pre-exists. The *motion* of the Aristotelian argument is interpreted in terms of the production of the act which makes a thing exist. It concludes to a substance which exists per se.[77] The potency envisaged in the demonstration seems to include a potency to the act of existing, and the act which finally is reached is accordingly the act of existing per se.

St. Thomas is also careful to point out that the necessity of the primary movement is subject to the will of God, just as artifacts are to the will of the artificer.[78] Likewise, a heavenly body has the potency of receiving its *esse.*[79] In this interpretation, the primary immobile movent by knowing itself knows all other things.[80] It seems to impart motion, then, as the efficient cause of all things according to their act of *esse*; and hence, as their efficient cause through intelligence and will, it knows those things in itself. Since Aristotle himself uses the terms "god" and "gods" to designate separate entity in this treatise, St. Thomas has no hesitation in referring to the primary movent as God. He sees the Aristotelian argument concluding to the God of his own religious faith.[81]

[*to be continued*]

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probantur de sempiternitate et immaterialitate primae substantiae, ex necessitate sequuntur. Quia si non fuerit mundus aeternus, necesse est quod fuerit productus in esse ab aliquo praeexistente. Et si hoc non sit aeternum, oportet iterum quod sit productum ab aliquo. Et cum hoc non possit procedere in infinitum, ut supra in secundo probatum est, necesse est ponere aliquam substantiam sempiternam, in cujus substantia non sit potentia, et per consequens immaterialem" (*ibid.* [Cathala no. 2494]).

[77]"Si autem primum movens est sempiternum et non motum, oportet quod non sit ens in potentia; quia quod est ens in potentia natum est moveri; sed quod sit substantia per se existens, et quod substantia ejus sit actus" (*ibid.*, lect. 6 [Cathala no. 2518]).

[78]". . . assimilatio autem ad id quod est volens, et intelligens, cujusmodi ostendit esse Deum, attenditur secundum voluntatem et intelligentiam, sicut artificiata assimilantur artifici, inquantum in eis voluntas artificis adimpletur: sequitur quod tota necessitas primi motus subjaceat voluntati Dei" (*ibid.*, lect. 7 [Cathala no. 2535]).

[79]"Sed nec etiam potest dici quod in corpore caelesti sit virtus infinita, etsi infinito tempore esse habeat; quia in eo non est virtus activa sui esse, sed solum susceptiva" (*ibid.*, lect. 8 [Cathala no. 2550]).

[80]"Quanto autem aliquod principium perfectius intelligitur, tanto magis intelligitur in eo effectus ejus; nam principiata continentur in virtute principii. Cum igitur a primo principio, quod est Deus, dependeat caelum et tota natura, ut dictum est, patet, quod Deus cognoscendo seipsum, omnia cognoscit" (*ibid.*, lect. 11 [Cathala no. 2615]).

[81]"Et hoc est quod concludit, quod est unus princeps totius universi, scilicet primum movens, et primum intelligibile, et primum bonum, quod supra dixit Deum, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen" (*ibid.*, lect. 12 [Cathala no. 2663]).

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Postscripts and Addenda to De Principiis Naturae (Continued)

John J. Pauson

II

SAMPLE OF VARIATIONS FROM ALL AVAILABLE TEXTS.

SIGLA CODICUM

A—Avignon, Ville, 253, *saec.* XIV
B—Bologna, Univ. 861 (1655), *saec.* XIV (B^2 - *saec.* XIV*ex.*)
C—Cambridge, Corpus Chr. 35, *saec.* XIII/XIV
D—Budapest, Hungarian National Museum, 104, *saec.* XIV
E—Escorial, h-II-1, *saec.* XIII/XIV
F—Bruxelles, Bibl. Roy. 873-885 (1561), *saec.* XIII/XIV (F^2 - *saec.* XIV*ex.*)
G—Paris, Ste-Geneviève, 238, *saec.* XIV
H—Bordeaux, Ville, 131, *saec.* XIV
I— Napoli, Nazionale, VII B. 16, *saec.* XIII/XIV
J—Toledo, Cabildo, 19-15, *saec.* XIV
K—München, Clm 3754, saec. XIV/XV
L—Roma, Comm. Leonina, 8, *saec.* XV
M—Metz, Ville, 1158, saec. XIII
N—Napoli, Nazionale, VIII B. 21, *saec.* XIII
O—Roma, Vat. Ottob. lat. 198, *saec.* XIV (O^2 - *saec.* XV)
P—Paris, Nat. lat. 14546, *saec.* XIII/XIV (P^2 - *saec.* XIV, P^3 - *saec.* XV)
Q—Pommersfelden, 90/2656, *saec.* XIII/XIV
R—Roma, Vat. lat. 807, *saec.* XIV
S—Sevilla, Colombina, 5-1-13, *saec.* XIV (S^2 - *saec.* XV*in.*)
T—Toulouse, Ville, 872, *saec.* XIII
U—Padova, Univ. 1158, *saec.* XIV
V—Roma, Vallicelliana, E. 30, *saec.* XIII/XIV
W—Wien, Nat. lat. 2303, *saec.* XIV
X—Oxford, Canon. Script. Eccles. 76, *saec.* XIV
Y—Oxford, Corpus Chr. 225, *saec.* XIV
Z—Venezia, S. Marco, Cl. IV, Cod. 31, (Z.L. 128B), *saec.* XIV
a—Bologna, Archiginnasio, A 1454, *saec.* XIV/XV (a^2 - *saec.* XV, a^3 - *saec.* XV*ex.*)
b—Basel, Univ. F VI 58, *saec.* XV
c—Cambridge, Univ. 763, *saec.* XV

d—Budapest, Hungarian National Museum, 269, *saec.* XV
e—Roma, Vat. Barb. lat. 463, *saec.* XV
f—Bruxelles, Bibl. Roy. 2453-73 (1573), *saec.* XV
g—Berlin, Nat. lat. Q 90 (992), *saec.* XV/XVI
h—München, Clm 6942 (968), *saec.* XV (h^2 - *saec.* XV*ex.*)
i—Innsbruck, Univ. 197, *saec.* XV
j—München, Clm 18656 (1589), *saec.* XV
k—München, Clm 18985 (1779), *saec.* XV
l—Leipzig, Univ. 1422, *saec.* XV/XVI
m—München, Univ. Fol. 49, *saec.* XV
n—Napoli, Nazionale, VIII F. 40, *saec.* XV
o—Napoli, Nazionale, VIII G. 35, *saec.* XV
p—Paris, Nat. lat. 6738A, *saec.* XV
q—Pisa, S. Caterina, 99 (115), saec. XV
r—Roma, Casanatense, 1533, *saec.* XV
s—Paris, Univ. 1032, *saec.* XV
t—Roma, Vat. lat. 806, *saec.* XV (t^2 - *saec.* XV)
u—Roma, Vat. Urb. lat. 472, *saec.* XV
v—Valencia, Univ. 2300, *saec.* XV
w—Wien, O.P. 69/295, *saec.* XV (w^2 - *saec.* XV)
x—Wien, Nat. lat. 3513, *saec.* XV
y—*Incun.* Koln, 1472
z—*Incun.* Belgicum, 1485
2—*Incun.* Leipzig, 1492
3—*Incun.* Leipzig, 1495
4—*Incun.* Milano, 1488
5—*Incun.* Venezia, 1490
6—*Incun.* Venezia, 1498
7—Parmae *ed.* 1852-1873
8—Vives *ed.* 1871-1882
9—Lethielleux *ed.* 1881

CAPUT PRIMUM

Nota quod quoddam potest esse licet non sit, quoddam vero est. Illud quod potest esse, dicitur potentia esse; illud quod iam

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1 Nota quod: Quoniam autem ABIPgi(vel nota quod *add in marg* P), Quoniam HORSWZcemoswx45679, Notandum quod EP^{3}UVp, *om* Y, Quoniam igitur hjk, Quoniam quidem tu, quoniam autem quidem v, in aliquibus codicibus sic incipit quoniam autem quoddam esse potest *add in marg* F^2 || **quoddam**: quaedam Ddy2(res *add* y^2), quidam ORWa, aliquid a^{3}hjks, quaedam res 13 || **potest esse**: esse potest BPghjk || **licet**: cum Y || **non**: nondum i || **sit**: aliquid *add* hjk || **quoddam vero est**: quoddam est iam Ag, iam *add* BHIWcemwx, *om* Ebdfly23, quidam vero est iam OR, quoddam vero iam est SYZhijknoz45679, quidam vero iam est a, aliquid vero iam est a^{2}s ||
2 Illud quod: Id quod BJWZgtuv, Quod vero Ebdflyz23, Et illud quod F, Illud autem quod NSXY(Illud quod S^2), Sicut Illud quod h, sic quod j, sicut quod k, Id autem quod r || **potest esse**: et non est *add* a^{2}pq456789, licet non sit *add* ce, esse potest g || **dicitur potentia esse**: est in potentia ad

est, dicitur esse actu. Sed duplex est esse : scilicet esse essentiale sive substantiale rei, ut hominem esse, et hoc est esse simpliciter est aliud esse accidentale, ut hominem esse album, et hoc est esse aliquid.

Ad utrumque esse est aliquid in potentia. Aliquid enim est in potentia ut sit homo, ut sperma et sanguis menstruus; aliquid est in potentia ut sit album, ut homo. Et tam illud quod est in

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A, est potentia BHORSZg, dicitur esse potentia CDFGIJKLNTXaprtuv 456789, dicitur in potentia E, potentia est Wmx, dicitur esse in potentia Ybcdefilnoqsyz23, est in potentia w || **illud**: id BWZgrtuv, autem *add* E456789, *om* F, sed illud S, vero *add* UVceis, sic illud h, sicut quod jk || **iam est**: est iam ABPg ||

3 dicitur esse actu: actu A, actus dicitur esse HORS, dicitur esse in actu cs est actu g, dicitur actu esse hjk, actu dicitur esse mwx || Sed: Secundum N || **duplex**: dupliciter t || **scilicet**: *om* mx || **esse essentiale** essentiale ABHOPRWYZcegno(esse essentiale B^2, esse O^2), rei *add* CDFG IJNQTXpqrs, essentiale et rei M, substantiale S, esse substantiale bi essentiale rei hjk, *om* mx ||

4 sive substantiale rei: sive substantiale CDFGIJMQTYhjkpqrstuv, ve substantiale NX, substantiale rei O^2(sive substantiale rei O), sive essentiale rei Sbi, unum substantiale rei mx, sive esse substantiale rei 456789 || **ut**: et g || **esse**: *om* D || **est**: *om* uy || **simpliciter**: simplex Zblijk hominem simpliciter 13 ||

5 est aliud: aliud est ABHORSWdmwx, est autem aliud CDFGIJMNQTXY cehijkrtuv456789, aliud est est R, et aliud est b, et est aliud g, est autem et aliud pq, aliud autem est s || **accidentale**: actuale H, scilicet *add* KL scilicet accidentale c || **ut hominem esse album**: *om* ASWZ, ut scilicet hominem hunc album esse UV, ut hominem esse a(ut hominem esse album a^3), ut hominem album mx || **et hoc est**: et hoc HPs, et hoc esse est Ebdflyz23 || **esse aliquid**: aliquid esse ABEHORSUVZabfpqw, aliquid esse vel secundum quid C, esse vel aliquid vel secundum quid G, secundum quid esse KLS^{2}a^{3}dlyz23, esse secundum quid Petuv456789, secundum quid sive aliquid esse W, aliquid esse secundum quid g, esse accidentale m accidentale esse x, ut hominem esse album *add* ASW, ut hominem album *add* Z ||

7 Ad: Et ad Jrtuv || **esse**: tamen esse ANORiwx2, autem esse B^2Za^3ce 456789(esse Ba), cum esse H, enim esse S, aliquid esse W, tamen esse X, *om* fno, autem horum m || **est**: enim K, esse X, *om* ce || **aliquid in potentia**: in potentia aliquid G, *om* ce, aliud in potentia l, esse *add* h^2 || **Aliquid enim est**: Nam aliquid est AORSWZmwx, Aliquid igitur est B, *om* H, Aliquid est NXc, Aliquid e, Quia ut sit homo est aliquid g, Aliquid enim sit v ||

8 in potenia: *om* HW || **ut sit homo**: *om* Dceg || **ut sperma**: et sperma Ag, *om* D, sicut sperma EKLUVabdflnowyz23 || **et sanguis menstruus**: *om* D, sanguis menstruus J, et sanguis mentruum W, sunt in potentia ad esse hominem *add* ce || **aliquid est**: *om* D, aliquid autem est Ebdfi, et est aliquid S, ut sit *add* W, aliquid etiam est cl3, aliud enim est e, aliud esse est g, aliud est hjky, et aliquid est pq, aliquid s456789, aliud autem est yz2 ||

9 in potentia *om* Ds, esse in potentia d || **sit**: si 9 || **ut homo**: sicut homo EUVabdflnopqwyz23 || **Et tam illud**: Tam illud ABDFIJPTUVWZ abfgpst (Et tam illud F^2), Tam id Edlquvyz23, Et tum illud H, Ut tam illud K, autem id N, Tam autem id Xr, Tam autem illud i456, Unde et tam illud no Tamen illud 789 ||

potentia ad esse substantiale, quam illud quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale, potest dici materia; sicut sperma hominis et homo albedinis. Sed in hoc differunt, quia materia quae est in potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur materia ex qua; quae autem est in potentia ad esse accidentale, dicitur materia in qua. Item proprie loquendo quod est in potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur materia prima; quod vero est in potentia ad esse accidentale, dicitur subiectum. Unde dicitur quod accidentia sunt in subiecto;

ll. 15-17 *Versio Altera*

i proprie loquendo quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale

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10 ad esse substantiale: sive essentiale rei *add* B, ad esse actuale H, *om* 56789 || **quam illud**: quam id ENXqrtuv, tam illud TU, *om* a56789(quam illud a^3) || **quod est**: quod B, *om* a56789(quod est a^3) || **in potentia**: est *add* B, *om* Zam56789(in potentia a^3), ad esse accidentale x || **ad esse accidentale**: ad esse substantiale H, *om* ax(ad esse accidentale a^3), ad accidentale esse g, accidentale t(ad esse accidentale t^2), in potentia x ||
11 potest dici materia: dicitur materia B, materia potest dici pq || **sicut sperma**: sicut sperma est materia AHORSmwx, si sperma M, scilicet sperma Q, ut sperma WZcegt^2(sperma t), scilicet sperma s, sperma v ||
12 homo albedinis: homo dicitur materia no, albedinis homo tu, albedinis hoc v || **in hoc**: hoc Z, haec i, || differunt: differt CDEFGHIJMNOQRSTYZfhjkpqrstuv(differunt F^2), est differentia i || **quia materia**: quia illud BHORa^{3}wx456789(quia materia a), quod illud H, quod materia LPZno, quoniam materia W, quia id m || **quae est**: quod est BHORa^{3}mwx456789(quae est a), est K, quae esse T ||
13 substantiale: substantia H || **dicitur**: potest dici U || **qua**: hominis *add* x || **quae autem est**: quod autem est BHa^{3}x(quae autem est a), quae est MQ, quod est autem ORw, quae autem dicitur PWZ, illud autem quod est m, quae vero est s ||
14 in potentia: materia PWZ || **ad**: ud 9 || **accidentale**: actuale H || **dicitur**: esse *add* MQjk || **materia**: ut *add* BEHORadfyz(materia O^2a^3) || **item**: iterum KLNOPRTUVXa^{3}ginopq(*om* a) || **14-16** dicitur . . . accidentale *om* Wb ||
15 quod: id quod ABmx, illud quod HORSa^{3}w456789, quod vero pq || **substantiale**: accidentale A || . . . .
16 materia prima: materia AEHKLOPRSUVZacdefglnowxyz23(materia prima a^3), proprie materia pq || **quod vero**: quod autem AHORS^{2}UVZanopqw456789(et quod S), quae vero g, illud autem quod x || **ad esse accidentale**: accidentale S(ad esse accidentale S^2), ad accidentale esse a ||
17 dicitur subiectum: est subiectum g, Quod vero est in potentia dicitur materia proprie. Quod autem id quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicatur subiectum signum est quia dicuntur accidentia *add* x, quod autem illud quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicatur subiectum signum est *add* z, Subiectum enim dat esse accidenti scilicet existendi quia accidens non habet esse nisi per subiectum *add* 456789, subiectum dat esse accidenti scilicet esse existendi quia accidens non habet esse nisi per subiectum *add in marg* a || **Unde dicitur**: Unde Z(Unde dicitur Z^2), *om* x, quia dicitur z || **quod accidentia**: dicitur *add* H, quod e, *om* x || **sunt in subiecto**: insunt subiecto c, in subiecto sunt accidentia e, *om* x ||

ii dicitur subiectum; quod vero est in potentia ad esse sub-
iii stantiale dicitur materia proprie. Quod autem illud quod
iv est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicatur subiectum sig-
v num est. Dicuntur enim accidentia esse in subiecto;

non autem dicitur quod forma substantialis sit in subiecto. Et secundum hoc differt materia a subiecto, quia subiectum est quod
20 non habet esse ex eo quod advenit, sed per se habet esse completum; sicut homo non habet esse ab albedine. Sed materia habet esse ex eo quod sibi advenit, quia de se habet esse incompletum. Unde simpliciter loquendo forma dat esse materiae, accidens autem

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15-17 *versio altera*: CDEFGIJMNQTXYhijklmrstuv
i loquendo: illud quod est in potentia ad esse substantiale dicitur materia, illud autem *add* m || **in potentia ad esse**: ad esse in potentia CG || **ii vero est**: non est G, vero Y || **ad esse substantiale**: *om* m || **iii materia proprie**: proprie materia CDGJThmrtuv (prima *add* h^2) || **quod autem illud**: quod autem id NXYtuv, quia autem illud r || **iv est in potentia**: in potentia est CG || **signum est**: patet per hoc NXI ||
v Dicuntur enim: quia dicuntur CDFGIJTrs, quod NXi, quod dicuntur Y, quia dicitur quod m, quia accidentia dicuntur tuv || **acccidentia esse**: esse accidentia CFGIJTr, accidentia NXi, accidentia sunt m, esse tuv || **in subiecto**: esse dicuntur *add* NXi ||
18 autem dicitur: dicitur A, autem CDFGINTXLpqs, tamen dicitur S, om Y, dicitur autem tuv || **forma substantialis**: forma I, substantialis forma UV || **sit in**: sit a(sit in a^3), inest c, est in mx || **subiecto**: accidentaliter *add* A || **et secundum**: secundum autem B, et in g ||
19 differt materia: dicitur materia H, differunt materia cgno, materia differt qs || **a subiecto**: et subiectum cgno, a sensu i || **quia**: nam AHORSmwx, quod Xbfy || **est quod**: *om* WZ, est illud quod c ||
20 ex eo: eo D, ab eo ex eo F(ex eo F^2), ab eo e || **quod**: aliquid *add* a^3no456789 || **advenit**: sibi advenit Binorw, sibi *add* Ebdflyz23, ei advenit S^2ahjkpqtuv456789(advenit S), ei *add* e || **sed per se**: quia de se B, sed quod est per se et $a^3$456789(sed per se a), sed ex se e, sed habet esse m, sed habet x || **esse completum**: completum esse BGHOPRcew, per se completum esse mx ||
21 sicut: ut ce456789 || **non habet esse**: non potest esse B, non enim habet esse g, albus i || **ab albedine**: albedine KTai, per albedinem $a^3$456789, ex albedine gtuv || **materia habet esse**: materia dicitur quod habet esse 456789 || **21-22** sicut homo . . . incompletum *om* ADW ||
22 ex:ab ce || **sibi advenit**: ei advenit CFGIMNQS^2TXhjkpqtuv(sibi advenit S), ibi advenit J, advenit Ycg, advenit sibi Z, advenit ei e, ei advenit forma s || **quia**: qua P(*quia* P^3), quod CGZ || **habet**: *om* 6789 || **esse incompletum**: incompletum esse B, esse completum KLq, immo nullum esse habet ut Commentator dicit supra secundum de anima Materia de se *add* NX, immo non esse habet materia de se ut Commentator dicit supra secundum de anima *add* h^2, incompletum esse immo de se habet nullum esse unde Commentator in secundo de anima dicit i, immo de se nullum habet esse *add* w^2, immo nullum esse habet ut dicit Commentator in secundo de anima *add* 456789 ||
23 Unde: id est X, ita i || simpliciter: *om* o || **autem**: *om* W || **23-24** accidens . . . subiecto *om* CDEFGJKLMNQTUVXYbdfhijklrstuvyz23(*includit* F^2) ||

non dat esse subiecto, sed subiectum accidenti, licet aliquando
25 unum ponatur pro altero, scilicet materia pro subiecto et e converso.

24 non: *om* a(non a^8) || **esse:** *om* A || **subiecto:** substantiae I || **sed:** et NXituv || **accidenti:** potius accidenti AHORSmwx, secundum accidenti E, dat esse accidenti et non e converso MQ, accidenti dat esse et non e converso hjk, dat esse accidenti s || **licet:** sed DFIMQYhjks || **aliquando:** *om* KLUVg, quandoque m ||

25 unum ponatur: unum ponitur B, unum sumatur CGJNTXpqrtuv, unum sumitur DFIMQYhjks, ponatur unum HORamnox46789(ponatur uno 5), unum pro altero aliquando ponatur K, unum aliquando pro altero ponatur L, unum aliquando ponatur UVg || **pro altero:** pro alio ABHORSaimnoswx-456789, *om* DKLP, pro aliquo P^2g || **materia pro subiecto:** subiectum pro materia AHORSmwxy || **converso:** contrario 456789 ||

Although this sample of the variations from all the currently available texts is helpful indeed in establishing and proving the important and parent manuscripts, it should be obvious that it would be hardly profitable to carry out the whole text in this manner. The resulting variations would take up four times the space of the text itself. But a more important consideration is that unless some principle of selection is adopted, the reader would be left with a mass of unvalued variations which would do more to obscure than to bring to light the important variations. Also, while it is generally true that a sample of the variations from the beginning of a text will not give us perfect certitude that the rest of the text follows in exactly the same manner, however, in a comparatively short work such as the *De Principiis*, the probability is greater. Certainly, the evidence gives a sufficient basis to justify the editor's previous choice of six manuscripts and to refute objections alleged from specific examples.

[*To be continued*]

CHRONICLE

The Philosophy Club of Saint Louis University, during the academic year 1951-52, joined with the Graduate School in sponsoring a public lecture by M. Etienne Gilson. In addition, it sponsored lectures to the student body, or to the club members and the faculty, by Dr. Vincent E. Smith and Professor Yves Simon, and a series of two talks by the Reverend Doctors Benedict Ashley, O.P., and Raymond Nogar, O.P.

The Reverend Julien Péghaire, C.S.Sp., a leading Catholic philosopher of Canada, died suddenly on March 3, 1952. A member of

the faculty of philosophy of the University of Montreal, he was the author of several books and a contributor to numerous journals, among them The Modern Schoolman.

The Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association was held in Cleveland, April 15 and 16, 1952. The general subject of the meeting was philosophy and experimental sciences. The four major papers were read by Dr. Vincent E. Smith, Dr. Karl F. Herzfeld, the Reverend Lucian Dufault, O.M.I., and Dr. Raymond J. McCall. (An account of these papers will be found in the Current Bibliography of this issue, in the bibliographical note on the *Proceedings* of this meeting.) At the annual dinner, greetings were extended to the members of the association by the Most Reverend Edward F. Hoban, Archbishop of Cleveland. The Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas Medal was presented to Professor Etienne Gilson, after a citation by Professor Anton C. Pegis. M. Gilson then delivered the annual association address. The outgoing president, the Reverend Francis X. Meehan, then delivered the presidential address. At the business meeting, Dr. Elizabeth G. Salmon took over the presidency of the association, and Dr. James Collins was elected vice-president.

The Western Division of the American Philosophical Association met at the University of Michigan on May 8, 9, and 10, 1952. The meeting of the first day was devoted to the theory of knowledge, with papers by Virgil G. Hinshaw, Jr., and Richard H. Popkin. The morning of the second day was taken up by two concurrent sessions, one on the theory of value, with papers by Denton L. Geyer and A. M. Mardiros, and the other on induction and probability, with papers by David L. Miller, Wesley C. Salmon, and Asher Moore. The afternoon session was on the present status of the mind-body problem, with papers by Gustav Lergmann, Warner Wick, and Wilfred Sellars. The presidential address at the annual dinner was delivered by Richard P. McKeon. On the third day, a session was devoted to art and knowledge, with papers by Eliseo Vivas, Ian McGreal, and Abraham Kaplan.

At the Annual Meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, Paul Weiss was re-elected as president and Constantine Cavarnos was re-elected as treasurer; Oliver Martin was elected secretary. John Wild was elected as a new member of the Council.

The Institute for Philosophical Research, of San Francisco, incorporated in May, 1952, has announced a board of directors under the chairmanship of Harold R. McKinnon. The president and director of the institute will be Mortimer J. Adler, assisted by William Gorman.

The purpose of the institute is said to be "to promote the advancement of learning in general through an analysis of the fundamental ideas and issues of Western thought."

At Canisius College in Buffalo, a public defense of philosophy was held on April 23. Following the medieval custom, two college seniors, John J. Cooney and Richard M. Mattimore, were appointed defenders. Among the objectors were the presidents of St. Bonaventure University, Niagara University, and the rector of the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto.

A Meeting of Philosophy Students of four Catholic colleges was held at St. Michael's College, Winooski Park, Vermont, last spring. The meeting was held under the auspices of the Thomists, the philosophy club of St. Michael's. The theme was "Man the Existent." Another meeting is planned for next year; the place has not yet been determined.

"The Annals of American Research," a monograph series organized by the Public Affairs Press of Washington, D. C., is a new medium of publication for scholarly papers. The series is to be chiefly devoted to papers in the liberal arts and sciences.

The Matchette Foundation Prize in Aesthetics, an award of $500, will be given for the best article on aesthetics or the philosophy of art by an American author. Articles are to be sent to Dr. Thomas Munro, editor of the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* at the Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland 6. The latest deadline is May 1, 1953. Articles may run from 3,000 to 20,000 words. Though the Matchette Foundation was set up to further the "Absolute-Relative Theory," the prize itself, according to the announcement of the *Journal,* does not require either an acceptance or a detailed discussion of that theory.

Emile Bréhier, member of the Institut and honorary professor at the Sorbonne, died in Paris on February 3, 1952. His studies in the history of philosophy have made him known and respected as a scholar by all philosophers.

The Second International Congress of Humanistic Studies, organized by the Centro Internazionale di Studi Umanistici of Rome, was held April 5 to 8, 1952. The president of the Centro, Enrico Castelli, was also president of the executive committee of the congress. The general theme of the papers was "Christianity and the Nature of the State." The Congress was held in connection with an exposition of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century art (Palazzo Barberini), organized around the theme of the demoniac in art.

A Vacation Course was held under the auspices of *L'Eau Vive* at Soisy-sur-Seine during the month of August. M. Jacques Maritain lectured on "The Responsibility of the Artist"; M. Olivier Lacombe, on "Christian and Indian Metaphysics"; and M. de Monleon, on "Sociology and Human Acts." The remaining lectures were on theological topics.

The Istituto Di Filosofia Dell' Universita Di Roma sponsored a new philosophical journal, *Rassegna di Filosofia,* under the direction of Carlo Antoni, Bruno Nardi, and Ugo Spirito. Francesco Valentini is the secretary. The journal is intended to cover all currents of contemporary speculative philosophical thought. The foreign subscription price is 2500 lire.

The Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy will take place in Brussels, August 20 to 26, 1953. Written papers will be grouped under fourteen tentative heads: theory of philosophy, epistemology and metaphysics, formal logic and philosophy of deductive science, philosophy of the natural sciences, philosophical psychology, philosophy of language, philosophy of history, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of right, moral philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and history of philosophy. Papers, which shall not exceed eight double-space typewritten pages, may be written in French, English, German, Italian, or Spanish. The program for the various meetings tentatively suggests the following topics: experience and metaphysics, the function of proof, explanation in natural science, the knowledge of other persons, meaning, the intelligibility of history, foundation and limits of authority, the effect of relativism upon moral obligation, Robert Grosseteste, and George Berkeley.

The Twenty-sixth Indian Philosophical Congress was held at Poona on December 27 to 29, 1951. The sessions and sectional meetings were not organized around a central theme, though there were two symposia—one, "Is Existentialism Philosophy?" and the other, "Can There Be a Religion without God?" The presidential address, by A. C. Mukerji, was entitled "Human Personality." He opposed empiricism and naturalistic psychologism; positively, he proposed a transcendental analysis strongly influenced by the thought of Kant. Most of the other addresses and papers showed an awareness of the same currents of thought and inclined toward one or another form of idealism.

BOOK REVIEWS

NATURAL THEOLOGY—*Metaphysics II.* By Gerard Smith, S.J. New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. xvi + 297. $3.50.

This work on natural theology is a solid defense of Christian existentialism as opposed to various kinds of essentialism. The first part, which deals with the existence of God, explains at length and in considerable detail the difference and conflict between essentialism and existentialism. The second part is devoted to an expansion of the meaning of the name of God, He who is. The existential content of the divine name underlies all the divine attributes; it helps us to understand somewhat the divine knowledge and will, and it furnishes the key to the problem of creation.

St. Thomas Aquinas is Father Smith's leading authority, although the book is by no means a slavish echo of a great name. In fact, "conventional" is about the last word that could be applied to this book. It may be a matter of opinion, but the author at times seems to neglect the Thomistic axiom that no science proves its principles. Many points that are discussed at great length—such as the nature of proof, the problem of the universals, and questions concerning the end of man—could well be left to works in other fields. The approach, too, is that of a logician who requires strict attention to his phraseology if his elusive meaning is not to be lost. Here is an example: "An uncaused cause of causing is the cause of anything-existing-as-causing; therefore an uncaused cause is a cause of being, because for a thing-which-is-causing, to-be and to-be-causing are the same" (p. 127). Or this: "Note well that a cause-causing is a cause-existing-as-causing. Whence, uncaused-causing causes causes-existing-as-causing" (p. 144-45).

Father Smith's book, excellent though it may be as an argumentative and historical approach to his subject, raises some questions in the mind of this reviewer which must be mentioned.

The first concerns St. Augustine's proof of the existence of God from the necessity, eternity, and immutability of any essential truth; for example, seven and three are ten (p. 42). Father Smith does not give any citation from, or reference to, St. Augustine's works to illustrate his argument. On page 43, however, we find St. Thomas's argument against St. Augustine's proof, with references to St.

Thomas's works. References to St. Thomas are also given in the section that follows (pp. 46-47); and on page 60 we are told: "As we have seen, St. Thomas Aquinas rejected the Augustinian proof of God's existence from eternal truth."

Where have we seen this? In the texts cited from St. Thomas by Father Smith the Angelic Doctor is not discussing St. Augustine's proof for the existence of God but the doctrine of divine illumination. Whatever may be said about this doctrine, St. Augustine does not rest his case for the existence of God upon it alone; in fact, he already knows that God exists by a posteriori proofs derived from a consideration of the visible world around us. Father Smith makes no mention of these arguments but leaves us with the impression that St. Augustine's only argument is derived from eternal truth. Yet St. Augustine has a teleological argument for the existence of God drawn from the order and beauty of the world.[1] In the *Confessions* occurs the well-known argument from the world considered as changeable and variable: "Behold the heavens and the earth: they cry out that they are made, for they change and are variable."[2] In *De Genesi ad Litteram*, 1. 4, c. 32, St. Augustine could not be more Thomistic in his approach to the existence of God than St. Thomas himself. There he tells us that the human mind first acquires a knowledge of the effects of God and then seeks their causes, until it finds them principally and unchangeably in the Word of God.[3]

The second difficulty concerns the order of the proof of the existence of God. In particular, it concerns the moment at which we know that God is identified with his existence. For Father Smith, St. Thomas has not five proofs but one proof in various ways that God is *ipsum esse*. "So far as I know, St. Thomas never calls a way a proof or a proof a way" (p. 88).

In *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 2, a. 3, St. Thomas teaches that the existence of God can be proved in five ways. In *Contra Gentiles*, I, 13, the five ways become five *rationes* by which philosophers and theologians have proved that God exists. A *ratio* that proves is a proof. More important, however, is Father Smith's contention that through

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[1] *Serm.* 141, n. 2 (*PL* XXXVIII, 776); *Serm.* 241, n. 2 (*PL* XXXVIII, 1134); In Ps. 41, n. 7 (*PL* XXXVI, 468).

[2] Bk. XI, c. 4; *PL* XXXII, 811. See also *De Trinit.* I. 8, c. 3, n. 5; *PL* XLII, 950.

[3] *PL.* XXXIV, 316-17: "Mens itaque humana prius haec quae facta sunt, per sensus corporis experitur, eorumque notitiam pro infirmitatis humanae modulo capit: et deinde quaerit eorum causas, si quo modo possit ad eas pervenire principaliter atque incommutabiliter manentes in Verbo Dei, ac sic invisibilia ejus, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicere (Rom. 1, 20)."

each of the five ways we arrive at the conclusion that God is identically his own act of existing. Father Smith knows at the end of each of the five ways that God is by essence being, an act of existing; he knows this before his consideration of the simplicity of God. Yet, on page 184, after having ruled out any sort of composition from God, he states: "We have come to see that God is a pure act of existing." In Father Smith's book we come to see this at least six times: at the end of each of the five ways and finally as the conclusion of the demonstration of the simplicity of God.

For St. Thomas Aquinas the order is different. St. Thomas does not know at the end of each of the five ways that God is identically his act of existence. He equivalently rules out such knowledge in *Contra Gentiles,* III, 38. After granting that we can discover an orderer of nature from a consideration of the course of nature (the fifth way) St. Thomas concludes: "But who the orderer of nature is, or of what sort, or whether he is only one, is not yet clear from this common consideration of nature." It is only after he proves that the first cause must be absolutely simple (*Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 3) and rules out every kind of composition, above all the composition of essence and existence (art. 4), that St. Thomas knows that God is identified with his act of existence. Father Smith knows this already before he began his discussion on the simplicity of God. For him the argument for the simplicity of God serves "to make more precise our notion of Him who is existence only" (p. 180). For St. Thomas the simplicity of an absolutely first cause is the transition from Platonic and Aristotelian arguments, all of them basically essentialist, to an existentialist conception of God which Plato and Aristotle never discovered. Even the necessary and the contingent of St. Thomas's third way are essentialist and not existentialist. Father Smith himself points out that for Aristotle the necessary means God, celestial bodies, and matter (p.234). St. Thomas in his third way is speaking of the contingent that is equated with the generable and corruptible, which is an attribute of some, but not all, things in the world around us. This is Aristotelian contingency and necessity; it is not contingency and necessity on the deepest level of all, the level of being. St. Thomas reaches this level when he demonstrates that for God essence and existence are one.

Father Smith begins his work on a sound metaphysical basis: being is anything that exists or can exist (pp. 8, 37). It connotes (1) a subject of existence, and (2) its actual or possible existence (p. 10). The subject either does or can exist, so that the existence it "exercises" is either actual or possible.

Yet on page 111 we read: "Consider an actual subject of actual

change—*that* subject was not in existence before change, that subject was only potentially existent, that is to say, it was inexistent as an actual subject of actual change." On page 124: "The actual subject of actual causing exists *only* as actually causing; it does not exist before it is actually causing. To say that the actual subject of the act of causing existed before its actual causing is not true. Before its actual causing the subject did not actually exist at all, but only potentially, i.e., it was inexistent." This culminates in the statement on page 265 that "only the actual 'is.' "

To speak of an actual subject is one thing. To speak of the act of existence of this subject is another. The subject may be actually existing as a thing, as a substance, and yet it may be the subject of only potential existence in some accidental mode. This would be the case with actually existing water before it becomes hot. To equate *potential* existence with *inexistence,* as Father Smith does on pages 111, 124, and 265, seems to contradict the sound metaphysical notion of being with which he started: being is anything that exists—either actually or potentially. Incidentally, to speak of the "act, actual or possible, of a subject of the act of existing" (p. 48, and *passim*) seems to introduce too many acts. What is an act that is actual as opposed to an act that is possible?

We cannot, then, help feeling that an equivocation lies in the statement that "for a thing-which-is-moved, to-be and to-be-moved are the same" and "for a thing-which-is-causing, to-be and to-be-causing are the same" (p. 127). It fails to distinguish between substantial to-be and accidental to-be. To exist as changing, or as moving, or as causing —these are accidental ways of existing and, if we are speaking properly, they are not the direct object of creation.[4] God creates subsisting beings or substances; He concreates in them their accidental powers; and He moves these powers to their proper activities.[5] He properly causes these activities as first cause and under Him creatures operate as second and instrumental causes, even though they may be principal causes in their own order. "To cause an act of existing is to create . . . to cause an act-of-existing-as-causing is to create" (p. 227) is ambiguous. To cause the act of substantial existence of the universe in the beginning was an act of creation, is true. It is also true that every time God causes an individual soul to exist He creates. It is not true, however, that when God moves pre-existing creatures and causes

[4] *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 45, a. 4: "Sicut igitur accidentia et formae et hujusmodi quae non subsistunt magis sunt coexistentia quam entia, ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata. Proprie vero creata sunt subsistentia."

[5] Cf. *De Potentia,* III, 7.

their activities as first mover He is creating in the proper sense of the term. Creation uses no instruments and it does not terminate in an accidental *esse*.

"Instrumental agents do not exist as instruments until they are instrumentalized, and then they exist as instruments in virtue of the finality of their principal cause" (p. 147). The first part of this statement fails to distinguish the existence of the instrument as such from its use or activity as an instrument. An instrument is instrumentalized, I take it, when it is actually being used as an instrument. For St. Thomas Aquinas an instrument is first an instrument through its form, and then it is used by a principal agent.[6] For Father Smith a hammer is apparently an instrument only when it is being used to drive nails.

The conclusion of the book deals with the question of the end of man. On page 269 we find an excellent summary of Father Smith's views: philosophy knows that man can find no rest in creaturely goods, yet it hopes for something better. God could leave man's natural hope for repose unsatisfied, but would He? Father Smith replies, "We cannot think so." God, our lover, could possibly not-give Himself. "Yet God would not fail to give Himself." This giving of Himself by God to man we understand to refer to the beatific vision.

How does Father Smith know this? Does the freedom of God lie merely in the decision to create or not—and once He decides to create an intelligent creature, God would not fail to destine it to the beatific vision as its end? This considerably restricts the freedom of God. It is curious to see the parallel between this view and the view of Molina in this respect: they both know in advance what would take place in a given hypothesis. For Molina, God knows even before any decree to create what every intelligent creature would do in any hypothesis. Father Smith knows that on the hypothesis of creating an intelligent being God would not fail to give it the beatific vision as its end. Molina postulated a supercomprehension by God of the will of a creature before any determinations are actually there. Father Smith seems to have a supercomprehension of the mind of God if he is able to tell us what God would not fail to do if He decided to create an intelligent being.

As believers we know that the vision of God is our end. As

[6] *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 72, a. 3, ad 2: "Sicut enim instrumentum virtutem instrumentalem acquirit dupliciter, scilicet quando accipit formam instrumenti, et quando movetur a principali agente . . ." See also *In IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qu. 2, ad 2; *ibid.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, qu. 3, ad 3; *ibid.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, qu. 2, ad 1.

philosophers we know that it is not due to our nature to have such an end. At the same time we also know that God is free to create us or not; and, on the hypothesis that He wills to create us, He is still free to grant us the beatific vision as our ultimate destiny or to withhold it. Before God's decision is freely made and manifested to us by revelation we have no means of knowing which of the latter alternatives God will choose. To say that we know what He will not fail to do is to say too much.

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VARIA SPECIMINA CONCORDANTIARUM. By Roberto Busa, S.J. Archivum Philosophicum Aloisianum," Series II, No. 7. Milan: Bocca, 1951. Paper, pp. 175.

The subtitle accurately tells us that this work is "a first example of word index automatically compiled and printed by IBM punched card machines." In the Introduction, which is written in both Italian and English, the author explains his purpose, the methods and the machinery by which the index is compiled, and the nature of this sample study. The examples are the Thomistic hymns from the Office of Corpus Christi. The rest of the book gives a complete indexing and concordance of these hymns.

This punched card method has been used very successfully in some scientific fields. The examples shown here indicate that it could be of very great help to Thomistic scholars. For example, a student about to do a thesis, or a scholar beginning a textual study, could obtain either a complete list of references to the key words he wanted to investigate, or even a concordance. Presumably the fee would be nominal, and the list he would receive would be a means of saving him months of work. The reviewer is happy to be one of the many who ardently desire the complete indexing of the *Opera Omnia.*

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems. "Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

ALLAN, D. J. *The Philosophy of Aristotle.* "The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge"; New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 220. $2.00.

Though this little book is written only for the general reader and carefully avoids most of the more difficult points of Aristotle's doctrine, it can be highly recommended even for somewhat advanced students. Some of the author's "defence" of Aristotle may strike an American reader as strange, but this is to be explained by the prevalence of logical positivism in the intended British audience.

APOSTLE, HIPPOCRATES G. *Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. $6.00.

ARISTOTLE. *Works of Aristotle.* Vol. XII, *Select Fragments.* Tr. by David Ross. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. $3.00.

AUDEN, W. H. *The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard.* New York: David McKay Co.; Sept., 1952. Pp. 192. $2.50.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *Sermons for Christmas and Epiphany.* Tr. by Thomas S. Lawlor. "Ancient Christian Writers," Vol. XV; Westminster, Md.: Newman Press. $2.75.

———. *The City of God.* Books 8-16. Tr. from the Latin by Gerald G. Walsh and Mother Grace Monahan. New York: Fathers of the Church. Pp. 567. $5.00.

BACHHUBER, ANDREW H., S.J. *Logic.* 1952 ed. Saint Louis: Saint Louis Univ. Bookstore, 1952. Pp. viii + 278. Paper.

This introductory text has five parts: prerequisites for and the general notion of inference; immediate inference; mediate deductive inference; apprehension, concept, and term; and some supplementary material on propositions, induction, and the definition of logic. The

author has arranged the material in this order to arouse the student's interest and to enable him to use what he has learned from the beginning.

The book is written to be integrated into a course that includes the Thomistic metaphysics and philosophy of man. It is provided with an abundance of examples, diagrams, and exercises; summaries are inserted at frequent intervals.

There is an index.

BAILLIE, JOHN. *Natural Science and the Spiritual Life.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1952. Pp. 43. $1.75.

BAKER, HERSCHEL. *The Wars of Truth. Studies in the Decay of Christian Humanism in the Earlier Seventeenth Century.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. xi + 390. $6.00.

These studies deal with a group of related important and very interesting topics: tradition, death and time, reason, the revolt against authority, Anglicanism and Puritanism, church and state, and the conquest of nature. The author considers this book as "a thematic and chronological extension of, if not precisely a sequel to," *The Dignity of Man.* The main interest is in English thought, though continental Europeans are often referred to and used.

Undoubtedly, the seventeenth century is a period of very great importance for the history of ideas and civilization. The topics chosen by the author for consideration are fascinating. The references are numerous and indicate great diligence as well as a wide acquaintance with the field. Yet the book is unsatisfactory and often irritating to a philosopher. Almost all the topics the author deals with are philosophical, and many of them have received elaborate and careful technical development. These developments are often ignored by the author, and widely varying traditions are lumped together under rubrics like "realism." Moreover, the author is often unsympathetic to his subject; his attitudes show themselves in the copious use of adjectives like "sterile," "unoriginal," "tortuous," and so forth.

BALZ, ALBERT GEORGE ADAM. *Descartes and the Modern Mind.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 506. $10.00.

BANTOCK, G. H. *Freedom and Authority in Education.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Nov., 1952. $4.50.

BAUMOL, WILLIAM J. *Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. vii + 171. $4.25.

This book is a publication of the London School of Economics and Political Science and has appeared in a British edition. The work has two parts. The first part is entitled "The Extension of the External Economies Argument"; the second, "Towards an Economic Theory of the State." The author seems to wish to avoid philosophical and especially ethical considerations. He tells us, in his Introduction, "It is clear that any yardstick which pretends to indicate the proper sphere of government must itself be arbitrarily based on some peculiar set of ethical preconceptions" (p. 11). He believes that economic efficiency itself excludes both anarchism and collectivism.

The author maintains that classical laissez-faire is considerably different from anarchism. But he believes that few authors had properly expressed the economic or "self-interest" argument for the existence and functions of government. The major step in his argumentation is the interdependence of the members of the economic community. This interdependence makes the state necessary and to some extent determines its function. In the author's opinion, welfare considerations are only of negative value; they can show that

certain courses of action are wrong, but not that a particular concrete action is right or necessary.

BECK, LEWIS WHITE. *Philosophic Inquiry.* "Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series"; New York: Prentice-Hall. Pp. 486. $6.00; text ed., $4.50.

BETHELL, SAMUEL LESLIE. *The Cultural Revolution of the Seventeenth Century.* New York: Roy Publs., 1952. Pp. 161. $3.50.

BLACKHAM, HAROLD JOHN. *Six Existentialist Thinkers.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. 180. $3.00.

BLAU, JOSEPH L. *Men and Movements in American Philosophy.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. Pp. xi + 403. $4.50.

This history of American thought covers the entire period. The author restricts his consideration, in the period after the Revolution, to thinkers whose training was American. As a method of organization, he groups American thinkers into ten schools or movements: the Puritans, colonial materialism and immaterialism, the American enlightenment, philosophical orthodoxy, the New England school, philosophy influenced by biology, idealisms, the pragmatic movement, the various realisms, and naturalism. The author does not intend to be completely inclusive, and consequently many men are not treated in detail.

A bibliography of suggested readings and a detailed index are added.

BOWER, WILLIAM CLAYTON. *Moral and Spiritual Values in Education.* Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1952. Pp. xv + 214. $3.50.

BOWLE, JOHN. *Hobbes and his Critics: A Study in the Seventeenth Century Constitutionalism.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. $2.75.

BRAIN, W. RUSSELL. *Mind, Perception and Science.* Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas, 1952. Pp. vi + 90. $2.50.

Originally published in England in 1951, this book contains seven somewhat loosely connected essays. The author, a specialist in diseases of the nervous system, attempts to answer the philosophical problems which disturbances of perception raise for him. The author contends that the philosophers are "unfamiliar with the facts that daily confront the neurologist and the psychiatrist" (p. 1). The discussion of the validity of knowledge includes a number of interesting facts. The author stresses the relativity of observation, the transformations undergone in the peripheral and central nervous system, and the "immateriality" of the modern physicist's world-picture. His solution seems to be simply this: knowledge consists in this, that the nervous system is the kind of thing that is capable of symbolic representation. This seems to be nothing more than a restatement of the problem with which he began.

BRIDGMAN, P. W. *The Nature of Some of Our Physical Concepts.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. 64. $2.75.

This book contains three lectures given at the University of London in 1950, which have been previously published in England after having appeared in the *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.* In these lectures, Professor Bridgman attempts first to give a fuller analysis of what he means by an "operational analysis," or "an operational approach to the meaning of physical concepts." This presentation is fuller and clearer than any which the author had previously attempted. After making a distinction between instrumental operations on the one hand and "paper-and-pencil" (mathematical or symbolical) and verbal operations on the other, he continues in the second and third lectures to show the relation and interaction of these

two types of operations in some of the concepts of thermodynamics and electrical phenomena in massive conductors. There is an index.

Though these three lectures are of very great importance for anyone working in the field of the philosophy of science or the philosophy of nature, the high price of the American edition will put the book beyond consideration for many students.

BRUNSWIK, EGON. *The Conceptual Framework of Psychology.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 106. $2.00.

BUCKLEY, JOSEPH, S.M. *Christian Design for Sex.* Chicago: Fides, 1952. Pp. xxii + 216. $3.50.

This book is addressed to teachers, counselors, and parents, rather than to young people directly. Though its presentation is largely theological, ethical considerations are not neglected. The author's attitude is moderate and straightforward; the style is plain and direct.

BURY, J. B. *History of Freedom of Thought.* 2d ed.; New York: Oxford Univ. Press. $2.00.

BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT. *History and Human Relations.* New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 254. $3.50.

CALLENDER, CLARENCE NEWELL, and CHARLESWORTH, JAMES CLYDE (eds.). *Ethical Standards in American Public Life.* Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1952. Pp. 265. Paper, $2.00.

CANTOR, GEORG. *Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers.* Tr. with introd. and notes by Philip E. B. Jourdain. New York, Dover Pubns. Pp. vii + 211. $2.75; paper, $1.25.

This reprint of the edition of 1915 provides two classical essays in mathematical theory by Cantor with a long (pp. 1-82) historical and theoretical introduction by Jourdain. Though Cantor himself insisted that mathematics is "free" of philosophy, Jourdain points out that the "use" of mathematics involved philosophical principles and that Cantor himself was apparently an idealist in philosophy (pp. 69-70). The work is very valuable for students of the history of mathematics and of the philosophy of science.

CARNAP, RUDOLF. *The Continuum of Inductive Methods.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 97. $3.50.

CARVER, GEORGE A., JR. *Aesthetics and the Problem of Meaning.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952. $2.50.

Catholic Authors. Contemporary Biographical Sketches. Vol. II. Ed. by Matthew Hoehn, O.S.B. Newark: St. Mary's Abbey, 1952. Pp. xiv + 633. $6.50.

This second volume contains 374 additional short biographies. The two volumes are undoubtedly of very great importance for all librarians, and will be a great convenience to students.

CHALMERS, GORDON K. *The Republic and the Person.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Sept., 1952. $4.00.

Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, The. Tr. from the Latin with an introd. by R. H. M. Elwes. New York: Dover Pubns., 1951. Pp. 453. $3.95.

CLARK, JOSEPH T., S.J. *Conventional Logic and Modern Logic.* Preface by W. V. Quine. "Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association," Vol. III. Washington: American Catholic Philosophical Assoc., 1952. Pp. 109. Paper.

The author intends to show that "conventional logic" (traditional or Scholastic or Aristotelian logic) and modern logic are not in violent opposition, but that modern logic is a prolongation and further de-

velopment of the older logic. To this end, he studies Aristotelian, traditional logic (which for the author seems to be mainly Stoic logic) and Scholastic logic from Boethius to William of Ockham. In all these areas, the author tries to show that problems of modern logic have been studied, at least in an inchoative and implicit form. There is a long annotated bibliography (pp. 61-98) listing mainly modern works, though some historical studies are included. There are five indices.

COATES, ADRIAN. *Prelude to History.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. $4.75.

COLLINS, JAMES. *The Existentialists. A Critical Study.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952. Pp. xi + 268. $4.50.

This timely account of the existentialists is both a careful, well-documented exposition and a critique. The introductory chapter presents the historical backgrounds provided by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Husserl. Then follow four chapters, one each on Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, and Heidegger. In these four chapters, the author gathers the principal thoughts of each existentialist philosopher, shorn of their esoteric terminology and without their baffling indirection. The author does not shun the philosopher's task of criticism, but he does not drag it in everywhere. As occasion presents itself, criticism is presented from the standpoint "of a philosophical theism and realism" (p. x). The final chapter summarizes the study in terms of five themes common to the philosophers studied.

There is a bibliography and an index. [*To be reviewed*]

COPLESTON, FREDERICK C., S.J. *Medieval Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. v + 194. $2.75.

This little (16mo) volume is a presentation of the history of medieval philosophy from St. Augustine to Nicholas of Autrecourt and Marsilius of Padua. The book is directed to readers who have no philosophical training or, at least, no previous acquaintance with medieval thought. However, a very good general background is required if the reader is to acquire even a general understanding of the various medieval philosophies.

A short, selected bibliography and an index are provided.

CORNFORTH, MAURICE CAMPBELL. *In Defence of Philosophy, against Positivism and Pragmatism.* New York: International Publs., 1952. Pp. 275. $2.50.

CRANE, RONALD SALMON (ed.). *Critics and Criticism, Ancient and Modern.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 652. $6.00.

CRARY, RYLAND W., and STEIBEL, GERALD L. *How You Can Teach about Communism.* "Freedom Pamphlets"; New York: Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, 1951. Pp. 48. Paper, 25¢

CURRAN, CHARLES A. *Counseling in Catholic Life and Education.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. xvi + 462.

In ethics, the virtue of prudence occupies a large theoretical and practical place. Yet it is extremely difficult to describe philosophically and equally difficult to find good illustrative examples. In Father Curran's exposition and exemplification of nondirective counseling both the teacher and the student of ethics will be able to find a rich abundance of material.

As far as its more immediate purpose is concerned, the book is an indispensable practical manual that should be in the hands of all counselors and should be well known to all students of counseling techniques.

D'Abro, A. *The Rise of the New Physics.* 2d ed., corrected and enlarged (formerly titled *Decline of Mechanism*); New York: Dover Pubns., 1951. 2 vols. Pp. ix + 982 (continuous pagination). $8.00 the set.

In reading this book, one question keeps insistently coming to mind, For whom was this book written? It is too superficial, in general, to be of value to the trained scientist in helping him either to analyze or synthesize his knowledge. That same superficiality can make it a misleading source book for someone not trained in science. The treatment of quantum mechanics (more than half the book) could possibly be of value as side reading for a beginning student in that branch of physics. It will not do as a textbook.

This work is partially history, largely descriptive of physical phenomena together with an indication as to how these phenomena are correlated and used heuristically by the theoretical physicist; it is partially an attempt at philosophy. The descriptions are satisfactory as far as they go, but the student who wants a real understanding of physics would do better to consult recognized physics textbooks. The philosopher who is not trained in science is urged not to use this book as his primary source of scientific information.

Attempts at philosophy in this book are rather few. Those made indicate that the author has not made a serious study of any philosophy except that expressed by men whose reputation is rather that of a scientist than that of a philosopher. Why a clever mathematician or an expert experimentalist should *ipso facto* be classed as a deep-thinking philosopher is a question to which this author, like other writers in science, offers no answer.

It is unfortunate that so much effort has been spent in writing a book that fills no real need in the academic and intellectual world. [L. W. Friedrich, S.J.]

Davidson, Robert F. *Philosophies Men Live By.* New York, Dial Press.

Decennial Index to Philosophical Literature, 1940-1950. New York: Russell F. Moore Co.; May, 1952. $4.50.

Dennis, Wayne, and Others. *Current Trends in Psychological Theory.* Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1952. Pp. 213. $4.20.

D'Entrèves, A. P. *Dante as a Political Thinker.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 119. $2.00.

The substance of this book is the three "Barlow Lectures" on Dante which the author delivered in 1951. To this there is added an Appendix on the phrase *gratiosum lumen rationis* and some notes. The author has to his credit a number of books on political theory—specifically, medieval political theory.

He proposes an interpretation according to which Dante's political ideas changed during his lifetime. The key word in his early thought is *civitas;* of his middle period, *imperium;* and of his final thought (most clearly contained in the *Divine Comedy,* in the sixteenth canto of the *Purgatorio*), *ecclesia.* This involves the author's dating of the *De Monarchia* as prior to the *Divine Comedy,* on the basis of the internal evidence of the change in Dante's political thought. Perhaps not all Dante scholars will be convinced, but the author's analysis certainly contributes to a better understanding of the poet and his writings.

Dewey, John. *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought.* New York: Peter Smith, 1952. Pp. 309. $3.75.

DE WULF, MAURICE. *History of Mediaeval Philosophy.* Vol. I, *From the Beginnings to the End of the Twelfth Century.* Tr. by Ernest C. Messenger. New York: Dover Pubns., 1952. Pp. xviii + 317. $4.00.

M. De Wulf's classic *History* was first translated in 1909 (from the second French edition). In 1926 E. C. Messenger translated the fifth edition in two volumes. In 1935 and 1938 the first two volumes of the sixth and final edition were translated by the same translator. The third volume of this French edition appeared in 1947; and since all copies of the first two volumes had been destroyed, a new translation was prepared which included all three volumes. In this new translation the bibliographies have been brought down to 1947; a section in Volume II, dealing with the thirteenth-century translations of Greek and other works, which had been omitted in the previous translation, is now included. The first volume contains a brief biographical note on Professor De Wulf (pp. x-xii). [*To be reviewed*]

DOBREE, BONAMY. *Alexander Pope.* New York, Philosophical Lib.

DOUGLAS, PAUL. *Ethics in Government.* "The Godkin Lectures" for 1952; Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1952. $2.50.

DU VAIR, GUILLAUME. *The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks.* Tr. by Thomas James. Ed. with an introd. and notes by Rudolf Kirk. New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. ix + 134. $3.50.

EBENSTEIN, WILLIAM. *Introduction to Political Philosophy.* New York: Rinehart & Co., 1952. Pp. 342. $4.00.

FAIRCHILD, HOXIE N., and OTHERS. *Religious Perspectives in College Teaching.* New York: Ronald Press Co., Sept., 1952.

FASNACHT, G. E. *Acton's Political Philosophy.* New York: British Book Centre; June, 1952. $4.50.

FITCH, FREDERIC BRENTON. *Symbolic Logic.* New York: Ronald Press Co., 1952. Pp. 248. $4.50.

FLEWELLING, RALPH TYLER. *The Person or The Significance of Man.* Los Angeles: Ward Ritchie Press, 1952. Pp. xii + 339. $4.00.

For many years the author has been recognized as one of the leaders of the movement that is sometimes called Christian personalism. The present work is a completely rewritten development of the same author's *Creative Personality,* which appeared twenty-five years ago. Personalism, as the author understands it, intends to give science, philosophy, and religion each its own sphere and its own validity. In practice, this philosophy may be called a personal idealism—an idealism, that is, which admits the existence of finite human persons and of a supreme or divine person who, however, is not to be considered absolutely infinite. The religion in question is a rationalistic Christianity (which has a lot in common with the literary, Platonizing Christianity of many nineteenth-century British writers).

The present book is the crowning achievement of a lifetime of work by a man whose broad interests encompass philosophy, science, literature, and human problems. What the book lacks in technical accuracy and scholarliness may well be compensated for by its broadness and inclusiveness of interest.

[FREGE, GOTTLOB] *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege.* Ed. by Peter Geach and Max Black. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. x + 244. $5.75.

Previously published in England, these selections provide important and valuable source material for logicians, philosophers, and mathematicians. The passages translated are: "*Begriffsschrift* (Chap. I)," "Function and Concept," "On Concept and Object," "On Sense and Reference," illustrative extracts from Frege's review of Husserl's

Philosophie der Arithmetik, "A Critical Elucidation of some Points in E. Schroeder's *Algebra der Logik*," "What is a Function?," "Negation," and translation of parts of Frege's *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*.

The editors have provided a glossary of terms.

FUNG YU-LAN. *History of Chinese Philosophy.* Vol. I. Tr. by Derk Bodde. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Sept., 1952. $6.00.

GALILEI, GALILEO. *Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1952. Pp. 309. Paper, $1.50.

GALLIE, W. B. *Peirce and Pragmatism.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1952. Pp. 247. 65¢

This is the second in a series of Pelican Books on philosophy, under the general editorship of A. J. Ayer; the first was *Spinoza* by Stuart Hampshire. The author first attempts to locate the philosophical activity of Peirce, especially in relation to pragmatism. Peirce's thought is then presented under three headings: theory of knowledge, pragmatism, and metaphysics.

The book, though written in relatively nontechnical language for the general public, is full of valuable insights even for professional philosophers. It might be remarked that the author shows a vivid awareness of, and frequently refers to, logical positivism.

GARDINER, PATRICK. *Nature of Historical Explanation.* New York, Oxford Univ. Press. $2.00.

GARNETT, A. CAMPBELL. *Moral Nature of Man.* New York: Ronald Press Co.; Sept., 1952.

GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, REGINALD, O.P. *The Trinity and God the Creator.* Tr. by Frederic C. Eckhoff. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952. Pp. vi + 675. $7.50.

This is a commentary on St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae*, first part, questions 27 to 119. These questions contain, among other things, the discussions of relations, angels, and man. Father Garrigou-Lagrange's commentary is almost entirely theological; his explanations of philosophical points follow the tradition of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.

GILBERT, KATHARINE, and KUHN, HELMUT. *History of Esthetics.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; Sept., 1952. $7.50.

GILSON, ETIENNE. *Wisdom and Love in Saint Thomas Aquinas.* "Aquinas Lecture," 1951; Milwaukee, Marquette Univ. Press. Pp. 55. $2.00.

GRAY, JAMES, and OTHERS. *Men, Ideas and Judgments: American Non-Fiction, 1900-1950.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; July, 1952. $3.00.

Great Ideas of Plato, The. Ed. by Eugene Freeman and David Appel. "Library of Great Ideas"; New York: Lantern Press, 1952. Pp. 220. $3.00.

GUENZEL, LOUIS. *Medical Ethics, and Their Effect upon the Public.* New York: Vantage Press, 1951. Pp. 100. $2.00.

GURIAN, WALDEMAR. *Bolshevism.* (International Studies of the Committee on International Relations, University of Notre Dame). Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1952. Pp. 189. $3.25.

HAAS, FRANCIS J. *Man and Society.* 2d ed.; New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts Co. Pp. 545.

HALL, EVERETT WESLEY. *What Is Value?* New York: Humanities Press, 1952. Pp. 268. $5.00.

HAMPSHIRE, STUART. *Spinoza.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1952. Pp. 237. Paper, 65¢

HARTMANN, NICOLAI. *The New Ways of Ontology.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Dec., 1952. $4.00.

HASTINGS, JAMES (ed.). *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.* 7 vols. Popular ed.; New York, Chas. Scribner's Sons. Pp. 11,661. $85.00.

HAZELTON, ROGER. *On Proving God.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Aug., 1952. $2.50.

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH. *Hegel's Science of Logic.* Tr. from the German by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers. 2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. 494, 486. $6.50.

———. *History of Philosophy.* Tr. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson. 2 vols.; New York: Dover Pubns., 1952. $10.00.

HEISENBERG, WERNER. *Philosophic Problems in Nuclear Science.* New York: Pantheon Books; Aug., 1952. $2.75.

HEMPEL, CARL G. *Concept Formation in Empirical Science.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Sept., 1952. $2.00.

HEXTER, J. H. More's Utopia. *The Biography of an Idea.* "History of Ideas Series," No. 5; Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. xii + 171. $3.00.

This is a study of the development of *Utopia.* According to the author, the discourse of Hytholday together with some introductory matter was composed first, and the dialogue was composed later and inserted. The aim of the discourse is the defense of common property, not for its own sake, but as a means of controlling pride. The aim of the dialogue is to present the problem of the Christian humanist: Should he remain a private and free individual, or take a powerful position as court councilor, with its attendant moral and physical dangers?

The way in which the author establishes this thesis, and the way in which he disposes of minor problems (like that of the philosophy and religion of the Utopians), fit the quoted text and the historical facts with satisfying appropriateness. This volume will be read and treasured by scholars in philosophy, history, and literature.

HOARE, FREDERICK RUSSELL. *Eight Decisive Books of Antiquity.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1952. Pp. 258. $4.00.

Hobhouse Memorial Lectures, 1941-1950. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. $4.00.

HOENEN, PETER. *Reality and Judgment According to St. Thomas.* Tr. from the French by Henry F. Tiblier. Appendix by Charles Boyer. "Library of Living Catholic Thought"; Chicago, Henry Regnery Co. Pp. 359. $6.00.

HOLTON, G. J. *Introduction to Concepts and Theories in Physical Science.* Cambridge: Addison-Wesley; June, 1952.

HOPE, RICHARD. *Aristotle's Metaphysics.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1952. $4.50.

HUBBEN, WILLIAM. *Four Prophets of Our Destiny.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. $2.75.

HUSSERL, EDMUND. *Ideas.* Tr. from the German by W. R. Boyce Gibson. "Muirhead Library of Philosophers"; New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. 465. $4.50.

HYNDMAN, OLAN R. *The Origin of Life and the Evolution of Living Things.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. $8.75.

JAFFA, HARRY V. *Thomism and Aristotelianism. A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the* Nicomachean Ethics. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. viii + 230. $4.25.

This deeply thoughtful study springs from the insight that moral judgments, to be worthy of an intelligent man, must somehow be based on reality. The author realizes, moreover, that such a basis cannot be found by way of the natural and social sciences as they

are presently constituted. He does not want to use philosophy for this purpose, because many men must make sound moral judgments without the benefit of an explicit philosophy. He turns, therefore, to ordinary knowledge, purified by dialectical considerations. And for a guide for those who do not have the Christian theology available, he proposes the moral philosophy of Aristotle.

The author maintains that, whereas the moral philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is specifically a Christian ethics, that of Aristotle is based on considerations available to men at the level of moral excellence they have reached. He says that, whereas Aquinas holds out only one ideal, Aristotle holds out at least several: that of the ordinary citizen, that of the magnanimous man, that of the philosopher.

There are two difficulties with the author's presentation. On the one hand, he does not realize that St. Thomas uses a matter-form analysis of the interrelation of the virtues. On the other hand, the author seems to imply that the lower forms of virtue may be based on what is actually an error (though of course it is not known to be such at that stage). Hence, far from protecting an individual moral agent from totalitarianism, he absolutely subjects the ordinary citizen to the judgment (good or bad) of his political superiors.

JASPERS, KARL. *Existentialism and Humanism.* New York: Russell F. Moore Co.; May, 1952. $3.50.

JONES, AUSTIN DUNCAN. *Butler's Moral Philosophy.* Baltimore: Penguin Books; July, 1952. 65¢

JORDAN, E. *Theory of Legislation.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Sept., 1952. $7.00.

———. *Business Be Damned.* New York: Henry Schuman, 1952. Pp. xiv + 267. $4.00.

The author defines "business" as "the control of the processes of industry" (p. 2). He argues that this function is parasitic, irrational, and immoral; but he argues also that the average businessman does not recognize what he is doing and may even be a sensitive and moral man—outside of business. Business is not to be confused with industry nor with the corporation nor with capitalism; it is the control of all these for the private interest. The author proposes that the corporation be recognized as a public, moral agent and maintains that the corporation as a social and cultural institution can be made into an instrument of political and cultural advance. He opposes both individualism and communism, on the ground that both systems have an erroneous notion of property, value, and the good. He considers that the business function has invaded and corrupted politics, religion, law, and education.

Much of the author's criticism is telling. His positive solution, however, is based on a form of idealism. Hence, though he insists upon the objectivity of right and good, he leaves the impression that men need merely to think correctly about the nature of their common activity to remedy our present economic and social difficulties.

There is no index.

JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE. *The Ethics of Redistribution.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 100. $1.75.

KEYSER, CASSIUS JACKSON. *The Rational and the Superrational.* Collected Works, Vol. II; New York: Scripta Mathematica, 1952. Pp. viii + 259. $4.25.

This volume consists of essays of various lengths, most of which have been previously published. The two longest essays are "Science

and Religion" and "The New Infinite and the Old Theology." In them the author proposes a division of knowledge into three levels: the subrational (sensory), the rational, and the superrational. The proper field for a man is the rational, but he can gain some knowledge of the superrational (sometimes called the ideal) by a process of approaching a limit which is outside the process itself. Thus the author makes his distinction between science and theology. His distinction between science and religion is quite different, for he thinks that religion is purely an affair of the emotional life. These major essays, which are of considerable value and interest, have two presuppositions: the concept of religion already mentioned, and a Platonic conception of philosophy.

KIMPEL, BEN F. *Religious Faith, Language, and Knowledge (A Philosophical Preface to Theology).* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. x + 162. $2.75.

The author believes that modern theories of language are the source of much skepticism about the possibility and validity of religious knowledge. He tries to show that these theories are based on philosophical empiricism. His understanding of these theories does not seem to be technically accurate and complete, but it probably does correspond to the kind of popular and superficial idea that many nonphilosophical students are likely to have.

To show that theories of language and meaning need not exclude religious knowledge, the author maintains that all scientists and philosophers need to "believe" in the suitability of their method, in the existence of an object to be known, in the value of knowledge, and so forth. Hence, he argues, there is room also for "belief" in God. This argument, unfortunately, rests on an ambiguity in the term "belief" and consequently has no validity as it stands.

KLUBERTANZ, GEORGE P. *The Discursive Power. Sources and Doctrine of the* Vis Cogitativa *according to St. Thomas Aquinas.* Saint Louis: THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, 1952. Pp. viii + 353. Paper, $5.00.

This is a historical and textual study of the *vis cogitativa*, the properly human equivalent of the estimative power. The first part of the book is the historical investigation, beginning with the backgrounds of this doctrine in Aristotle, following the theories of psychological powers through the post-Aristotelians, and paying special attention to Jewish and Arabian philosophers and the early thirteenth-century writers. The second part is the textual investigation of St. Thomas's teaching, studying first the early writings of St. Thomas, then his Aristotelian Commentaries, and finally the *Summa Theologiae*. The third part then synopsizes the doctrine of St. Thomas from a systematic rather than a historical point of view and points out some relations between the Thomistic doctrine and present-day theories and recently discovered facts. The Appendices take up the doctrine of the *De Principio Individuationis* and give the original texts which are quoted in English in the main part of the book. There is an extensive bibliography (16 pages), and indices of proper names and subject matters.

KRAFT, VICTOR. *Vienna Circle.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1952. $3.75.

KRUSE, FREDERIK VINDING. *The Community of the Future.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. 830. $12.00.

LAPLACE, MARQUIS PIERRE SIMON DE. *A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities.* Tr. from the sixth French edition by Frederick Wilson Truscott and Frederick Lincoln Emory; introduction by E. T. Bell. New York:

Dover Pubns., 1951. Pp. viii + 196. $2.50; paper, $1.25.

In this essay the author says that he is giving a nonmathematical presentation of his theory of probabilities; in reality, as the author of the introduction indicates, he has avoided mathematical symbolism, but has expressed himself in the much more difficult medium of ordinary language. In the first part of the work (pp. 1-52), the theory itself is expounded; in the second part, it is applied to games of chance, natural philosophy (i.e., natural science), testimony, moral and political questions, and so forth. Even though the theory of probabilities has undergone changes since the eighteenth century, Laplace's original presentation remains a classic, valuable for students of the history of science and mathematics and for philosophers. Quite otherwise is the case with the second part of the work. Some of his remarks are worthwhile, being, as he himself says, "only common sense reduced to calculus" (p. 196). But in many others, the influence of the *simpliste* eighteenth-century rationalism is palpable.

LEE, CHARLES H. *Layman Looks at Philosophy, Natural Science and Divine Metaphysics.* New York, Philosophical Lib. $3.00.

LEEUW, J. J. VAN DER. *The Conquest of Illusion.* New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 239. $3.50.

LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON. *Theodicy.* Ed. by Austin Farrer. Tr. from the German by E. M. Huggard. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 448. $6.50.

LEYS, WAYNE R. *Ethics for Policy Decisions.* New York, Prentice-Hall. $4.75.

LINSKY, LEONARD (ed.). *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press; Sept., 1952. $3.50.

MACDONALD, JOHN. *Mind, School and Civilization. A Contribution to the Philosophy of Education.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. xi + 132. $3.00.

This essay discusses the aim and meaning of education, language, formal discipline, both intellectual and moral, material values, the values of art, scientific and philosophical values, general education in itself and in relation to vocational training, and ethical and religious values. The author intends to present a philosophy of education, which he says at times "strikes a distinctly conservative note" (p. vi). The author is convinced that there are values, especially moral and religious ones. Unfortunately, he does not go into his basic presuppositions, with the result that his presentation of these values is often obscure and confusing and is not likely to generate any intellectual convictions.

MACIVER, ROBERT MORRISON. *Democracy and the Economic Challenge.* "William W. Cook Foundation Lectures"; New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 88. $2.50.

MACPARTLAND, JOHN. *The March Toward Matter. Descensus Averno.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. 80. $2.75.

In a trenchant but highly sympathetic analysis the author studies modern thought. In his view, modern thought since Descartes has been engaged in a progressive materialization. By this the author means that modern conceptions of the human mind have increasingly assimilated it to the transient activity of material things. Thus, in place of the mind's natural tendency to union (to become the other), moderns have put the separative activity characteristic of transient, efficient causality. From this there results an alienation of man from the universe and from God, and of men from each other. In the prac-

tical order, this means frustration, conflict, and destruction. In his conclusion the author pleads for a reunion between the view of man presented by the perennial philosophy and the modern technical understanding of the material universe. He adds to this plea some examples of the kind of sympathetic understanding that will help to bring about such a reunion. The book is highly recommended to all who are interested in healing the schism in today's thought.

Maimonides: *The Guide of the Perplexed.* Tr. by Chaim Rabin. New York: Farrar; Aug., 1952. $4.50.

MARCEL, GABRIEL. *Homo Viator.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952. Pp. 270. $3.50.

———. *Man against Mass Society.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; spring, 1953.

———. *Metaphysical Journal.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Sept., 1952. $6.00.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *The Range of Reason.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Oct., 1952. $3.00.

MARX, KARL. *Theories of Surplus Value.* New York: International Publs. Co.; May, 1952. $4.25.

MARX, KARL, and ENGELS, FREDERICK. *Letters to Americans.* New York: International Publs. Co.; July, 1952. $3.50.

MAYER, FREDERICK, and ROSS, FLOYD H. *Ethics and the Modern World.* Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown & Co., 1952. Pp. 392. $4.00.

MAYO, BERNARD. *Logic of Personality.* New York: British Book Centre; July, 1952. $2.50.

MCCALL, RAYMOND J. *Basic Logic.* 3d ed.; New York: Barnes & Noble, 1952.

MCKEON, RICHARD. *Freedom and History.* New York: Noonday Press, 1952. $2.50.

MCPHERSON, WILLIAM. *Codetermination.* Urbana, Univ. of Illinois Press. Pp. 12.

MEAD, HUNTER. *An Introduction to Aesthetics.* New York: Ronald Press Co., 1952. Pp. 314. $4.00.

MEISEL, JAMES HANS. *The Genesis of Georges Sorel.* Ann Arbor, George Wahr Pub. Co. Pp. 320. $5.00.

MESSNER, J. *Ethics and Facts. The Puzzling Pattern of Human Existence.* Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952. Pp. v + 327. $4.00.

This book is a consideration of the ground of ethics. The author, a well-known writer in the field of social and political theory, considers that there are certain conflicts in and about man that lead him to doubt the validity of ethical precepts. These are centered about the sex impulse, the impulse toward happiness, toward liberty, the social impulse, and the cognitive impulse. In these five areas, the author examines human nature as revealed in them (the "facts"), as well as various theories and philosophies.

The book seems to be directly addressed to the educated public; it should also be very valuable as supplementary reading for ethics courses.

MEYER, R. W. *Leibnitz and the Seventeenth Century Revolution.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Nov., 1952. $5.00.

MOLINA, LUIS DE. *Extracts on Politics and Government, from Justice, Tract 2.* Tr. and ed. by George Albert Moore. Chevy Chase, Country Dollar Press. Pp. 107. $8.00.

MOORE, CHARLES ALEXANDER (ed.). *Essays in East-West Philosophy.* Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1951. Pp. 479. $5.00.

MOUNIER, EMANUEL. *Personalism.* Tr. from the French by Philip Mairet. New York: Grove Press, 1952. Pp. 152. $3.50.

MUMFORD, LEWIS. *Art and Technics.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. vii + 162. $2.50.

NEUGEBAUER, OTTO EDUARD. *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 200. $5.00.

NOCK, ALBERT J. *Our Enemy, the State.* Reprint; Caldwell, Id., Caxton Printers. Pp. 209. $2.50.

ONIANS, R. B. *The Origins of European Thought.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 548. $9.00.

OTIS, LOUIS-EUGENE. *La Doctrine de l'Évolution.* Montreal: Fides, 1950. Vol. I, pp. 211; Vol. II, pp. 263. Paper, $4.00.

The first volume presents a well-organized summary of the facts, theories, and hypotheses concerning evolution. The author also discusses the place of finality in the scientific explanation. The second volume begins with a study of the relation between science and the philosophy of nature, in which the author takes the point of view of Charles De Koninck, that science is the dialectical (that is, the uncertain or hypothetical) and detailed study of nature whereas philosophy is the certain but more general study of the same object. He then studies the general principles of causality in nature, with special attention to finality and equivocal causality. In a second part of this volume, the author presents the theological point of view on evolution.

This is an important book, particularly because it is one of the few treatments of equivocal causality to be found in recent Thomistic literature. Both volumes are well indexed.

PARMALEE, PRENTICE E. *Hunger and History.* Reprint of the Harper edition of 1939; Caldwell, Id.: Caxton Printers, 1951. Pp. 288. $5.00.

PARSONS, EDWARD ALEXANDER. *The Alexandrian Library, Glory of the Hellenic World.* Houston: Elsevier Press, 1952. Pp. 480. $7.50.

PASSMORE, JOHN ARTHUR. *Ralph Cudworth.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 130. $3.00.

PEIFER, JOHN FREDERICK. *The Concept in Thomism.* New York: Bookman Associates, 1952. Pp. 225. $4.00.

This is a study of the meaning of *concept* in Thomism and its function in the theory of knowledge. As his chief sources, the author uses St. Thomas, Cajetan, and John of St. Thomas. The author states his problem in contrast to the Cartesian and nonrealist traditions. Then he takes up the nature of knowledge in general, the impressed species and the problem of their origin, the formal concept (which the author says is identical with the mental word), and the objective concept. The study, which follows closely the tradition of the Commentators, is well documented. There are a bibliography and an index. The book is recommended for supplementary reading by students.

Philosophy of Albert Einstein, The. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. 2d ed., "Library of Living Philosophers"; New York: Tudor Pub. Co. Pp. 781. $6.00.

Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. 2d ed.; "Library of Living Philosophers"; New York: Tudor Pub. Co. Pp. 814. $6.00.

Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, The. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. 3d ed.; "Library of Living Philosophers"; New York: Tudor Pub. Co. Pp. 844. $6.00.

Philosophy of George Santayana, The. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. 2d ed.; "Library of Living Philosophers"; New York: Tudor Pub. Co. Pp. 722. $6.00.

Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, The. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. "Library of Living Philosophers"; New York, Tudor Pub. Co. In preparation.

Philosophy of John Dewey, The. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. 2d ed.; "Library of Living Philosophers"; New York: Tudor Pub. Co. Pp. 733. $6.00.

Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, The. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. "Library of Living Philosophers"; New York, Tudor Pub. Co. In preparation.

Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, The. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. "Library of Living Philosophers"; New York: Tudor Pub. Co., 1952. Pp. 897. $7.50.

PIERON, HENRI. *The Sensations.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; July, 1952. $6.00.

PLATO. *Gorgias.* Tr. with an introd. by W. C. Helmbold. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts"; New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952. Pp. x + 107. $1.75; paper, 65¢

Though this is one of the less important of the Platonic dialogues, it could be used with great profit as a starting-point of discussion in courses on ethics or political theory. Because the translation is smooth and almost conversational, it should be able to be used with profit and enjoyment even by those who have no training in technical philosophy. Inasmuch as its subject is rhetoric, the work could also be used profitably in literature courses. The introduction is brief but informative; there is aso a short bibliography. The publishers are to be congratulated in continuing to make such classics available at moderate prices.

———. *Socrates and the Soul of Man.* A new translation of the *Phaedo* by Desmond Stewart. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 130. $2.00.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXVI. Washington: American Catholic Philosophical Assoc., 1952. Pp. 232. Paper, $3.00.

The general theme of the 1952 meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association was "philosophy and experimental science." The four major papers given at the morning sessions were devoted to divisions of this topic. The first of these, by Dr. Vincent E. Smith, was entitled "Abstraction and the Experimental Method" and was a general introduction to the topic. Dr. Smith attempted to show that though the philosophy of nature and experimental science belonged to the same level of abstraction, they are specifically different because of their method. He argued that whereas philosophy moves from the more abstract to the less abstract, science moves in the opposite direction. Professor Karl F. Herzfeld, who spoke on philosophy and experimental physics, spent most of his time discussing the relation between theory and practice within science. The third of the major papers, by Lucian Dufault, O.M.I., dealt with the philosophical and biological implications of evolution. This paper seemed to argue not only to the compatibility of a Thomistic philosophy of nature and a scientific theory of evolution, but to something resembling a deduction of the latter from the former. The fourth paper, by Raymond J. McCall, investigated the possibility of communication between philosophers and psychologists. He divided each field of knowledge into several stages and urged that philosophers approach nonphilosophers, not at the level of deductive construction, but at the level of "elementary implication" and at the integrative level.

The annual association address, given by M. Etienne Gilson, was entitled "Science, Philosophy, and Religious Wisdom"; it offers, in the luminous and eloquent style that is characteristic of him, a deep insight into the proper relations and mutual complementarity of the three knowledges. The presidential address, delivered by the outgoing president, the Reverend Francis X. Meehan, described the difficulties of the philosopher in a scientific age. Several of the sectional papers also deal with isolated aspects of the general problem.

Quest for Utopia, The: An Anthology of Imaginary Societies. Ed. by Glenn Negley and J. Max Patrick. New York: Henry Schuman, 1952. Pp. 608. $6.75.

RADHAKRISHNAN, SARVEPALLI. *Radhakrishnan.* An Anthology. Ed. by A. N. Marlow. New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. 148. $2.25.

RADHAKRISHNAN, SARVEPALLI, and MUIRHEAD, JOHN HENRY (eds.). *Contemporary Indian Philosophy.* Rev. 2d ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. 648. $6.00.

Readings in Ethical Theory. Ed. by Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952. Pp. x + 707. $5.00.

A glance at the contents of this book shows that its scope is not as great as its title might indicate. The readings are almost entirely contemporary and largely devoted to illustrating the various schools within philosophical analysis (logical positivism). The introductory section is a selection from Bertrand Russell. The first chapter presents utilitarianism as a "sample ethical theory" from the writings of G. E. Moore. The second chapter discusses the naturalistic fallacy with selections by G. E. Moore, G. C. Field, W. K. Frankena, and A. C. Ewing. The third chapter takes up ethical intuitionism, from the writings of Sidgwick, Prichard, Ross, Ewing, and Strawson. The fourth chapter gives the naturalistic rejoinder, from Santayana, Dewey, Perry, Ross, White, Campbell, and Broad. The fifth chapter gives the emotive theory, from Barnes, Ayer, Ross, Carritt, Stevenson, and Moore. The sixth chapter takes up the psychology of conduct, from Moore, Broad, Prichard, Field, Falk, W. Sellars, and Aiken. The sixth chapter discusses moral freedom, guilt and responsibility, from Stout, Stevenson, Hospers, Lewis, and Paul. The last chapter deals with justification, from Campbell, Balfour, Williams, Feigl, and Kneale. There are five pages of added bibliography, which list ancient works all the way back to the nineteenth century and include some idealist and Kantian ethicians.

The book is a valuable source book; it should be in every library and available to all students of ethics. But any student who is misled into thinking that he knows ethics after reading this book has been cheated—not indeed by the publishers, who have provided a real bargain, but by his teachers. The advantage of being contemporary is too high a price to pay for being uneducated.

REINHARDT, KURT F. *The Existentialist Revolt. The Main Themes and Phases of Existentialism.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1952. Pp. vii + 254. $3.50.

This is a study of the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers, and Marcel. The author holds that the existentialists, in stressing human existence and human freedom, bring into much-needed focus some important points. He sees existentialism as a revolt against rationalism, idealism, the atomization of life, and the loss of personality in totalitarian anonymity. In his final chapter he sums up the main themes of existentialism under the headings of subjective truth, estrangement,

existence and nothingness, anguish, the situation, temporality, death, and God.

A bibliography and an index are added.

RICARDO, DAVID. *The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo.* Ed. by Piero Sraffa and M. H. Dobb. Vol. V, *Speeches and Evidence.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 568. $4.75.

ROUSSE, THOMAS A. *Political Ethics and the Voter.* New York: H. W. Wilson, 1952. Pp. 18. $1.75.

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. *Of God, the Devil and the Jews.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. 186. $3.00.

This is a collection of thirty-four essays of very uneven value. In some of the essays against racial discrimination, there is a lofty moral tone and a real eloquence. In the philosophical and religious essays, which express a kind of Spinozistic rationalism, the tone is sometimes petulant and the argumentation usually uncertain. In a few of the essays in which the author attacks certain ascetical practices which he dislikes, he descends to vulgarity and name-calling.

RYAN, JOHN K. (ed.). *Philosophical Studies in Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, O.P.* Westminster, Md.: Newman Press; June, 1952. $5.00.

SARTON, GEORGE. *A History of Science: Ancient Science through the Golden Age of Greece.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Nov., 1952. $10.00.

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SHIRK, EVELYN URBAN. *Adventurous Idealism: the Philosophy of Alfred H. Lloyd.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; July, 1952. $4.50.

SISTER TERESIA RENATA DE SPIRITU SANCTO. *Edith Stein.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1952. $3.25.

SMALLEY, BERYL. *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages.* 2d ed. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. xxii + 406. $7.50.

The first edition of this work in 1940 was hailed as an exact and careful history of Bible study from the Carolingian revival to 1300 A.D. Because of the central importance of the Bible in all areas of medieval life, the light cast on medieval thought and life by Miss Smalley has been greatly appreciated by historians, theologians, philosophers, and literary men.

The revision includes recent studies by the author herself as well as by many others. The introductory chapter has been enlarged; the chapter on the friars has been rearranged and expanded; the conclusions, the author tells us, have been entirely rewritten. The value of the revision has been increased by a detailed index.

SPRIGGE, CECIL JACKSON SQUIRE. *Benedetto Croce, Man and Thinker.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 64. $2.50.

STACE, WALTER TERENCE. *The Gate of Silence.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 50. $1.75.

———. *Time and Eternity.* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 176. $3.00.

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———. *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes.* Tr. from the German by Elsa M. Sinclair. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 192. $4.00.

Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Ed. by Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1952. $2.00.

SULLIVAN, ROBERT PATRICK, O.P. *The Thomistic Concept of the Natural Necessitation of the Human Will.* River Forest, Ill.: Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy, 1952. Pp. 120. Paper.

This dissertation has already appeared as an article in the *Thomist* (July, 1951). In three chapters, it deals with the existence and extent of natural necessitation and the nature of the natural appetite of the human will. In general, it is a brief but accurate presentation of the Thomistic position, as understood in the light of the Commentators. It should be useful as supplementary reading for the student. There is a brief bibliography but no index.

SULLIVAN, SISTER HELEN. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Natural and Mathematical Sciences.* New York: Vantage Press, 1952. Pp. 209. $3.75.

SUZUKI, DAISETZ TEITARO. *Essays in Zen Buddhism.* 2d series; Boston: Beacon Press. Pp. 348. $3.75.

THAYER, H. S. *The Logic of Pragmatism.* New York, Humanities Press. Pp. 222. $4.00.

Theology and Evolution. Ed. by E. C. Messenger. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, [n.d.]. Pp. 337.

This book consists of two parts. The first presents various reviews of the editor's earlier *Evolution and Theology*, together with his rejoinders. In this part, the most valuable contribution is that by A. Brisbois, S.J., called "Transformism and Philosophy" (pp. 109-47). Though this review does not solve the problems raised, it at least has the merit of seeing where the philosophical problems lie and pinpointing them in an unmistakable fashion. Strangely, the editor does not see them as problems. In the second part, the editor presents a study of animation theories, in which he holds that the rational soul is created not before several weeks after conception. The author makes an interesting point, "supporting" it with a discussion of human embryology, and various irrelevant statements that the human soul is a formal, not an efficient cause.

One objection, which the author has apparently never thought of, is very damaging. The observable development of the higher primates parallels that of the human body. But it is impossible that the final specific form arise any later than the moment of conception in the case of primates (unless we were to dream that such a soul were created). If the single-celled embryo of a primate must be an animal with a very high level of sensitive life, then the single-celled embryo of a human being is also informed by a rational soul.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *On Man.* "Great Books Series"; Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951. Pp. 121. Paper, 80¢

———. *On the Power of God.* Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952. $6.50.

This book is a reprint in one volume of the three-volume English Dominican translation of the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei.* The original page numbering is retained as well as Father Gilbey's introduction to Volume I. The introduction to Volume III has been omitted, probably because it repeated, though in more detail, the content of the last sentence of the introduction to Volume I: namely, that the English Dominican translation of the *De Potentia*, the

Summa Theologica, and the *Summa contra Gentiles* has been the work of one man, Father Lawrence Shapcote, O.P.

Beginning students of St. Thomas may need to be reminded that the listing of "Second Book" and "Third Book" on the title sheets refers not to any division of the Latin text, but merely to the divisions imposed by the publisher of the English Dominican translation (Burns Oates & Washbourne) in 1932-34.

Since 1949 we have had a new Latin edition of the *De Potentia* (in Volume II of the two-volume Marietti edition of the *Quaestiones Disputatae*), but the English translation has been out of print and unobtainable for several years. Although the Newman Press edition includes no revisions of the translation and no comments on recent studies of the *Disputed Questions*, students will be glad that a reprint of the Shapcote translation of the *De Potentia* is again available.

[B. H. Zedler]

———. *Political Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Ed. by Dino Bigongiari. New York: Hafner Pub. Co.; Sept., 1952. $3.00.

THOMPSON, LAWRENCE. *Melville's Quarrel with God.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Oct., 1952. Pp. 475. $6.00.

TOMLIN, ERIC WALTER FREDERICK. *The Great Philosophers of the Western World.* New York: A. A. Wyn, 1952. Pp. 295. $3.00.

Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I. New Orleans: Tulane Univ. Bookstore, 1952. Pp. 112. Paper, $2.00.

This is a collection of the following essays: "Introduction," by T. V. Smith; "Reason and Convention," by Edward G. Ballard; "Universality and Meaning," by Richard L. Barber; "Propositions and Facts," by James K. Feibleman; "Philosophy—Mid-Century," by Carl H. Hamburg; "A Criticism of the Marxian Interpretation of History," by Harold N. Lee; and "Formalism of Terminist Logic in the Fourteenth Century," by Louise Nisbet. If future numbers of these *Studies* maintain the high level of philosophical competence shown here, the series will be of great value to students. The essays by Professors Barber and Nisbet should be mentioned with special commendation.

VANDERVELDT, JAMES H., O.F.M., and ODENWALD, ROBERT P. *Psychiatry and Catholicism.* Foreword by Most Reverend Patrick A. O'Boyle. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952. Pp. ix + 433. $6.00.

The first thirteen chapters of this book treat of the problems that arise in the contact between philosophy (especially ethics), the Catholic religion, and psychiatry. The rest of the book is an introduction to various psychiatric concepts, classifications of diseases, therapeutic methods, and so forth. The book begins with a consideration of the philosophical concept of personality. But the major preoccupation of the authors is ethical and religious. The extremely difficult problem of the relation between the theories of scientific psychology and philosophical psychology is scarcely touched. This is a major disappointment. Nondirective counseling is given short shrift. Of all the types of analytic psychology, the authors prefer "existential analysis," though not without some reservations. More reservations might well have been in order.

VAN MELSEN, ANDREW G. *From Atomos to Atom: the History of the Concept* Atom. Tr. by Henry J. Koren, C.S.Sp. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. xii + 240. $4.25.

This study of the history of the concept of "smallest parts" is a very important one. In itself the concept is basic for much of modern science. In the form it takes in the modern atomic theory, it is not

as such a philosophical concept. Yet it has and must have some relations with philosophy. The author shows that historically the concept of "smallest parts" was connected with several different philosophies.

In studying the origin and development of the concept of "smallest parts" the author often refers to the relationship of philosophy and science. In part, he is studying a particularly crucial instance of that relationship. Both philosophers and scientists should profit from reading this work.

There are a bibliography and an index.

VEATCH, HENRY B. *Intentional Logic.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. xxi + 440. $6.00.

Against a common view that logical objects are to be considered in themselves, the author holds that the logical consideration of knowledge must consider it as knowledge *of something.* This characteristic the author calls "intentionality." The author first presents the idea of an intentional logic and then contrasts it with the nonintentional mathematical logic. In the second part he considers the concept, proposition, and argument, presenting and criticising the intentional and nonintentional accounts of these divisions of knowledge.

There is an analytical table of contents and a detailed index.

VON HILDEBRAND, DIETRICH. *Christian Ethics.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Oct., 1952. Pp. 484. $5.00.

VON WEIZSÄCKER, C. F. *The World View of Physics.* Tr. by Marjorie Grene. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 219. $3.75.

In this book an eminent scientist and philosopher gives an interpretation of modern science, especially of physics. He begins by placing the problem of interpretation, relating it to the concepts of "wholeness" and "perceptibility." In this light he studies the atomic theory and the law of the conservation of energy. Chapters four to six are the most directly philosophical parts of the book. According to the author, the Kantian a priori expresses the necessary foundation for quantum mechanics. But that is not all. In discussing the infinity of the world and the modern understanding of the laws of nature, the author shows how the methodological simplifications of science have left areas of experience and reality out of consideration. This methodological purification of science has not destroyed these areas, even if many persons ignore them at the present.

In his last chapter on the experiment, the author shows how the experiment begins to involve moral values and how these values increase as the object of the experiment is a living thing or a human being. He also points out that the moral value does not result from the experiment and that it does not impose itself with physical necessity. With that statement of the problem the author ends this serious and important study.

WARD, LEO R., C.S.C. *Christian Ethics. An Introduction for College Students.* Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952. Pp. 298. $4.00.

This book aims "to combine a study of the moral order with a study of cases" (Preface). The first part, usually called general ethics, is somewhat lacking in depth and clarity of expression. The second part, usually called special ethics, is filled with concrete applications and may be of use to a teacher for its examples or as a supplementary text to enrich other, more abstract texts. There may also be situations where this book will be a satisfactory text.

WIENER, PHILIP P., and YOUNG, FREDERIC H. (eds.). *Studies in the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1952. $5.00.

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A New Approach to Metaphysical Language

ST. THOMAS and the EXISTENCE OF GOD

Three Interpretations

by William Bryar

The ambiguity and diversity of recent learned controversy in America and Europe has complicated the interpretation of St. Thomas on the existence of God. The analytic techniques and the work of logical reconstruction by philosophers of language and science suggest a primary method for clarifying this situation. William Bryar's new study, ST. THOMAS AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, is the first systematic attempt to apply the methods of contemporary philosophy in interpreting the Thomistic proofs.

As a preliminary step in this direction, Bryar has included some results of a formal analysis of the vocabulary and devices in the *Summa* on the existence and attributes of God, and the joining of parallel passages in Aristotle, St. Thomas, the commentators and critics. He also examines the formulae of Salamucha and Bochenski rendering St. Thomas in mathematical logic. Separate discussions of contemporary studies directly related to St. Thomas in this area are included, as well.

The first proof from motion for the existence of God is given an orderly pluralistic interpretation. The elaboration of the framework for pluralistic interpretation required facing in some measure the problem of scientific scholarship itself as well as the problem of understanding St. Thomas. The book derives the language of St. Thomas on God from an implicit conception of transcendental terms, and Bryar relates these to certain empirical foundations. The corollary placing and relating of his various sublanguages is the step intermediate to interpretation.

Bryar's orderly assembling of the various methods of clarification in respect to one cardinal topic affords a view of the broadness and depth of the basic philosophical issues. These issues separate St. Thomas as a whole from other thinkers and determine his language and methods in varied beginnings in logic, psychology, and metaphysics.

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